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CICLOPs Volume 1 
The Bernstein Memorial Lecture 
The First Six Years 
 CICLOPs,  the  Center  for  International  &  Comparative  Law  Occasional Papers, could not be launched with a better issue than one dedicated to Duke  Law's  named  lecture  series  in  the  field,  the  Annual  Herbert  L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law.    Herbert Bernstein was Duke's much‐beloved professor of compara‐tive law. His early life is warmly described in a meticulously researched article by my colleague and friend Paul Haagen, published  in a special issue  of  the Duke  Journal  of  Comparative  &  International  Law  (2003) that  was  dedicated  to  Prof.  Bernstein's  memory  and  is  available  at www.law.duke.edu/bernsteinlecture/.  The  lecture  series,  established in  Prof.  Bernstein’s  honor  after  his  sudden  death  in  2001,  has  drawn leading scholars from all around the world to speak at Duke Law School on comparative law. This first issue of CICLOPs contains the text of the first six  lectures, some of  them previously published  in hard‐to‐access venues and  some not  at  all. As  such,  it  serves as  a  tribute not only  to Herbert Bernstein, but also to Duke Law's vibrant and active compara‐tive  law  community,  which  encompasses  both  numerous  faculty members and also students pursuing Duke's JD/LLM degree in interna‐tional and comparative law as well as other student groups.   The  issue contains all  lectures  in the order  in which they were de‐livered.  The  inaugural  Bernstein  lecture  was  given  in  2002  by  Hein Kötz,  former director of  the Max Planck  Institute  for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, perhaps the  leading  institution worldwide  in  its  field  [Civil  Justice  Systems  in  Europe  and  the  United 
States, pp. 1–16]. Hein Kötz takes on a pet theme of comparative law—the  comparison  of  German  and  U.S.  principles  of  civil  procedure—     and brings,  in his hallmark elegant style not  just a  lucid assessment of the  debate  but  also  a  number  of  useful  insights.  Perhaps  the  most       important among these  is one based  in Kötz's  long‐standing emphasis on  functional  equivalence:  Comparatists,  in  comparing  German  and  U.S.  court  rules,  are  dealing  with  nonequivalent  things:  U.S.  rules  are made with  big  cases  in  mind,  for  which  German  civil  procedure may 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be  inadequate.  German  rules  by  contrast  are  made  for  small  cases, which  in  the  U.S.  would  be  dealt  with  not  in  ordinary  courts  but  in  small  claims  courts,  with  rules  not  so  dissimilar  to  those  in  German  civil procedure.   Christian  Joerges,  then  of  the  European  University  Institute  in   Florence and now again a professor at Bremen University, gave the next lecture  in  2003  [Europeanization  as  Process:  Thoughts  on  the  Europe­
anization  of  Private  Law,  pp.  17–40].  Prof.  Joerges  suggests  an  ambi‐tious reconceptualization for private law in Europe, combining insights from European  law,  comparative  law, and private  international  law or conflict of  laws,  in  the  tradition of Brainerd Currie,  a  leading  figure of U.S.  conflict  of  laws  and  a  former  Duke  Law  professor.  A  much‐extended version of this lecture has been published by the Duke Journal of  Comparative &  International  Law and  is widely  cited.  In  this  issue, we republish a text that resembles more closely the original lecture as it was presented.   For  the  third  Bernstein  Lecture  in  2004, we  took  our  focus  away from European law schools but not necessarily from Europe itself. The speaker was Chibli Mallat, a  Jean Monnet Professor of Law at  the Uni‐versity  of  St  Joseph  in  Beirut,  former  candidate  for  the  Lebanese presidency,  now  a  professor  at  Utah  Law  School,  and  perhaps  the world's  leading expert on what he calls Middle Eastern Law  [Constitu­
tions  for  the  Twenty­First  Century,  Emerging  Patterns:  The  EU,  Iraq, 
Afghanistan…, pp. 41–62]. Prof. Mallat provides a fascinating comparison of new constitutions  in the 21st  century  that may at  first  sight  look  in‐comparable, namely those of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the European Union. He not only shows how comparison between them can provide exciting insights  but  also  provides  comparative  constitutional  law  with  mile‐posts, simplifiers, acid tests as tools, and with an outlook on emerging patterns that are valuable beyond just his own analysis.   The fourth Bernstein Lecture,  in 2005, was given, perhaps untypi‐cally,  by  a  U.S.  scholar,  but  one  of  unusually  broad  and  cosmopolitan erudition—Richard  Buxbaum  from  Berkeley  [Comparative  Law  as  a 
Bridge Between  the Nation­State and  the  Global Economy: an Essay  for 
Herbert Bernstein, pp. 63–78]. Prof. Buxbaum offers nothing less than a reconceptualization of the field of comparative law itself, away from its focus on disinterested comparison between national legal systems, and towards  acknowledgement  of  both  the  supranational  nature  of  much contemporary law and a new emphasis on economic, as opposed to pri‐vate or public,  law. The  lecture has not  previously  been published,  so we are especially grateful to Prof. Buxbaum for updating it for publica‐tion in this issue and are sure that the comparative law community will join in these thanks. 
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 In 2006, Duke Law was fortunate that Zhu Suli accepted the Dean's invitation  to  speak  [Political  Parties  in  China's  Judiciary,  pp.  79–110]. Prof. Zhu  is Dean of Peking University Law School, China's most highly regarded law school, and a scholar of unusually extensive interest and expertise not only in Chinese but also  in U.S. law and legal philosophy. His  lecture  begins  as  a  response  to  a  review  of  one  of  his  books  but soon turns into a fascinating suggestion that Western notions of judicial independence  are  inadequate  for  an  analysis  or  even  critique  of  Chi‐nese  law. Provocative  for  a Western audience,  the  lecture highlights  a core theme  in modern comparative  law: the  contingency and frequent Western bias of many of our frames of reference, and the difficulty (and promises)  of  intercultural  comparison  and  critique.  Jonathan  Ocko,  a professor of history at North Carolina State University and an adjunct professor at Duke Law School, adds an immensely helpful introduction.   Finally, 2007 saw a lecture by a close friend and collaborator of the late Prof. Bernstein: Joseph Lookofsky, an American graduate from New York University Law School who is now a professor at the University of Copenhagen  [Desperately  Seeking  Subsidiarity:  Danish  Private  Law  in 
the  Scandinavian,  European,  and  Global  Context,  pp.  111–130].  Prof. Lookofsky provides an insight into Danish legal culture, but not as mere illustration. Rather, he views that culture as endangered by the Europe‐anization  of  law,  and  his  view  on  that  Europeanization  from  the perspective of a small country with a very peculiar identity, both national and Scandinavian, greatly enriches our standard pictures of Europe.   Viewed together, these lectures provide a glimpse of the richness of comparative  law  today  and  prove  the  high  value  that  the  field  has  at Duke. The six authors came from universities in six different countries, and where a  topic  occurs  in more  than one  lecture—the constitution‐alization of European  law for example, or the direction of comparative law as a field—their views often differ. The variety of perspectives and viewpoints among these articles reflects quite effectively what may be the best of comparative law today. As compared to the lone perspective available to the mythological Cyclops, this variety bodes well for the fu‐ture of CICLOPs.   In finishing, I thank Stephen Bornick, Associate Director of the Cen‐ter  for  International &  Comparative  Law,  and  Jonathan White,  a  first‐year student in Duke's JD/LLM program, for their editorial work on the individual  papers.  Susan  Manning  and  Melinda  Vaughn  from  Duke Law’s communication department  formatted  the papers;  I  am grateful to them as well. I thank Neylân Gürel, program coordinator at the Cen‐ter, for her work and her contributions, including especially the design of the CICLOPs cover. 
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Civil Justice Systems in Europe 
and the United States* 
 
Hein Kötz**  I. INTRODUCTION Allow me first to say what an honor it is to be invited to present Duke’s first Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture. Herbert’s death at the Law School a little more  than  a year ago was  a  great  shock  not only  to  the Duke  Law School community but also to the many friends he had in Germany. I knew him for nearly 40 years, and I am very grateful indeed for this opportunity to pay tribute to him and his contribution to the law and legal education. When Dean Bartlett agreed to the topic of my lecture she must have realised  that  letting  a  foreign  lawyer  touch  upon  American  civil procedure would be a hazardous affair. Not only is a foreign lawyer who ventures into this field bound sooner or later to fall into error, but also he will expect you to forgive him and kindly put him right when he does so. Not  only  is  he apt  to  rush  in where  local  angels  fear  to  tread,  but  also courtesy may require you to call his views original and refreshing when they  are  heretical  or  bizarre.  There  is  one  countervailing  argument supporting the choice of my subject, however, and that is that it was very dear  to Herbert’s heart.  He  and  I  discussed    it  on many occasions,  and while we  both  felt  that  comparing  the machinery  of  civil  justice  in  the common  law  and  the  civil  law was  a most  challenging  and  interesting undertaking, we  also  agreed  that  it was  a  subject  fraught with  greater risks of  fundamental misunderstanding of  foreign law than those which beset the comparative endeavours in substantive law.1 
 
* First Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke 
University School of Law, Sept. 10, 2002. Reprinted with permission from The Duke Journal 
of Comparative and International Law: CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED 
STATES, 13 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2003).  
** Emeritus Director, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, 
former president of the Bucerius Law School. Professor Kötz delivered the inaugural Herbert 
L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture on September 10, 2002, at Duke University School of Law. A 
friend and colleague of Professor Bernstein, Professor Kötz is co-author of Konrad Zweigert 
& Hein Kötz, Introduction To Comparative Law (3rd ed. transl. Tony Weir 1998).  
1.  Herbert L. Bernstein, Whose Advantage After All?: A Comment on the Comparison 
of Civil Justice Systems, 21 U. Cal. Davis 587 (1988). 
Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe, 1 Duke L. CICLOPs 1 (2009) 
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Our shared  interest  in the comparison of civil  justice systems goes back to the early 1960s when both Herbert and I were graduate students at  the University of Michigan  Law  School.  All  graduate  students with a European  Law  background  were  given  an  introductory  course  on American Law. Procedure was an  important  subject of  this  course,  and adversariness was held up to us as the hallmark of the American proce‐dural  system.  The  introductory  course  itself  followed  the  adversary model  in that we were asked to read Roscoe Pound’s celebrated article, “Causes  of  Popular  Dissatisfaction  with  the  Administration  of  Justice,” with its sharp attack on the excesses of the adversary system.2 We were told  that  Jerome  Frank  had  described  the  American  mode  of  trials  as being based on what he  called  the  “fight theory”,  a  theory which  in his view  “derives  from  the origin of  trials  as  substitutes  for private out‐of‐court brawls” and “frequently…blocks the uncovering of vital evidence or leads to a presentation of vital testimony in a way that distorts it.”3 At the time,  however,  this  had  no  great  impact  on  us. We were  enthralled  to watch  lawyer‐dominated  civil  and  criminal  trials  at  the  Ann  Arbour Circuit  Court  on  closed‐circuit  television  in  a  viewing  room  at  the  law school. We  also  enjoyed  the moot  court  cases with  their  colourful  and dramatic  confrontation  between  partisan  student  advocates,  and  any lingering doubts about the attractions of adversariness were dispelled by reading  Earl  Stanley  Gardner,  Raymond  Chandler  and  Robert  Traver’s novel entitled Anatomy of a Murder.4 For  those  of  us  who  remained  in  contact  with  American  law, however, a gradual process of disenchantment set in. Like most readers of Robert Traver’s novel we were delighted by the defendant’s acquittal on the basis of a successful plea of impaired mental capacity. But the not‐guilty verdict was based on facts supplied by the defendant only after his lawyer had impressed upon him what type of fact would constitute that defence. Can it be right to allow or even require a lawyer to arm his client for effective perjury? There were other questions we asked. It is all very well to say that cross‐examination is, in the words of John Wigmore, “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth” and that it is a most effective weapon to test dishonest witnesses and ferret out the truth.5 But isn’t it a weapon equally lethal to heroes and villains? There is no doubt that all procedural systems aim at an intelligent inquiry into all 
 
 2. Roscoe Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
40 Am. L. Rev. 729 (1906). 
 3. See Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality, in American Justice 80–90 
(1949). 
 4. Robert Traver, Anatomy of a Murder (1958). 
 5. John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1387, at 29 (3d ed. 1940). 
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the practically available evidence in order to ascertain, as near as may be, the  truth  about  the  facts.  But  suppose  a  businessman  were  to  decide whether  or  not  to  build  a  new  plant:  Would  he  think  of  obtaining  the needed  information  by  subjecting  his  informants  to  the  experience  of standing as a witness at a common law trial? Is there no more businesslike method to unearth the relevant facts? II. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN GERMANY It  is  indeed a routine business meeting an American  lawyer will believe he  is attending when he  is  led  into a German courtroom.6 What  is most likely  to  strike  him  is  the  fact  that  mainly  the  court  conducts  the interrogation of witnesses.7  It  is  the court that will ask  for the witness’s name, age, occupation, and residence.8 It is the court that will then invite the witness to narrate, without undue interruption, what he knows about the matter on which he has been called. After the witness has given his story  in his or her own words  the court will  ask questions designed  to test, clarify, and amplify it. It is then the turn of counsel for the parties to formulate pertinent questions. But in an ordinary case there is relatively little  questioning  by  counsel  for  the  parties,  at  least  by  common  law standards. One  reason  is  that  the  judge will normally have  covered  the ground. Another reason is that for counsel to examine at length after the court  seemingly  has  exhausted  the witness might  appear  to  imply  that the court does not know its business, which is a dubious tactic. There is no cross‐examination in the sense of the common law, nor is there a full stenographic  transcript  of  the  testimony.  Instead,  the  judge  himself pauses  from time to time to dictate a summary of what the witness has said so far.9 At the close of testimony the clerk will read back the dictated summary  in  full,  and  either  witness  or  counsel  may  suggest  improve‐
 
 6. For more detailed information in English on the German civil justice system, see the 
seminal study by Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of 
German Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1443 (1958), now over 40 years 
old but fundamentally accurate. Comparative articles based on this study are Benjamin 
Kaplan, Civil Procedure – Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 409 
(1960); William B. Fisch, Recent Developments in West German Civil Procedure, 6 Hastings 
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 221 (1983); Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on 
First Instance Civil Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal 
Rules, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 609 (1988). See also David J. Gerber, Extraterritorial 
Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 745, 748–69 (1986). 
 7. Michael Bohlander, The German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View of German 
Civil Procedure in The Nineties, 13 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 25, 43 (1998). 
 8. Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1234–35. 
 9. John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 
828 (1985) [hereinafter German Advantage]. 
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ments  in  the  wording.  If  the  exact  phrasing  of  a  particular  part  of  the testimony is believed to be of critical importance, counsel may insist on having it set down verbatim in the minutes. A similar system is used with respect to expert witnesses. Suppose a case  requires  an  expert’s  evidence,  for  example  an  action  for  damages brought  by  a  patient  against  his  physician  on  the  ground  of  the defendant’s failure to use ordinary care in his treatment. In Germany, as indeed  in  most  Continental  countries,  the  expert  will  be  selected  and appointed by the court after consultation with the parties.10 It is the court that will conduct his examination, and it is the court that will advance the expert’s fees eventually to be borne by the losing party.11 In the common law it is up to the parties, or rather their lawyers, to find suitable experts who  will  then  be  examined  and  cross‐examined  in  the  same  way  as ordinary witnesses.  I  have  served  both  as  a  court‐appointed  expert  on foreign  law  in  cases  pending  before  a  German  court,  and  as  party‐selected expert witness on German law in litigation before the High Court in  London,  and  I  assure  you  that  there  are  substantial  differences between the two roles. As a court‐appointed expert you are an ally and partner  of  the  court.  You  assist  the  court  to  the  best of  your  ability  in reaching a correct result, and it is with the court that your duty of loyalty lies. What struck me most in my role as party‐selected expert witness in the English  cases was not  the experience of being examined and cross‐examined, but  the difficulty to  resist  the subtle temptation  to  join your client’s team, to take your client’s side, to conceal doubts, to overstate the strong and  downplay  the weak  aspects  of his  case  and  to  dampen  any scruples you might have by  reminding yourself  that  the other side will select  and  instruct  another expert witness and  that, when  the dust has settled, the truth will triumph. The examination of witnesses  in  the Continental  style may not be free from certain risks. One might say, for example, that the technique of inviting the witness to tell his story in narrative form and without undue interruption  provides  an  incentive,  in  the  interest  of  presenting  a conclusive, logically coherent, and convincing story, to fill in gaps by half‐truths or fiction. There is also a danger that the judge, in acting as chief‐examiner of the witnesses, may sooner or later appear to favour one side over the other. By putting questions to the witness, in the words of Lord Denning, he “drops the mantle of the judge, and assumes the robe of an 
 
 10. Id. at 835–41. 
 11. For a detailed and accurate description of the process of selecting, instructing and 
examining experts in Germany, see id. Much of what follows on the characteristic features of 
German civil procedure is based on this brilliant article. See also Bohlander, supra note 7, at 
41–43. 
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5 
advocate.”12  In  general,  however,  a  competent  judge  in  questioning witnesses knows how to play his cards close to his chest.  If he pursued one line of questioning with undue vigour or in some other way revealed his evaluation of the testimony this would at any rate have no influence on a jury as the sole trier of facts because there are no civil juries on the Continent, nor any even in the United Kingdom. As to counsel, they may ask  follow‐up  questions  as  an  antidote  against  unfair  or  incompetent questioning by the judge.13 On the other hand, under the Continental system there is no need, as in common law jurisdictions, to prepare the prospective witness for counsel’s  questions  during  the  examination‐in‐chief  and  cross‐examination.14  Consequently,  the  “coaching”  or  “sandpapering”  of witnesses  is not  a problem.  Indeed, German  lawyers will  generally  be reluctant  to engage  in extensive out‐of‐court  contact with prospective witnesses.15 A canon of professional ethics promulgated by the German Bar  Association  in  1973  provided  that  out‐of‐court  contact  with witnesses was advisable only when special circumstances justified it and was at  any  rate  limited  to  clarifying what  the witness would be able  to say.16 This rule was dropped when new provisions on professional ethics were enacted  in 1996, probably because there  seemed no need  for  it.17 After all, it is fairly clear to an attorney that the judge would take a dim view of the reliability of a witness who previously had been closeted for long periods with counsel. Civil  procedure  in  Germany  and  in  other  civil  law  jurisdictions differs  from  the American  system by making  the  judge  responsible  for the selection of expert witnesses, for the examination‐in‐chief of both fact 
 
 12. Jones v. National Coal Board, [1957] 2 Q.B. 55, 63. 
 13. Bohlander, supra note 7, at 43. 
 14. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 835–37. 
 15. Kaplan, von Mehren, Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1200–01. 
 16. Section 6, entitled Questioning and Advising of Witnesses, provides as follows: (1) 
The lawyer may question persons out of court who might be considered witnesses if this is 
necessary with a view to the obligation to provide for clarification of facts, advice or 
representation. (2) The lawyer may inform these persons as regards their rights and duties as 
well as give advice to them. (3) The lawyer is allowed to establish a record of such 
questioning and to have the person sign a declaration. Such a record may be used by the 
lawyer in order to confront the witness with these statements in a judicial or administrative 
proceeding. However, the lawyer may present the record itself only in exceptional cases to 
the court or the administrative agency, for example, in those cases where the witness is 
unable to testify in the pre-trial discovery stage or during the proceedings. [. . .] (5) In any 
event, the appearance of undue influence is to be avoided. Grundsaetze Des Anwaltlichen 
Standesrechts, Hrichtlinien Gemaess § 177 Absatz 2 Nr. 2 Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung 
(Brao). 
 17. See new provisions of Brao available at http://jurcom5juris.de/bundsrecht/ 
brao/index.html. 
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and  expert  witnesses,  and  for  creating  the  record  based  on  those examinations.18  The  judge’s  conspicuous  role  in  the  actual  taking  of evidence, especially in the taking of witness testimony, has led common lawyers  to  label  Continental  civil  procedure  as  “inquisitorial”  or  “non‐adversarial”.  This  is  misleading  because  it  conjures  up  the  Spanish Inquisition, Kafka’s Castle, and bureaucratic omnipotence and has indeed led an English judge to say, in comparing English and Continental proce‐dure,  that  “our  national  experience  found  that  justice  is more  likely  to ensue  from  adversary  than  from  inquisitorial  procedures  –  Inquisition and  Star  Chamber  were  decisive,  and  knowledge  of  recent  totalitarian methods has merely  rammed the  lesson home.”19  In my view, however, this  is  not  only  misleading,  but  also  downright  wrong.  All  arguments generally praising  the virtues of  the adversarial system of  the  common law  and  contrasting  them  with  the  vices  of  the  inquisitorial  system ascribed to the civil law are misguided and, in Herbert Bernstein’s words, “cannot  advance,  even  by  an  inch,  the  comparative  analysis of  German and American civil procedure.”20 The truth is that both in the American and Continental civil justice systems,  the power  to establish  the  facts on which the  judicial decision rests  is reserved to the decision‐makers, whether the trial  judge or  jury in the United States, or the court on the Continent.21 On the other hand, it is in both systems exclusively for the parties and their lawyers to identify the  facts  they  think  will  support  the  claim  or  defence,  to  make  the appropriate  factual  allegations,  and  to  nominate  the witnesses  and  the facts of which they allegedly have knowledge. In the United States, just as on  the Continent,  the  civil  courts must work with what  they are given, and  they  must  establish  the  factual  basis  of  their  judgments  from  the materials the parties supply, and no others. Facts not in dispute between the parties  are  beyond  judicial  scrutiny,  nor  can  the  judge  do  anything about a  fact alleged by one party and not specifically challenged by the opponent. He must take that fact as established and if he believes that the facts presented by the parties are not true he has no power to unearth what he thinks might be the truth by introducing independent evidence. True,  this does  not  apply  to  criminal  procedure.  In  a  criminal  case  the Continental  judge  may  disregard  the  defendant’s  guilty  plea  or  a confession or admission and introduce  independent evidence,  including witness  testimony,  to  determine  what  is  called  the  “material  truth” 
 
 18. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 835–36. 
 19. D. v. National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, [1978] A.C. 171, 
231. 
 20. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 589–90. 
 21. von Mehren, supra note 21, at 609. 
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(materielle Wahrheit). In civil matters, however, the principle of “formal truth”  (formelle Wahrheit)  applies.  “Formal  truth”  is what  the  court,  to the best of  its  ability, believes  to be  true having  regard  to  the evidence placed before it by the parties. The court’s task is to do, and be seen to be doing,  justice  between  the  parties;  it  is  not  to  ascertain  some  inde‐pendent truth. It often happens, from the imperfection of evidence, or the withholding of it, sometimes by the party in whose favour it would tell if presented,  that  an  adjudication  has  to  be  made  which  is  not,  and  is known not to be, the whole truth of the matter. Yet provided the decision has  been  in  accordance  with  the  available  evidence  and with  the  law, justice will have been fairly done. It  follows  that  in  their  own ways  both  the  German  and American systems are adversary systems of civil procedure.22  In both systems the lawyers  advance  partisan  positions  from  first  pleadings  to  final  argu‐ments.  In  both  systems  the  parties  and  their  lawyers  investigate  and identify  in their briefs  the  facts they think will support their claims and defences. In both systems the court cannot go beyond the parties’ factual contentions nor can the court strike out on its own in the search for what it believes might be the real truth. III. PROCEDURAL CONTRASTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE To be sure, quite a few features of German civil procedure are in marked contrast to American practises. First  there  is  the  judge’s prominent role in the actual taking of witness testimony.23 This should not be overrated, however, because the  judge, even though he serves as the examiner‐in‐chief of the witnesses, is prohibited from inducing them to testify on facts other  than  those  for which  they were named. Another  characteristic of German  and  indeed  Continental  civil  procedure  is  that  no  party  is allowed to call as many witnesses as he pleases. There is no rule requir‐ing  all  of  plaintiff’s  witnesses  to  be  heard  before  the  defendant’s witnesses, nor  is there a compulsion to take proof on all the apparently contested issues at one sitting or to call first the witnesses nominated by the party carrying the burden of proof. What  the  parties  can  do  and will  do  is  to  nominate  witnesses  in support of specific factual allegations.24 It is then for the court to make an evidentiary order identifying the witnesses to be heard, describing with 
 
 22. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 841–48. 
 23. Id. at 832–35. 
 24. Ronald J. Allen, Stefan Kock, Kurt Riecherberg & D. Toby Rosen, The German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea For More Details and Fewer Generalities in 
Comparative Scholarship, 32 NW. U. L. Rev. 705, 720–21 (1988). 
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some  precision  the  facts on which each witness  is  to  be  examined and fixing the order in which they are to be called. In making this evidentiary order the court will consult with the parties who will direct  the court’s attention  to  particularly  cogent  lines  of  inquiry.  However,  the  final decision rests with the court whose discretion will be guided by a strict standard of  relevance as well  as by the principle  that  evidence  is  to be taken only to the extent and in the order most likely to result in a speedy disposal of the case. If,  for  example,  witnesses  have  been  nominated  for  a  factual contention, which the judge believes on legal grounds to be immaterial to the party’s  claim or defence, he will not  allow  the witness  to be  called. Nor will  he  order  the  examination  of  a witness  in  support  of  a  factual allegation,  which  the  judge  finds  is  not  really  in  dispute  between  the parties or which has not been specifically challenged by the opposition. If the  court  perceives  that  there  is  a matter  that  is  likely  to  be  determi‐native, it may confine the evidentiary order to that matter and await the results  before  issuing  a  further  evidentiary  order.  Suppose  that  in  a seller’s action for the price the buyer’s defence  is,  first,  that no contract was formed; second, that the goods delivered were defective; and, third, that in any event the seller’s claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations. In  this  situation  it  is within  the  judge’s discretion  to  select  the defence most likely to lead to a dismissal of the action, and to postpone consider‐ation of the other defences. In  a  brilliant,  if  controversial,  article  John  Langbein  characterized the German procedural system as one in which the gathering of the facts was  entrusted  to,  and  controlled  by,  the  judge.25  In  his  view,  judicially dominated  fact‐gathering  is  the  hallmark  of  the  German  system  and constitutes the major “German advantage” as compared with the system prevailing  in  the  United  States.  I  am  not  sure  whether  it  is  wholly appropriate  to  describe  the  court’s  job  as  that  of  “gathering  the  facts”. After all, it is the parties and their lawyers who will investigate the facts, discuss them with their clients, select what will be presented to the court, indicate  means  of  proof,  and  thus  “gather”  the  factual  materials  with which  the  court  must  work.26  This  is  why  the  German  system  is  an adversarial system. However, once the parties have supplied the  factual materials  and  the time has  come to  investigate  the truth of  the parties’ allegations,  evaluate  the  evidence,  and  find  the  facts  on  which  the decision  is  to be based, the German judge has  fairly strong control over 
 
 25. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9. 
 26. Allen, Kock, Reichenberg & Rosen, supra note 24 at 722–26. 
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the procedure.27 He may disregard proof offers, which, according to strict criteria  of  relevance,  might  safely  be  overlooked.  Nor  are  there  any binding  rules  on  sequence,  such  as  “plaintiff’s  case  before  defendant’s case”. Instead the judge is encouraged to range over the entire case and concentrate  the  inquiry  on  those  issues  most  likely  to  result  in  an expeditious  disposal  of  the  matter.  While  the  court  can  only  call witnesses nominated by the parties, it does exercise discretion as to the order and number of the witnesses and plays a vigorous role in acting as the examiner‐in‐chief of the witnesses. John Langbein’s attack on American civil procedure and his praise for  the  German  counterpart  have  stirred  up  a  lively  debate  in  this country.28 Some critics accept that strengthening the court’s role in the evidentiary  process  would  save  time  and  money,  reduce  the wastefulness  and  complexity  of  pre‐trial  and  trial  procedure,  and  cut down on the distortions inherent in the system of partisan preparation and  production  of  witnesses  and  experts.29  They  argue,  nevertheless, that  such  a move would  be  incompatible with  the  traditional  roles  of lawyers and judges in this country and fly in the face of significant and ineradicable features of American legal culture.30 On the one hand, John Langbein  has  rightly  admonished  us  not  “to  allow  the  cry  of  ‘cultural differences’  to  become  the  universal  apologetic  that  permanently sheathes  the  status  quo  against  criticism  based  upon  comparative example.”31  On  the  other  hand,  cultural  differences  do  explain  some‐thing of why institutional and procedural differences arise  in different legal systems and why transplanting legal institutions from one society to  another  may  be  more  difficult  in  one  case  than  in  another.  The important  question  is what weight  to attach  to  this  factor  for present purposes. John Langbein’s answer is: “Not much.”32 
 
 27. Id. at 727. 
 28. See Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 
85 Mich. L. Rev. 734 (1987); Allen, Kock, Reichenberg & Rosen, supra note 26. See also 
Langbein’s reply: John Langbein, Trashing the German Advantage, 82 NW. U. L. Rev. 763 
(1988) and the rebuttal: Ronald Allen, Idealization and Caricature in Comparative 
Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. Rev. 785 (1988). For a thoughtful critical reaction to Langbein’s 
article, see John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil 
Procedure, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 987 (1990). I found this article most helpful for the following 
discussion, although perhaps not always in a direction that John Reitz would have preferred. 
 29. Gross, supra note 28, at 752–56. 
 30. Oscar G. Chase, Legal Process and National Culture, 5 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 
1, 7-9 (1997). 
 31. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 855; see also John Langbein, 
Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 41 (1997) [hereinafter 
Cultural Chauvinism]. 
 32. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism, supra note 31, at 48–49. 
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But  this  is  surely  a  point  on which  reasonable  people may  differ. The  possibility  of  transplanting  legal  institutions  is  indeed  one  of  the most  controversial  topics  of  comparative  law.33  It  is  also  a  topic much ventilated these days  in Europe. We are currently embarking  in Europe on  a  process  of  unifying  the  contract  law  of  the  Member  States.34 Although work on a Uniform European Code of Contract Law has not yet received the official blessing of the European Commission, the academic debate on what is surely the largest current comparative law enterprise in Europe is intense. In this debate, a small but articulate minority holds the  view  that  each  of  the European  nations  is  the  product  of  a  unique legal,  political,  and  social  history  and  that  each  nation’s  social  and political  values  and  goals  are  so  different  that  the unification  of  law  in Europe, like the merger of the French, English and German languages, is a barren and pointless exercise and indeed a chimera.35 I do not share this view. There is today what Oliver Wendell Holmes might have called a far‐reaching free trade in legal ideas in all that relates to  economic  activity,  trade  and  transport,  banking,  and  insurance.  In these fields, the possibility of transplanting legal institutions and indeed of  unifying  the  law  should  not  be  ruled  out  at  the  start  because  of supposed cross‐cultural differences. However, we are concerned here not with  business‐related  fields  of  substantive  law,  but  with  procedure. There  is  much  to  be  said  for  the  view  that  all  rules  organizing  constitu‐tional,  legislative, administrative, or judicial procedures are deeply rooted in  a  country’s  peculiar  features  of  history,  social  structure,  and  political consensus and as such are more resistant to transplantation. “Procedural law  is  tough  law,”  said  Otto  Kahn‐Freund.  Since  “all  that  concerns  the technique of  legal  practice  is  likely  to  resist  change”  he  concluded  that “comparative law has far greater utility in substantive law than in the law of  procedure,  and  the  attempt  to  use  foreign  models  of  judicial organization and procedure may  lead  to  frustration and may  thus be a misuse of the comparative method.”36 
 
 33. See, e.g., Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach To Comparative Law (2d 
ed. 1993); Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 Law Q. Rev. 79 (1976). See 
also the debate between Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 
Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1974) and Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses—and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 
NW. L. Rev. 198 (1977). 
 34. See Law Reform Projects, European Contract Law, available at http:// 
www.jura.unifreiburg.de/ipr1/reform.html. 
 35. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, Book Review, 58 Mod. L. Rev. 262 (1995); Pierre 
Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging, 45 Int. & Comp. L. Q. 52 (1996); 
Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 Mod. L. Rev. 44 (1997). 
 36. Kahn-Freund, supra note 33, at 20. 
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Must  we  accept  this  as  the  last  word  on  the  matter?  Another distinguished comparative  lawyer and proceduralist, Arthur von Mehren, reached  a  different  conclusion.  While  not  challenging  the  view  that  a procedural  system’s  general  structure  and  principal  features  express society’s  social  and  political  values  and  goals  he  nevertheless  said  that “very  real differences  between  first‐instance procedural  arrangements  in the United  States,  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  France  and Germany,  on  the other, derive much  less  from differences  in social or political values or  in institutional,  sociological,  or  psychological  assumptions  than  from  the institutional fact of the concentrated or discontinuous nature of the trial”.37 One salient characteristic of European civil procedure lies indeed in the fact that it is wholly unfamiliar with, and knows nothing of, the idea of  a  “trial”  as  a  single,  temporally  continuous  presentation  in which  all materials are made available to the adjudicator. Instead, proceedings in a civil  action  on  the  Continent  may  be  described  as  a  series  of  isolated conferences before the judge, some of which may last only a few minutes, in which written communications between the parties are exchanged and discussed,  procedural  rulings  are  made,  evidence  is  introduced  and testimony  taken  until  the  cause  is  finally  ripe  for  adjudication.38 Procedure in the common law jurisdictions, on the other hand, has been deeply  influenced by the  institution of  the  jury.39 Since a  jury cannot be convened,  dismissed  and  recalled  from  time  to  time  over  an  extended period, a common law trial must be staged as a concentrated courtroom drama,  a  continuous  show,  running  steadily,  once  begun,  toward  its conclusion. This in turn entails a separate pre‐trial process for the parties enabling them not only to gather the evidence that they may need at trial but also to prevent surprise by informing themselves of the details of all positions the opponent may advance when the controversy is ultimately presented  to  the  court.  This  solution  requires  elaborate pre‐trial  inter‐rogatory  and  discovery  procedures  because  once  the  trial  commences, there  is no opportunity  to  go  back,  search  for  further  information,  and present it to the court at some later date.40 Clearly, elaborate pre‐trial probing of the arguments of fact and law on  which  the  other  party  proposes  to  rely  provides  a  solution  to  the surprise problem. However, this solution is not without its cost. First, it is intrinsically  duplicative. Witnesses  are  prepared,  examined,  and  cross‐
 
 37. Arthur von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the 
Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, in: 2 Europäisches Rechtsdenken In 
Geschichteund Gegenwart, Festschrift Für Helmut Coing 361, 362 (München 1982). 
 38. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism, supra note 31, at 42–44. 
 39. Reitz, supra note 28. 
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examined during pre‐trial, then prepared, examined, and cross‐examined again at trial. Second, it tends to be overbroad. Only rarely can a litigator tell  at  the  beginning  precisely  what  issues  and  what  facts  will  prove important in the end. Since the judge customarily has little contact with pre‐trial investigation, he has no opportunity to signal what information he  thinks  relevant  to  his  decision.  As  a  result,  litigators must  strain  to investigate and analyse everything that could possibly arise at trial. They tend to leave no stone unturned, provided, of course, as is often the case, that they can charge their fees by the stone. Because of their active role in the pre‐trial phase, lawyers typically have a greater understanding of the case than does the judge when the controversy is presented at the trial. It follows that lawyers run the show at trial and that they frame the issues, question the witnesses, and stage and present even uncontroversial facts as  if  in  a  drama.  Since  the  judge  comes  to  the  trial  with  little  more understanding of  the  controversy than he  can have  from  the  complaint and other documents filed with the court, he is hardly in a position to act as the examiner‐in‐chief of the witnesses and to confine the scope of the evidentiary process to those avenues of inquiry he thinks are relevant or most likely to resolve the dispute. It would seem therefore that the institution of the jury is the cause of the strict segmentation of American procedure into pre‐trial and trial compartments,  and  that  this  segmentation  in  turn  is  the  cause  for  the waste  and  duplication  of  lawyer‐dominated  pre‐trial  discovery procedures.  Strengthening  the  court’s  control  over  the  evidentiary process would then be practicable only if the United States followed the example of most, if not all, major common law jurisdictions and abolished the civil jury. In England, trial by jury has almost disappeared from civil litigation  except  where  a  person’s  reputation  is  at  stake,  for  example where  he  sues  for  libel,41  and  the  civil  jury  has  also  withered  to insignificance  in Canada42  and Australia,43  not because of dissatisfaction with its results, but because of the costs and inefficiencies imposed by it on  the  civil  litigation  process.  Clearly,  abandoning  the  civil  jury  or restricting  its  availability  would  be  a most  controversial  matter  in  the United  States.  Not  only  is  the  right  to  trial  by  jury  enshrined  in  the Seventh Amendment and in comparable state constitutional guarantees, 
 
 41. See generally Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little 
Parliament”: Juries and Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7 
(Spring 1999). 
 42. See William A. Bogart, Guardian of Civil Rights . . . Medieval Relic: The Civil Jury in 
Canada, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 305 (Spring 1999). 
 43. See Michael Tilbury & Harold Luntz, Punitive Damages in Australian Law, 17 Loy. 
L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 769, 775–76 (1995). 
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there is also a substantial body of opinion that both the criminal and the civil  jury  are  worthwhile  bulwarks  against  biased,  eccentric  or incompetent trial  judges and enable the public  to take an active part  in the administration of both civil and criminal justice.44 I do not think, however, that the civil jury is the only or even major villain of  the piece. True,  it  is because of  the  jury  that  the  trial must be carried out as a single‐episode courtroom drama, and it is because of the trial  as  a  concentrated  event  that  pre‐trial  discovery  procedures  are needed to handle the surprise problem. But it seems to me that discovery in the form practised today in the United States goes far beyond the mere prevention  of  courtroom  ambush.  Rather,  discovery  allows  a  party  to search and indeed “fish”  for  information  in opponent’s and non‐parties’ hands under a very liberal standard of relevancy requiring only that the search be  “reasonably  calculated  to  lead  to  the discovery of  admissible evidence.”45  It has been said that  it  is possible and by no means rare  in the United  States  for  a  plaintiff  to bring a  lawsuit  in  order  to  discover whether  he  might  actually  have  one.  Aggressive  discovery  in  the American style is unknown not only in Continental procedure, but also in English  procedure  as  well.  Of  course,  all  procedural  systems  must balance  the  importance of  truth  for the  fact‐finding process against  the need  to  protect  areas  of  business  and  personal  privacy  from unreasonable  invasion. But not all systems will strike the same balance between  the  two  goals.  It  is  evident  that  the  breadth  of  American discovery rules comes down more heavily on the side of privacy in civil litigation.  Judge  Rifkind  had  a  point  when  he  said  that  “[a]  foreigner watching  the discovery proceedings  in a  civil  suit would never  suspect that this country has a highly‐prized tradition of privacy enshrined in the Fourth Amendment.”46 Nonetheless,  I  think  an  argument  can  be  made  for  American discovery  methods  despite  the  excesses  to  which  they  are  prone. Consider the type of case  in which full‐dress discovery proceedings will normally  take  place.  In  many  of  those  cases  the  lawsuit  is  not  only  a dispute  between  private  individuals  about  private  rights,  but  also  a grievance about  the operation of public policy or the vindication of  the public  interest.  In  his  famous  book  Democracy  in  America,  Alexis  de Tocqueville  noted  that  “scarcely  any  political  question  arises  in  the United  States  that  is  not  resolved,  sooner  or  later,  into  a  judicial 
 
 44. Id. at 996-97. 
 45. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 
 46. Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 107 
(1976), quoted in Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 845. 
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question.”47  This  observation  seems  to have  lost  none  of  its  pertinence today. If a European lawyer looks at the contemporary legal scene in the United  States,  he  is  impressed  by  the  extent  to  which  court  litigation, rather than  legislation and administrative action,  is used as a means  to cure  defects  in  the  structures  and  practises  of  important  social institutions. Class actions are a good case in point. By allowing plaintiffs  to sue  for the aggregated damages suffered by many other similarly situated  individuals,  the class action provides an  effective  means  of  vindicating  the  rights  of  groups  of  people  who individually would not have the strength to bring their opponents  into court.  In  this  sense,  class‐action  plaintiffs  may  be  viewed  as  private attorneys‐general  advancing  and  protecting  substantial  public interests.  The  Supreme  Court  has  described  treble  damages  actions under  section  4  of  the  Clayton Act  as  “a  vital means  of  enforcing  the antitrust  policy  of  the  United  States”48  and  it  is  not  the  SEC,  but  the shareholders’ derivative suit,  that  the Supreme Court regarded as “the chief  regulator  of  corporate  management.”49  What  surprises  the European observer about American product liability litigation is not the preconditions  for  liability, which are  just  as  strict  in Europe as  in  the United  States;  what  he  finds  indeed  astonishing  is  the  stupendous volume  of  litigation,  the  size  of  awards made  to  successful  claimants, and the fact that it is not uncommon for many thousands of claims to be bundled  together  and  dealt  with  in  a  single  trial.  All  developed  legal systems  must  ensure  the  safety  of  products  in  the  interest  of  the consumer.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  Americans,  with  their traditional mistrust of governmental authority, rely not so much on the initiative of administrators or public prosecutors, but rather on private litigation as the chief regulator of corporate action in the product safety field. If this analysis is correct, a strong case can be made for the view that to the extent to which private litigation serves the vindication of a public  interest,  the  parties  must  be  equipped  with  robust  discovery procedures  to  ferret out  the  truth,  even at  the expense  of business or personal privacy. Nor would it seem plausible to put the discovery tools in the hands of judges or parajudicial officials, if only because discovery conducted  by  a  judge  or  magistrate  would  not  be  as  thorough  as discovery conducted by the parties’ lawyers. Civil  litigation as a means of  vindicating  the public  interest  is  far less  significant  in  Europe.  Class  actions  for  the  recovery  of  damages 
 
 47. Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy In America 280 (1945). 
 48. Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). 
 49. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547–48 (1949). 
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suffered  by  hundreds  or  thousands  of  persons  are  unknown  on  the Continent. Derivative suits by shareholders, product  liability cases and actions  based  on  a  violation  of  the  antitrust  law  are  not  unusual,  but have  attained  nowhere  the  dimension,  vigour  and  force  that  would qualify them as significant checks on corporate behaviour. It  is  much  harder  to  argue  the  case  for  the  American  civil  justice system where it deals with cases in which the lawsuit  is merely a dispute between  private  individuals  about  private  rights,  as,  for  example,  in  an ordinary personal injury action. True, the vast majority of all civil matters in the United States do not result  in a jury trial, and most are resolved by settlement.50 In Germany, too, the great majority of personal injury claims are  settled  rather  than  resolved  by  court  decision.  However,  in  both systems the parties are bargaining in the shadow of the law, and the law is very different  indeed.  In the United States due to the cost  and number of attorney  hours  spent  on  investigating  the  case  and  on  pretrial  motions, discovery, and trial,  the economic pressure to settle  is  intense. Moreover, the outcome of an American jury trial is less predictable than that of a case tried by a German judge. Let me illustrate this by looking at one important area  of  the  law  in  which  the  differences  are  indeed  striking:  the  law relating to the assessment of damages for personal injuries. Legal doctrine in  Germany  and  the  United  States  does  not  differ  greatly  in  most  such cases.  Far  more  significant  are  differences  in  the  mode  of  trial.  Because these  cases  are  tried  by  a  judge  alone  in  Germany,  and  damages  are assessed  by  judges, who give  full  and detailed  reasons,  the  calculation of damages has  become much more  regularized,  systematic  and uniform  in Germany while the range of awards in similar cases is very much larger in the American system of trial, almost entirely as a result of the use of juries. Accordingly,  the  probable  range  of  damages  is  less  predictable  in  the United States than  in Germany. Unpredictability  leads to uncertainty, and uncertainty  increases the  importance of good  legal representation, which may  be  easily  available  to  repeat  players  like  insurance  companies  but raises concerns about access to justice for the poor and procedural equality of litigants with disparate economic resources. IV. CONCLUSION In conclusion I would like to emphasize that what is often overlooked in the literature on comparative civil procedure is that different procedural systems may  focus on  different  categories  of  cases.  The  typical  case  at which  the  German  system  is  aimed  involves  a  comparatively  small 
 
 50. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1339 (1994). 
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amount of money, raises no major issue of public policy, and is merely a dispute  between  private  parties  about  private  rights.  In  such  cases  it obviously makes sense to give the judge a leading role in the examination of  witnesses  and  wider  powers  over  the  evidentiary  process,  thereby reducing considerably the amount of lawyer effort and cost in exchange for a modest increase in effort and activity on the part of the judge. This is where  I  think  the  advantages  and  the  strength  of  the  European procedural  systems  lie.  If  there  is  a  desire  to  reform  American  civil procedure so as to provide effective justice for the “little guy”, either by making  changes  within  the  traditional  system  or  by  developing alternative  methods  of  dispute  resolution,  then  the  Continental experience may well be a worthwhile object of study. 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Europeanization as Process  
Thoughts on the Europeanization  




 The present efforts in Europe to achieve more uniformity in private law and  the debates on a European civil  code need  to  be understood  in a wider context. Europe is plagued by concerns over  its problem‐solving potential  and  its  acceptance  amongst  citizens.  The  response  is  ambi‐tious projects: Eastern Enlargement, a Constitution, a Code. The project of  a European civil  code  is  the  least  visible among  the  three—and yet specifically  instructive.  Europe  has  to  learn  how  the  openness  of  na‐tional markets can coexist with differences in legal cultures, differently shaped relations between state and society. In its multi‐level system of governance none of  the established  legal disciplines can provide guid‐ance for the denationalization and Europeanization of private law. The Europeanization  process  needs  to  be  understood  and  organized  as  a process of discovery and learning. Only then can Europe make produc‐tive use of its diversity. INTRODUCTION European  law  is  affecting more  and more  areas  within  national  legal systems.  The processes of  change  that  it  initiates are  complex and di‐verse,  to an extent that there are good  reasons to concentrate  in their analysis on the discipline one feels most at home with. Hence, constitu‐tional  lawyers  observe  and  comment  on  the  constitutionalization  of Europe, administrative and commercial lawyers primarily on the emer‐gence of  complex European  governance arrangements  throughout  the fields of regulatory politics. At the same time, an autonomous epistemic community  is  engaging  in  a discussion on  the Europeanization of pri‐vate  law with a  growing  number of  individual  themes,  fora,  organisa‐
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tions  and  publications.  Leading  in  terms  of  literary  productivity  are German‐speaking  academics.  The most  recent  habilitation  thesis  I  am aware of was submitted in Munich. It looks beyond the traditional bor‐ders  between  legal  sub‐disciplines  and  focuses  instead  on  the  trans‐formation of private law in the light of the integration process. It is 740 pages  long  (single  spaced).1  But  its  German  speaking  predecessors (there  are  around  10  of  them),  albeit  more  limited  in  scope,  are  not significantly shorter.2 This  is  no  coincidence.  A  tradition  of  legal  science  that  under‐stands the systematic analysis of  the  law as  its core commitment, will naturally  feel  challenged  by  the manifold  impacts of  the Europeaniza‐tion process, and the  less  it becomes possible  for legal science to com‐ply  with  its  own  systematic  expectation,  the  more  its  scepticism towards that process will be fostered. To pose the question in an ironi‐cally sounding, but nonetheless serious,  form: should Europe be about to take suit, to proceed, against our law (bring the law to trial)?3 Taking the question seriously also means not to condemn Europe just because it does not correspond with our  inherited notion of  the  law. The chal‐lenge  flowing  from  the  Europeanization  process  could  be  that  it  will force us to redefine the normative proprium of the law. This,  in  fact,  is  the  thesis of my contribution.  It  sets out  to  show, for  one,  that  the  Europeanization  of  private  law  should  be  seen  as  a process that triggers disintegration within national private law systems and affects their systematic consistency. But I also wish to demonstrate how  that  process manages  to  uncover  productive  and  innovative  op‐portunities. For this, as I suggest by way of conclusion below, it merits recognition: Europeanization must derive  its  legitimacy  from  the  nor‐mative  quality of  the processes within which  it  takes place. There are three  steps  to  my  argument.  The  first  is  fundamental,  in  the  literal sense;  the  legal  disciplines  instructing  the  Europeanization  process assume each in their own way that legal systems are organized nation‐ally; Europe on the other hand constitutes a post‐national constellation; it is no longer an aggregation of nation States, but a multi‐level system (part A). The second part examines three different patterns of  juridifi‐
 
 1. Christoph Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts durch die Europäische 
Union, 2004. 
 2. Since Drexl, Die wirtschaftliche Selbstbestimmung des Verbrauchers, 1998. 
 3. The formulation can be found by Wiethölter, ‘lst unserem Recht der Prozeβ zu 
machen?’, in Honneth et al. (eds.), Zwischenbetrachtungen im Prozeβ der Aufklärung, 1989, 
794. l have previously thought to show, referring to the emergence of ‘new modes of govern-
ance’, that it should be addressed to the European process; see Joerges, ‘Law, Economics 
and Politics in the Constitutionalisation of Europe,’ 5 (2002-2003) The Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies, 2004, 123. 
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cation, of Recht­Fertigung (‘justification’),  induced by Europe,  to docu‐ment  the  opportunities  and  risks  borne  by  the  Europeanization  proc‐ess—and  to demonstrate why the process  itself  cannot but disappoint the dogmatic  and  systematic  expectations of  legal  science  (part  B).  In the  final  part,  I will  further  elucidate  the  normative  perspectives  that can be associated with my title, ‘Europeanization as Process’ (part C). A. THE CONTEST OF LEGAL DISCIPLINES AND THE MISERY OF METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM Three  legal disciplines are  trying  to unravel and understand the proc‐ess  of  Europeanization:  European  law,  private  international  law  and comparative  law.  They  all  have  different  perspectives  and  introduce contesting  criteria of  law. How are we  to  resolve  the  contest between those legal disciplines4? Should European law Europeanize private law, replace  national  private  laws  with  a  European  private  law?  Is  it  for comparative law to guide the quest  for a suitable system of  legal rules for Europe? But  surely,  it  is private  international  law’s  vocation  to  in‐struct Europe as to how it can reconcile its legal differences, to combine the construction of a  functioning European private law system and the respect  for national  legal  traditions? None of  them,  it  is my claim, can win  the  contest  of  the  disciplines.  None  is  equipped  to  deal  with  the Europeanization process. To be sure,  the  intention  is not to pass  judgment on the capabili‐ties  or  disabilities  of  entire  legal  subjects.  My  argument,  which  pro‐poses the  insolubility of  the contest of  legal disciplines,  rather  follows the specific tradition that underlies the statement, indicated above, that legal science should be prepared to acknowledge Europe’s postnational constellation.5 To follow up on a concretisation of this term, first coined by  Jurgen  Habermas6  and  analysed  by  the  political  scientist  Michael Zürn:  the  individual  legal  disciplines  must  overcome  their  ‘methodo‐logical nationalism,’7 their adherence in terms of concepts and method‐
 
 4. In his famous treatise in 1798, which this section`s heading alludes to, Kant referred 
not only to the sub-disciplines of one faculty. Alluding to Kant`s valuation of philosophy is 
justified: jurisprudence, much to the contrary of Kant’s derisory remarks, cannot limit itself to a 
function that serves given authorities, but must become productive and make use of what 
Kant names ‘reason.’ See Joerges. “The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation 
Process and as a Contest of Disciplines—An Analysis of the Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts,”  3 ERPL 3 (1995) 175. 
 5. Above, pre A. 
 6. “Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie,” in: Habermas, Die 
postnationale Konstellation, Politische Essays, 1998, 91. 
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Duke Law CICLOPs | Christian Joerges  Vol. 1 
 
20 
ologies  to national  shapes;  these  shapes  are  being  eroded as  a  conse‐quence  of  European  integration  together  with  ‘globalization’  (de‐territorializing  (Entgrenzung)  and  denationalising)  processes.  Again:  I do not wish to pass  judgment on  the state of  those disciplines;  the  in‐tention  is  rather  to highlight  and  reinforce  the developments  that  are verifiably taking place within the law and that should also be reflected by legal science. 
I. European Law My claim, that legal science rather stubbornly adheres to national cate‐gories of  thought, must  sound surprising,  if not  strange,  in  relation  to the discipline I discuss first, namely European law. Is not the European construction exactly the negation, the Überwindung, of the nation state? Is not the specific characteristic of European law precisely that, a claim to  supranational  validity8  without  any  need  for  Europe  to  become  a state  first? And  could  not maybe private  law,  even  though  it  is  a  ‘late comer’ of  the  integration process, become somewhat of  a  test case  for transnational  state‐free  law,  in  particular  when  it  would  require  no more of private law than to revise its own traditions? A  dominating  and most  instructive  topic  currently  under  discus‐sion  within  legal  science  and  legal  policy  concerns  the  case  for—or rejection  of—a  European  Civil  Code.  Numerous  institutional  and  aca‐demic  groupings  have  contributed  to  the  debate  on  the  codification project, in manifold ways. The European Parliament (EP) in its resolutions of 1989 and 1994 pleaded  for  a  European  Civil  Code.9  They  did  not  have  an  immediate impact,10 but did help to keep the idea alive. By now, the EP has become more cautious, or at least more patient.11 The Commission is more sib‐ylline. In its Communication on contract law in 2001,12 it presented four options  and  asked:  Should  the  European  private  law  be  generated through a  contest  between  legal orders?  Should Europe draft Restate­
ments  following the American model? Should it  ‘consolidate’  first what 
 
logical Nationalism, Towards a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent, Constella-
tions 10 (2003), 453), but I keep to Zürn’s interpretation sketched out at IV below. 
 8. ECR [I963], 24 f. Van Gend en Loos. 
 9. OJ C 158/1989, 400 and C 205/1994, 518. 
 10. Cf. Tilmann, ‘Eine Privatrechtskodifikation für die Europäische Gemeinschaft’, in 
Müller-Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen  Gemeinschaft, 1993, 485. 
 11. See the Decision of the European Parliament on the approximation of Member 
States’ civil and commercial law, [COM(2001) 398–C5-047l/2001–2001/2187(COS)] of 15 
November 1001, A5-0384/2001. 
 12. Commission Communication on European Contract Law, COM (2001) 398 final, 11 
July 2001. 
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it has accomplished  in terms of  existing elements of European private law?  Or  should  Europe  embark  on  further  legislative  measures?  The Commission  summarized  responses  to  these  questions  in  its  Action Plan of 12 February 2003.13 The Commission carefully  avoids taking a definitive position. But the  project  of  a  European  Civil  Code  has  had  a  mobilising  effect throughout  legal  science.14  The  most  prominent  academic  writer  and also one of  the most ardent advocates  in  favour of a European code  is Christian  von  Bar.15  Which  of  the  arguments  expressed  in  his  views seem  to  suggest  a  position  of  methodological  nationalism?  Von  Bar more  than  others  emphasizes  that  legislation  should  draw  on  the authority of science and scholarly deliberation rather than politics. His views quite accurately  reflect  the self‐understanding of German schol‐arly thought in the 19th century during the construction of the German Civil Code.16 The German Civil Code put into effect the uniformity of the German Reich and thus symbolizes the emergence of a German nation state. A European Civil Code  could play a  similar part,  as  contribution towards European state‐building, supplementing the political constitu‐tion of Europe. 
II. Comparative Law The process of European  integration has brought  about a  renaissance of  comparative  law.  For  long  decades  it  was—in  Germany  and  else‐where—virtually  self‐evident  that  comparative  research  would  focus on  American  law,  and  only  on  American  law.  In  the  meantime,  the 
Common Core project alone attracts, year after year, a growing number of comparative lawyers from all over Europe and the rest of the world to Trento.17 Comparative case books are available.18 European universi‐
 
 13. Communication of the Commission and the European Parliament and the Council: A 
Coherent European Contract Law, Action Plan, OJ C 43/2003, 1. 
 14. See summary by Schmid. Juristenzeitung, 2001, 694, updated in his habilitation 
thesis (note 1), part 3, section 2; especially on the expert working groups on the Europeaniza-
tion of private law, see: Riedl, Vereinheitlichung des Privatrechts in Europa, 2004. 
 15. See programmatically Von Bar, ‘From Principles to Codification: Prospects for 
European Private Law,’ Columbia Journal of European Law 9 (2002), 379. 
 16. See poignantly Jakobs, Wissenschaft und Gesetzgebung im bürgerlichen Recht 
nach der Rechts- quellenlehre des 19, Jahrhunderts, 1983, 160: the German Civil Code is ‘… 
a code of law, the sources of which can be found not in itself, but in the legal science that has 
created it; a code of law seeking to be dominated by, rather than to dominate, science...’ (my 
translation); see for closer analysis Joerges, Kritische Justiz, 1987, 166. 
 17. Bussani/Mattei (eds.), The Common Core of European Private Law, Essays on the 
Project, 2002; on this and with a further impressive summary of the discipline’s status quo, 
Gambaro, ‘The Trento Theses,’ Global Jurist 4 (2004), No. 1, Article 2. 
 18. Von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts, vol. l, I998; Van Gerven/Lever/ 
Duke Law CICLOPs | Christian Joerges  Vol. 1 
 
22 
ties  have  extended  their  intra‐European  comparative  research  with some enthusiasm, provoking not only quantitative but  also qualitative improvements—a real renaissance. Again,  it would be adventurous to try to force what has become a rich and diverse theoretical debate into a uniform agenda. And just as is the case  for European law, the claim that comparative law is pervaded by methodological  nationalism may  alienate  the  reader  at  first.  But  it holds true, in my view, as shall be demonstrated by turning to the views of two important exponents and opponents. Reinhard Zimmermann, on the  one  hand,  reveals  in  his  numerous works  that  the  common Euro‐pean  legal  heritage,  the  ius  commune  europaeum  continues  to  have  a considerable  impact  in  continental  civil  law  systems  and  throughout the  English  (but  not  the  American)  common  law.  He  seems  to  be sketching  out  the  foundations  of  a  position  in  favour  of  transnational and  non‐state  private  law.19  But  in  his  theoretical  approach,  Zimmer‐mann combines historical studies and practical work on  law. His writ‐ings  on  legal  history  are meant  to  provide  support  to  non‐legislative codification  movements.  It  comes  as  no  surprise  that  the  title  of  the first  section  of  the  Introduction  to  the Historical‐Critical  Commentary on  the  German  Civil  Code  reads:  ‘The  European  Codification  Move‐ment’.20 The section reads further: ‘the codifications have not rendered learned jurists redundant, nor have they led to a permanent consolida‐tion (or  fossilisation) of private  law. But they did  facilitate, on the one hand, national fragmentation of legal traditions…on the other, the codi‐fications ended the  ‘second  life’  of Roman  law, the history of  its direct practical  application…  .’21  The  Europeanization  of  private  law  cannot and should not rewind the clock of history. But historical legal scholar‐ship  is trying to feed  into it an awareness of  its pan‐European founda‐tions—to  boost  the European codification project which would  create and symbolise a uniform European legal space. At the opposite end of the spectrum of comparative contributions is  Pierre  Legrand.22  His  non‐convergence  thesis,  his  rigid  opposition 
 
Larouche/von Bar/Viney, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and Interna-
tional Tort Law, Scope of Protection, 1998. 
 19. See Zimmermann, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 193 (1993), 122–169: idem, 
Roman Law and European Legal Unity, in Hartkamp/Hesselink/Hondius/Joustra/Du Perron 
(eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 2nd ed. 1998, 21; idem. ‘Savignys Vermächtnis,’ in 
Caroni/Dilcher (eds.), Norm und Tradition, Welche Gerschichtlichkeit für die Rechtsgeschich-
te?, 1998, 281. 
 20. Zimmermann, Historisch-Kritischer Kommentar, paras. 1 ff. before § 1 (2003). 
 21. My translation. 
 22. Poignantly, e.g.: ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging,’ International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 45 (1996), 52; ‘Against a European Civil Code,’ Modern Law 
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against  functionalism  in  comparative  law  and  against  codification movements is based upon the assertion that common law and civil law cannot  communicate  because  the  law  is  a  cultural  phenomenon  and European legal cultures have developed, quite simply, in an incompati‐ble way. Both Zimmermann and Legrand loosen ties between  law and the nation state. Yet,  both remain themselves tied to a methodological nationalism.  Zimmermann  in  that  he  seeks  to  follow  the  example  of historical legal science in the codification movement, Legrand in that he deduces  from  the  cultural  features  of  common  law and  civil  law  their political autonomy.23 
III. Private International Law European and Private International Law (PIL) lived separate lives for a long time, encouraged by a culture of non‐communication where Euro‐pean  lawyers were part of public  law  and  PIL‐lawyers  part of private law.  Thus,  for  a  long  time  it went practically unnoticed  that  the Euro‐pean Court of  Justice (ECJ) adjudicated constellations that had already been thoroughly thought through by PIL. Nowhere did overlaps receive greater attention and were discussed earlier  than  in Germany. Discus‐sions  can  be  separated  into  several  stages: One phase, where  PIL was recommended  as  an  alternative  to  projects  suggesting  unification  of law.24  A  second  one,  still  ongoing, where  European  law—in  particular its  fundamental  freedoms  and  the  ban  of  discrimination,  but  also  its provisions  on mutual  recognition  of  binding  law—was  and  is  used  to correct  PIL.25  A  third  phase  is  approaching.  This  phase  will  see  the choice‐of‐law  methodology  pulling  away  from  its  traditional  home discipline and in particular from its orientation towards a geographical idea of justice. This is happening  in two ways. For one,  inconsistencies 
 
Review 60 (1997), 44. 
 23. These are no more than cursory remarks. Hein Kötz, representing the lead-
ingfunctionalistschool of comparative law, has always been sceptical towards the idea 
of codification, see his Gemeineuropäisches Zivilrecht, Festschrift Konrad Zweigert. 1981, 
481; methodologically strict exponents of the common core project are agnostic in terms of 
legal policy: e.g. Bussani, ibid. (note 17), but also Mattei, ‘Hard Code Now!’, Global Jurist 
Frontiers, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), Art. 1. The Gretchen question, however, remains whether 
comparative law can give up its perception of autonomous legal systems. How can we con-
ceptualise their interdependencies and the emergence of multi-level systems with intercon-
nected competences? 
 24. See e.g. Kreuzer, ‘Die Europäisierung des internationalen PrivatrechtsVorgaben 
des Gemeinschaftsrechts,’ in: Müller-Graff, Gemeinsames Privartecht in der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, 1993, 273. 
 25. See Grundmann, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht 
64 (2000), 457. Summary and analysis of current developments in Schmid (note 1), espe-
cially in part 3, section 1. 
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within  and  between  national  law26  and  European  law27 will  be  recon‐structed as ‘collisions’ and conflicts arising from the institutionalization of different  rationality  criteria. Accordingly  the  idea  that  law could  be set up as a stable, permanent and  ‘uniform’ system will be done away with.  Contributions  describing  the  law  of  a  multi‐level  system  and  in particular  European  law  as  a Kollisionsrecht,  a  ‘collision  law’,  increas‐ingly demonstrate a thinking of law in constantly recurring collisions.28 More on this will be said below.29 
IV. Interim Conclusion and Anticipation: the Misery of Methodological 
Nationalism in Europe’s Postnational Constellation The claim that our categories of  legal science and our  individual disci‐plines  attach  themselves  to  the  nation  state  is  anything  but  exciting. Equally, it should not come as a surprise that legal science—in constitu‐tional  and  administrative  as  well  as  private  law—draws  on  national and  federal  examples.  The  connected  question, however, whether—in legal sociological  terms—it  is possible to halt  the evolution of  law be‐yond the nation state, and—in legal theoretical terms—the debate sur‐rounding  the  normative  legitimacy  of  these  developments,  bear  some potentially explosive issues. The situation in the European Union inevitably requires a look, as indicated above, into the political science research on integration. For a long time, we have been reading that Europe  is more than an  interna‐tional organization, but less than a federation.30 To understand its posi‐
 
 26. Intellectually groundbreaking but little noticed: Wiethölter, Begriffs- oder Interessen-
jurisprudenzfalsche Fronten im IPR und Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht: Bemerkungen zur 
selbstgerechten Kollisionsnorm, Festschrift Kegel, 1977, 223; analysis by Teubner. ‘Der 
Umgang mit den Rechtsparadoxien: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter,’ in: Joerges/Teubner 
(eds.), Rechtsverfassungrecht, Recht-Fertigung zwischen Privatrechtsdogmatik und Gesell-
schaftstheorie, 2003, 22. 
 27. See Joerges, ‘Legitimationsprobleme des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts und der 
Vertrag von Maastricht,’ in: Brüggemeier (ed.), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa, 1994, 91. 
 28. Joerges, ‘The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Percep-
tions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutionalist Perspective,’ European Law Journal 3 
(1997), 378; Furrer, Zivilrecht im gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kontext. Das Europäische Kollisi-
onsrecht als Koordinierungsinstrument für die Einbindung des Zivilrechts in dax europäische 
Wirtschaftsrecht, 2002; Amstutz, Zwischenwelten, Zur Emergenz einer interlegalen Rechts-
methodik im europäischen Privatrecht, Joerges/Teubner, ibid. (note 26), 213; Vesting, Veröf-
fentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 63 (2004), 41, 65 ff.; Schmid 
(ibid. note 1) part 3, section 1; Teubner/Fischer-Lescano, ‘Regime-Collision: How the Emer-
gency of Private Governance Regimes Changes Global Legal Pluralism,’ Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 2004 (forthcoming). 
 29. Below B. II. and C. I. 
 30. W. Wallace, `Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a 
Political System,’ in H. Wallace/W. Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Commu-
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tion  between  these  two  poles  as  a  ‘multi‐level  systems  sui  generis’  is somewhat  of  a  dominating  view  in  political  science31  which  is  being further substantiated in respective studies. Before introducing the idea into  legal  science,  it  should  be  reconstructed  in  normative  categories. But this is anything but easy. In his essay introducing the ‘postnational constellation’  as  a  term  of  art,32  Jürgen  Habermas  posed  the  crucial question  whether  there  was  a  future  for  democracy.  Democracy  was institutionalised in (national) constitutional states. Therefore, postnational constellations are highly ambivalent; they constitute  not  an  achievement  but  rather  a  challenge.  The  thesis  in which Michael Zürn diagnoses  the misery of methodological national‐ism33  suggests  that we  cannot  avoid  the  challenge,  because  our  entry into the postnational constellation is not at our disposition. His diagno‐ses  affect  mostly  the  contextual  conditions  of  political  action:34  The nation  state  is  no  longer  in  a  position  to  define  its  political  priorities autonomously (as sovereign), but instead is forced to coordinate them transnationally.  Not  only  must  their members  (national  citizens)  rec‐ognise  their  political  action;  states  have  also  become  accountable  to transnational bodies where their politics are being subjected to evalua‐tion. To be sure, national governments continue to vehemently defend their fiscal powers. “Whilst resources remain (in most part) at national level,  the  formulation of politics has been  internationalised and recog‐nition transnationalized.”35 How  will  this  type  of  multidimensional  disaggregation  of  state‐hood  affect  the  law?  First  of  all,  we  should  be  prepared  to  find  the transnational (European) level of politics confronting national law with a  range  of  demands  arising  from  the  interconnectedness  of  nation states (in other words, the logic of integration of societal sub‐systems), and  from  the  project  of  integration  and  its  institutionalised  political telos manifested in the European Treaties. Neither the national nor the transnational dimension gives a  firm halt; both are  instead themselves in a state of contingent development. The thesis suggesting that we are and will be witnessing tensions between a functionalist logic of market integration  institutionalised  in  the  Treaties  and  a  normative  logic  of justification,  of  Recht­Fertigung,  institutionalised  at  national  level,  in 
 
nity, 1983, 403. 
 31. Instructive are contributions to Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch (eds.), Europäische 
Integration, 2nd ed., 2003. 
 32. Above note 6. 
 33. Above note 7. 
 34. Ibid., 188-191. 
 35. My translation; ibid., 188. 
Duke Law CICLOPs | Christian Joerges  Vol. 1 
 
26 
my  view  continues  to  have much  persuasive  force  as  a  starting  point and  basis  for  approximation.36  It  implies:  law  has  to  learn  how  to  ac‐commodate disaggregated competences of action and the fact that in a European  multi‐level  system  the  ‘higher’  level’s  competences  are  re‐stricted to the fields enumerated  in the Treaty, that Europe hence can‐not form a hierarchical system but instead relies on a plethora of policy networks and on cooperative problem solving. Any attempt to illustrate or  concretise  these  formulae  is  bound  to  fail  the  systematic  expecta‐tions and traditional thought patterns. B. EXEMPLA TRAHUNT: THREE PATTERNS OF EUROPEANIZATION OF PRIVATE LAW ‘Less than a “system”, but more than just a set of contingent case law’—thus  the  claim  of  the  following  analyses  of  the  practice  of Europeanization  of  private  law.  It  would  be  unrealistic  to  accredit  to the law the power to assert  itself as a  ‘system’ within the complex and conflict  ridden  territory  of  the  European  multi‐level  system.  But  any suggestion  to  break  the  law  down  into  a  string  of  individual  cases would  be  equally  far  from  reality.  Three  sets  of  examples  are  being introduced,  exemplifying  in  turn  some  significant  patterns  of Europeanization  of  private  law.  Their  ‘exemplicity’  is  manifested particularly in the range of options they uncover for integration policy. In  saying  this,  I  implicitly  suggest  that  these  options  include  diverse, even  opposite  perspectives.  I  also  assert  that  their  contest  will  not come to a rest, that we should not expect any one pattern to acclaim a monopoly  at  any  time  in  the  future.  Rather,  each  individually  will  be subjected  to  a  range  of  experiences  that  in  turn  will  provoke  further learning  processes.  Here  is  not  the  place  to  advocate  normative agnosticism.  Having  said  that,  it  should  be  stressed  that  the  law  will have to be prepared to deal with colliding concepts of Europeanization. 
I. Product Liability Law: on the Destitution of Orthodox Supranationalism The  European  Community  Product  Liability  Directive  was  adopted unanimously,  under  (the  old  version  of)  Article  100  TEC,  on  25  July 1985.37  This  explains  why  it  records  product  liability  law  so  incom‐pletely,38 why  it disappointed expectations especially of  those who ex‐
 
 36. See Joerges/Brüggemeier, ‘Europäisierung des Vertrags- und Haftungsrechts,’ in: 
Müller·Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Eurupäischen Gemeinschaft, 1993, 233. 
 37. OJ L 2l0/1985. 29. 
 38. Koch, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 152 (1988), 537. 
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pected  it  to  be  the  flagship  of  European  consumer  protection  law.39 Intense  debates  surrounded  the  Directive’s  implementation.  It  was widely considered a marginal piece of  legislation with  little  impact on the general  law of obligations  because Article 13 of  the Directive evi‐dently did not respect claims pursuant to other legal bases.40 There was, at any rate, broad agreement that the Directive would preclude further advances in consumer protection law by establishing a set of conclusive minimum standards. For  a  long  time,  these  expectations  appeared  justifiable,  until,  in three relatively recent  judgments of 25 April 2002,41  the ECJ shattered them quite dramatically. The Court recognised to the great surprise of most  observers  that  the  Directive’s  consumer  protection  provisions were  not  intended  to  introduce  protective  minimum  standards,  but rather  to  achieve  ‘complete  harmonisation’  As  a  consequence,  the  Di‐rective enjoys the standing of fully‐fledged European law: it is supreme to  national  private  law,  takes  precedence  over  subsequent  national legislation and creates a duty for national courts to refer to the ECJ. The three decisions just mentioned concern the French, the Greek and  the  Spanish  implementation  of  the  Directive.  The  Spanish  case  is particularly  frightening.42  Mrs.  Gonzalez  Sanchez  had  to  have  a  blood transfusion  in  the hospital  run  by  the defendant  institution  (Medicina Asturiana  SA).  As  a  consequence  of  the  transfusion,  she  was  infected with  the  Hepatitis  C  virus.  She  based  her  action  on  the  law  by which Spain had transposed the Directive into Spanish law and, in addition, on the general liability provisions of Spanish civil law, and on the Spanish General Law for the Protection of Consumers and Users of 19 July 1984, under which the claimant had only to prove damage and a causal con‐nection.  Under  the  Product  Liability  Directive,  implemented  10  years after  the  1984  law,43  she  also  had  to  prove  that  the  hospital  had  pro‐duced  the  blood  conserves,  which  she  failed  to  show.  Therefore,  the success  of  her  claim  depended  on  the  relationship  between  the  three legal bases. Article 13 of the Directive provides that the Directive “shall not affect any rights which an injured person may have according to the 
 
 39. See Brüggemeier/Reich, Wertpapier Mitteilungen 1986, 149. 
 40. E.g. Brüggemeier, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 152 
(1988), 511, 531. 
 41. Case C-52/00, ECR [2002] I-3827 Commission v. France; Case C-183/00, ECR 
[2002] I·3901 Mari}: MarÍa Victoria González Sánchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA; Case C- 
154/00, ECR [2002] I-3879 Commission v. Greece. 
 42. On the following, see analyses by Arbour, ELJ 10 (2004), 87 and Schmid (ibid., note 
1), especially part 2, section 4, chapter 5. 
 43. Case C-183/00 para. 7, 8. 
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rules of  the  law of  contractual or non‐contractual  liability or  a  special liability system existing at the moment when this Directive is notified.” Does  this  mean,  the  Spanish  court  asked  the  ECJ,  that  the  Directive could  “be  interpreted  as  precluding  the  restriction  or  limitation,  as  a result of  transposition of  the Directive, of rights granted to consumers under  the  legislation of  the Member  State?”44 To  the unversed  reader, the  question may  sound  rhetorical.  But  the  Court  responded:  “Article 13 of  the Directive cannot be  interpreted as giving  the Member States the possibility of maintaining a general system of product  liability dif‐ferent from that provided for in the Directive.”45 The provision that Article 13 does not affect claims on a different basis cannot “be relied on  in such a case in order to justify the mainte‐nance  in  force of national provisions affording greater protection than those of the Directive.”46 In  its analysis of  the Community  law provisions,  the ECJ refers to Recital  1  in  the  preamble  of  the  Directive,  according  to  which  “ap‐proximation  is  necessary  because  legislative  divergences may  distort competition  and  affect  the  movement  of  goods  within  the  common market  and  entail  a  differing  degree  of  protection  of  the  consumer against  damage  caused  by  a  defective  product  to  his  health  or  prop‐erty.”47 It had been necessary at the time to introduce this sentence, in order  to  ‘establish’  the  Community’s  (functional)  legislative  compe‐tence.  Since then,  the paragraph has become neither more empirically relevant,  nor  normatively  more  correct.  Nevertheless,  the  Court’s judgment reaffirmed its value as a virtually teleological motivation for restricting Member States’ legislative autonomy.48 European  law, understood this way, does not contribute much to the  Europeanization  process.  The  preliminary  rulings  procedure  has good institutional sense because it links the judiciary in Member States to the  jurisdiction of  the ECJ. But  it can bear painful consequences  for those who  seek  justice  in  a  case  that would  not  normally  seem prob‐lematic.49 After long years of litigation, Mrs. Sanchez finally knew whom she would have had to sue in order to enforce her rights. A result such as this one would be easier to accept, if we could see  in the ECJ’s judg‐
 
 44. Ibid., para. 13. 
 45. Ibid.. para. 30. 
 46. Ibid., para. 33. 
 47. Ibid., para. 3. 
 48. Ibid., paras. 24, 25. 
 49. More generally Joerges, ‘The Bright and the Dark Side of the Consumer’s Access to 
Justice in the EU,’ Global Jurist Topics 1 (2001): No. 2, Article 1. 





Citizensand their Bars The judgments in Centros,51 Überseering52 and Inspire Art53 are part of a single  complex which  should  be discussed  in unity, but  at  this  point  I will  focus on a particular aspect often shaded by a plethora of  literary analysis. From the interplay between the economic freedoms, the legis‐lative and  the  judiciary,  emerges  the  right  to hold  the  national  sover‐eign  to  account  for  its  legislation  and  to  confront  it  with  the  legal rationality  of  its  European  neighbours—this  to  me  is  the  normative significance of the Centros case law, but equally its practical weakness.54 The  judgment  in Centros  concerns  the  core  of  the  European  legal 
acquis, namely the freedoms of market citizens which apply directly and ought  therefore  to  take  primacy  over  national  law.  The  decision  was widely praised as a milestone in the realization of the market freedoms, as a contribution to the so‐called negative integration and the opening up of regulatory competition; but it also has wider implications. A  Danish  married  couple,  Marianne  and  Tony  Bryde,  wished  to import wine into Denmark. For this they planned to set up a company, but did not want  to pay  the  fee of  the DK 200,000  (28,000 Euro)  that Denmark required for the registration of companies.  In May 1992 they founded  a  private  Limited  company  in  England,  the  now  legendary Centros Ltd., and set up a subsidiary in Copenhagen—for none of these steps did they need the money that a regular registration  in Denmark would  have  required.  Unsurprisingly,  the  Danish  authorities  refused registration.  The  Brydes  went  to  court.  Seven  years  later,  the  ECJ handed  down  the  following  judgment  to  the  referring  Danish Højesteret. It found, rightly, that:  It  is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty for a Mem‐ber State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed 
 
 50. See below C. III. 
 51. Case C-212/97, ECR [1999] I-1459 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen. 
 52. Case C-208/00, ECR [2002] I-9919 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Com-
pany Baumanagement GmbH (NCC). 
 53. Case C-167/01, Kanter van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art 
Ltd, U. of 30 September 2003. 
 54. See Joerges, ‘Zur Legitimität der Europäisierung des Privatrechts. Überlegungen zu 
einem Recht-Fertigungs-Recht für das Mehrebenensystem der EU,’ in Joerges/Teubner, ibid. 
(note 26), 183, 189–194. 
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in  accordance  with  the  law  of  another  Member  State  in which it has its registered office but in which it conducts no business  where  the  branch  is  intended  to  enable  the  com‐pany  in question to carry on  its entire business  in the  state in  which  that  branch  is  to  be  created,  while  avoiding  the need  to  form  a  company  there,  thus evading  application of the  rules  governing  the  formation  of  companies  which,  in that state, are more restrictive as regards the paying up of a minimum share capital.55 
 Did the Court permit the Brydes,  in Gerhard Kegel’s well phrased words,56 to ‘cock a snoot’ at the law? Or, and this may be the case’s most popular reading, was it the ECJ’s intention to allow for a more efficient legal framework for company law in Europe?57 Maybe  the  truth  lies  in  the  middle?  What  is  so  abusive,  really, about setting up a company in another Member State with a seemingly more  beneficial  regulatory  system?  Should we  not  simply  understand it—as  the  ECJ  does—as  the  exercise  of  a  right  afforded  to  European citizens, a right which however will cede to  legitimate regulatory con‐cerns—foreclosing the concerns of those who warn against the superi‐ority of  economic against political  reason.  The ECJ did  not push aside Denmark’s right to enact compulsory provisions dealing with company law.  It placed Denmark under pressure to  justify why Danish registra‐tion fees would better serve the protection of creditors, which, accord‐ing  to  the  Danish  government’s  presentation,  was  the  object  of  the Danish  legislation.  The  Court  remained  unconvinced,  partly  because foreign companies were allowed to set up branches  in Denmark with‐out having to pay a registration fee. There are obvious parallels  to  the  jurisdiction on Article 28 TEC, which since Cassis de Dijon,  thus  for the past 34 years, has repeatedly found that Community  law must preserve and respect national  auton‐omy  (‘autonomieschonend’),  whilst  national  laws  must  pursue  their legitimate  regulatory  interests  in  conformity  with  Community  law (‘gemeinschaftsverträglich’).  In  other  words:  Danish  citizens  have  the right to test  their national sovereign  in a European court—the Brydes made use of their right.  In case  it  is found to be  in breach of European law, the Danish legislator is given the chance to amend its laws—and it 
 
 55. Sentence 1 of the tenor of the judgment, ECR [1999] I-1947. 
 56. In his editorial in Zeitschrift für Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (8) 1999 
(`Es ist was faul im Staate Dänemark und anderswo...`). 
 57. See Eidenmüller, ‘Wettbewerb der Gesellschaftsrechte in Europa,’ ZIP 2002, 2233. 
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has  done  so.58  The  new  regulation,  justified  by  legitimate  concerns  of the Danish government to secure tax demands, may be called into ques‐tion  again.  It  remains  to  be  seen—e.g.  whether  the  Brydes  are  again prepared to invest 10 years to challenge existing Danish law. 
Centros  has  not  remained without  consequences.  The  possibility that  interested  actors  would  try  to  test  how  far  their  new  freedoms would  reach  and  how  much  money  they  would  save,  was  easily  pre‐dictable yet  little  investigated.59 Debate  about  the  implications of Cen­
tros  in  terms  of  legal  systematique was however,  dense;  it helps us  in better understanding  the  two  following decisions.  In a  reference  for  a preliminary ruling by the Federal High Court of 30 May 2002 (Überseer­
ing),60  the  ECJ was  asked whether  German  law  could  prevent  a Dutch plaintiff from suing for over 1,000,000 DM by, firstly, restricting in § 50 (1)  of  its  Zivilprozessordnung  locus  standi  to  those  legally  competent (rechtsfähig)  companies,  and  secondly,  by prescribing  that  a  company incorporated according to Dutch law could lose its legal capacity once it transferred its activities to Germany in a way which constitutes, accord‐ing  to  German  law,  a  transfer  of  its  ‘seat’  or  legal  headquarters  (Ver­
waltungssitz).61  In an  internal market where  freedom of establishment exists  as  a  right,  such  legal principles  seem downright  incredible.62  In 
Inspire Art63 the ECJ continued its line of reasoning, and established: the right of a company set up under English law to carry on business in the Netherlands  should  be  respected  in  principle; only  for  ‘good’  reasons, not  accounted  for  in  European  secondary  legislation, may  this  funda‐mental freedom be restricted. The  Centros  judgment  found  Denmark’s  regulatory  interests  per se  legitimate.  In  the  follow‐up  decisions,  there  was  no  need  for  the 
 
 58. See Trefil, Centros und die Niederlassungsfreiheit von Gesellschaften in Europa, 
EUI Working Paper Law 2003/9, http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-9.pdf, 3l ff., referring to 
www.retsinfo.dk and the doubts about the solidarity of the Danish ‘Sonderweg.’ 
 59. lnstructively Baudisch. ‘From Status to Contract? An American Perspective on 
Recent Developments in European Company Law,’ in Snyder (ed.), The European Union and 
Governance, 2003, 24, 44 ff., who considers a ‘race to the bottom’ unlikely, because of 
existing interests for businesses in their reputation. 
 60. German Federal Court, BGH Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2000, 412. 
 61. See para. 45 of the Opinion of Advocate-General Colomer on 4 December 2001 for 
Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v. NCC GmbH. 
 62. Eventually the representation made by the German government, that the plaintiff 
could have acted as a company without legal personality under German law (cited in AG 
Colomer`s Opinion at para. 55: see also Roth, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfah-
rensrechts 2003, 117, 123 f.), will not suffice; poignantly Schanze/Jüttner, Die Akteingesell-
schaft 2003, 30. 
 63. Case C-167/01, U. v. 30.09.2003, Kamer van Koophandel v. Inspire Art Ltd., Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 2003, 3331. 
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Court to discuss the bars to the fundamental freedoms. But these ques‐tions have become  increasingly pressing: how are the general reasons in  favour of the ‘seat’ theory (Sitztheorie)—protection of creditors and of  subsidiary  companies;  co‐determination;  avoidance  of  double  taxa‐tion—to be accounted  for  in  the  future? Not by  invoking  the  seat  the‐ory!  In Europe’s multi‐level system, the  latter  is equally  as obsolete as its  counterpart,  the  ‘incorporation’  theory  (Gründungstheorie).  Both have no place in Europe’s postnational constellation.64 Their objectives must be expressed in different terms65 and addressed in a way so as to conform with Community principles.66  
III. Altmark Trans: Public Services after Privatization One of the most important characteristics of the Europeanization proc‐ess  is  that  it disconnects what  is  traditionally considered  ‘private  law’ from its regulatory context. This  is one of  the  inevitably disintegrative effects  of  integration,  legally  rooted  in  one  of  the  Community’s  core principles:  the  EU’s  competences  are  restricted  to  the  fields  enumer‐ated in the Treaty. Amongst them we find practically the whole field of regulatory law, and the Community has used those competences exten‐sively.67 The real world, however, continuously brings up constellations where  the  demarcation  of  competences  in  the  Treaty  does  not  corre‐spond with  real  existing  and  interconnected  regulatory  problem  con‐stellations.  Typically,  the European  level  is  competent  to  regulate  one aspect  of  a  problem,  whereas  Member  States  remain  competent  to 
 
 64. Clearly Schanze/Jüttner, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2003, 681, 685. 
 65. Especially Schanze/Jüttner, ibid., and Ulmer, Juristenzeitung 999, 662 and Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 2004, 1201 illustrate convincingly how this is possible. 
 66. The German co-determination rules are the most complicated, because they lack 
any functional equivalent elsewhere (see Dammann, 8 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 607).  
Co-determination may not be imposed on an undertaking simply because it uses its right to 
establishmentand vice versa: Community law may not dispense with an institution such as 
the German co-determination procedure, simply because it disturbs companies' freedom of 
establishment. It is instead left to initiate political processes through institutionalisation of 
existing tensions. An example, at first sight a little remote: the practices engaged by Microsoft 
in the US and in the EU are judged differently in either legal order. But where the EU, as was 
declared by the Commission on 24 March 2004, imposes its law in Europe, then it takes away 
de facto rights and freedoms Microsoft enjoys under US law. The EU can avail itself of a legal 
framework that does not leave these types of dilemmas to lie [with expected effects: see 
Sadowski/Junkes/Lindenthal, Labour Co·determination and Corporate Governance in Ger-
many, in: Schalbach (ed.). Corporate Governance, Essays in Honor of Horst Albach, 2nd ed. 
2003. 144]. 
 67. Jacques Delors in a slightly outdated but much cited statement announced that 80 
per cent of the economic law in Member States should be determined by the Community. 
Delors. ‘Europa im Umbruch. Vom Binnenmarkt zur Europäischen Union.’ in Kommission der 
EG (ed.), Europäische Gespräche, vol. 9. 1992, 12. 
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regulate  another  one.  The  term  ‘diagonal’  is  used  to  distinguish  such constellations  from,  on  the  one  hand,  ‘vertical’  conflict  resolutions where Community law trumps national law, and from ‘horizontal’ con‐flicts  which  arise  from  differences  among  the  Member  States’  legal systems and which belong to the domain of PIL on the other.68 The term ‘diagonal conflicts’ captures a structural characteristic of the European multi‐level system. Neither the European level nor the national level is in a position to address a specific problem in its entirety: European and national actors are forced to coordinate. Examples are legion, even though they do not always appear in the literature  under  the  heads  I  have  just  indicated.69  I  restrict  myself  to one: The Altmark Trans judgment of 24 July 200370 illustrates the impli‐cations  of  the  privatization71  of  public  services,  induced  by  European law;  these  Europeanized  so‐called  ‘Services  of  General  Interest’  or ‘Daseinsvorsorge’  are  controversial because they meet with  firmly em‐bedded national  regulatory  traditions,  expectations and  interests. The regulations they affect are not as much intertwined with private law as they may be in constellations where national private law pursues regu‐latory  goals  that may  collide with  some  goals  of  European  regulatory law. However, privatization initiatives are a major concomitant of inte‐gration; they affect the realm of private law as they determine to what extent services can be brought by and in conformity with the market. ‘Daseinsvorsorge’ was brought under the auspices of public law on the  basis  that  it  affected  basic  human  requirements  in  industrialised times. The German term was coined by no less than Karl Jaspers before 1933. The fact  that Ernst Forsthoff  in 1938 re‐applied the term  in the context of administrative law72 is no argument as such. In any case, it is correct  to  say  that  in  the  first  place  Daseinsvorsorge  had  to  gain  the social and democratic  legitimacy used today  in  its defence. Those who acknowledge its value, e.g. the British social philosopher Steven Lukes, must  fear the  ‘invasions of  the market’73  in Europe;  those who find no 
 
 68. See also Schmid (note 1), part 3, section 1, sub-section 1, chapter 2. 
 69. But see Schmid (note 1), part 3, chapter 2. 
 70. Case C·280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH v. Regierungspäisidium Magdeburg und 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, nyr. 
 71. On this process see ‘Communication on Services of General Interest in Europe` 
(COM (1996) 443 final of 11 September 1996), ‘Report on Services of General Interest` 
(COM (2001) 598 final of 17 October 2001) and the ‘Green Paper on Services of General 
Interest` (COM(2003) 270 final of 21 May 2003). 
 72. ‘Daseinsvorsorge als Aufgabe der modernen Verwaltung,’ idem., Die Verwaltung als 
Leistungsträger, 1938. 
 73. Lukes, ‘Invasions of the Market,’ in Dworkin et al. (eds.), From Liberal Values to 
Democratic Transition, 2003. Lukes argues within the anglo-saxon tradition: ‘As Marshall 
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place for it in a social welfare state, such as the expert committee to the German Federal Ministry of Commerce, would regard its protection by legal norms as an encroachment of ‘the citizens’ subjective rights, guar‐anteed  by  the  Community,  to  unhampered  participation  in  the  cross‐border transfer of goods and services’.74 
Altmark  Trans  concerned  subsidies  awarded  to  public  transport undertakings  in  the  Landkreis  of  Stendal  in  Germany.  The  case  itself may  seem  insignificant,  yet  the  ensuing  questions  are  of  fundamental importance: should availability of public transport be organised on the basis of social welfare and distributional justice or on the basis of effi‐ciency? Is this an openly political question to be decided by the German Lander  and  communes,  or  a  legal  question  for  Community  law  to  an‐swer? The ECJ knew not to decide these questions definitively, but  in‐stead  to  design  a  legal  framework  which  leaves  room  for  political processes and decisions—and still protects European concerns. This is, it seems to me, the core message of the decision which also brought up difficult  questions of  law concerning  the  interplay  between  secondary Community  law  and  the  German  public  transport  law  (Personenbe­
förderungsgesetz)  as  amended  in  1995.  Altmark  Trans  GmbH  and 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft mbH  both  sought  to organise public  transport in  the  Landkreis  of  Stendal  in  Sachsen–Anhalt,  one  of  the  German Lander. Altmark had been licensed, and got the license renewed by the Regierungspräsidium, whereas the bid of Nahverkehrsgesellschaft mbH was  rejected.  The  central  question  of  law  occupying  the  ECJ was:  did the  subsidies  given  to Altmark  Trans  after  it  had  been  granted  the  li‐cense  to  organise  bus  traffic  in  the  Landkreis  Stendal  qualify  as  state aid within the meaning of Art. 87 TEC? If yes,  then they would be sub‐ject  to  the Commission’s  competences under  the Treaty provisions on state aid. The  Court’s  response  sounds  like  old‐fashioned  legal  formalism: following  its own case  law, the Court  finds that an official act does not constitute state aid within the Treaty unless  it  includes an  ‘advantage’ to the beneficiary undertaking. Advantages for the purpose of state aid exclude financial means provided by the state by way of compensation 
 
argued, the first half of the twentieth century saw the acquisition by citizens of a range of 
basic services to which they could claim entitlement as citizens, services funded and provided 
by the state and thus excluded from the scope of the market. These are sometimes seen as 
constituents of ‘social citizenship’ but they can, equally, be seen as supplying the precondi-
tions for core citizenship by enabling citizens to acquire and maintain the capacities needed 
for its equal exercise.’ 
 74. My translation; see Expert Committee to the German Federal Ministry of Commerce 
[Wissenschaflicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft], ‘Daseinsvorsorge’ im 
europäischen Binnenmarkt, 2002, 7. 
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for public service obligations taken on by the service provider. But the Court  goes  further,  operationalizing  its  own  distinction  by  four  crite‐ria:75  (1)  The  recipient must  be  required  to  discharge  clearly  defined public  service  obligations;  (2)  The  parameters  of  the  calculated  com‐pensation must be established in advance in an objective and transpar‐ent  manner;  (3)  The  compensation  must  not  exceed  costs  plus  a reasonable  profit;  (4)  Decisions  are  to  be  taken  either  after  a  public procurement  procedure  or  the  level  of  compensation  is  to  be  deter‐mined  on  the  basis  of  an  analysis  of  the  costs  of  typical  undertaking, well run and adequately provided with adequate means of transport. These responses do bear some problems. They need to be further concretized  and  their  implementation  will  be  challenging.  But  they have high normative qualities: European  law does not take a stand for or against the organisation of public services through national welfare states;  it  decides  neither  for  nor  against  the  market.  Instead  it  puts justificatory pressure on national politics and forces those who organ‐ise  public  services  to  explain  how  they  fulfil  their  social  mandate.  It ‘constitutionalizes’  the  multi‐level  system  so  as  to  accommodate  the decentralised exercise of  formative (national) political  freedom, whilst at  the same time allowing  for European concerns to afford market  ac‐cess to non‐local suppliers. And if this were to prove a successful solu‐tion  guaranteeing  and  manifesting  some  social  sense  in  national practices,  then  it  would  be  an  achievement  that  so  far  has  remained hardly  conceivable  in  most  integrated  political  systems76—a  ‘proce‐dural’ conflict solution par excellence. C. VERBA DOCENT: ON THE PROCEDURAL LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS What I am now trying  is to bring the abstract deliberations in the  first part and the analyses of the second part into a synthesis. I will proceed in three steps. The first follows the understanding of Europe as a multi‐level  system,  to  demonstrate  its  implications  for  integration  policy. Normative  dependencies  of  political  action  become  apparent  in  this process and are being re‐conceptualised, in a second step, in legal cate‐gories. In a final step l will sketch out the legal constitution of the Euro‐peanization  process  itself,  which,  it  is  my  claim,  must  be  designed procedurally,  in order to overcome the  impasses of European  law and the methodological nationalism in comparative law and PIL. 
 
 75. Case C-280/00 (note 68), paras. 89–95. 
 76. See, Zürn/Joerges (eds.), Governance and Law in Post-National Constellations. 
Compliance in Europe and Beyond, 2005. 
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I. Farewell to Orthodox Supranationalism Europe is no federation, but more than a regime. It  is a heterarchically structured  multi‐level  system.  It  must  organise  its  political  action  in networks.  Since  the  powers  and  resources  for  political  action  are  lo‐cated at various and relatively autonomous levels in the EU, the coping with  functionally  interwoven  problem‐constellations  will  depend  on the  communication  between  the  various  actors  who  are  relatively autonomous  in  their  various  domains,  but  at  the  same  time mutually dependent.77  Jürgen  Neyer  formulated  his  thesis  in  a  most  concrete fashion,  usually  avoided  by  political  scientists:  the  EU‐specific  condi‐tions  for political action favour a deliberative mode of  communication that  is  bound  by  rules  and  principles  and  where  arguments  are  ac‐cepted only if they are capable of universal application.78 These consid‐erations  can help  legal  science  to  satisfy  an undeniable  need  to afford its declarative statements some normative value. But they cannot sub‐stitute the argumentative construction of normative statements specific to law, and they leave room for additional argumentation. To translate Neyer’s  argument:  the  European  legal  framework  is  not  designed merely  to  secure  fundamental  freedoms;  but  neither  to  create  a  new European  state.  The  purpose  of  European  law  is  instead  to  discipline the interactions necessary within the Community to act politically. It is to  guide  strategic  action  into  a  deliberative  style  of  politics.  It  should leave behind ‘vertical’ (‘orthodox’) supranationalism and instead found its validity as law on the normative (deliberative) quality of the political processes  that  create  it.79 To which we may add:80 No  state  in Europe can  make  or  refrain  from  making  decisions  without  causing  ‘extra‐territorial’ effects on  its neighbours. Provocatively put, but brought to its  logical  conclusion,  this  means:  nationally  organised  constitutional states are becoming unable to act democratically. They  cannot  include in  the  electoral  processes,  determining  the  democratic  sovereign,  all those who will be affected by their decisions. And vice versa: their citi‐zens  cannot  influence  the  behaviour  of  those  political  actors who  are 
 
 77. See above A. IV. 
 78. ‘Discourse and Order in the EU. A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Gove-
mance,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (2003), 687; more detailed in his habilitation 
thesis, Postnationale politische Herrschaft, 2004. 
 79. See Joerges/Neyer, with Jürgen Neyer. ‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to 
Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology,’ 3 (1997) European 
Law Journal 273; Joerges, ‘Good Governance’ in the European Internal Market: Two Com-
peting Legal Conceptualisation of European Integration and their Synthesis,’ in: von Bog-
dandy/Mavroides/Mény (eds.), European Integration and International Co-ordination. Studies 
in Transnational Economic Low in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 2002, 219. 
 80. See Joerges, ‘The Impact,’ ibid. (note 28). 
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taking  the  relevant  decisions  for  them.  It would  thus  seem  legitimate for Europe  to  require  its Member  States  to design  their national  laws with a view to accommodate Community law. It would also seem sensi‐ble  to  afford Member  States’  citizens  legal  rights  that  are  truly  Euro‐pean  because  they  allow  national  citizens  to  compare  their  own  laws with the laws and the experiences in other Member States. 
II. European Law as Choice of Law and the Constitutionalization of 
Transnational Governance The  normative  claims  identified  above  of  ‘deliberative  supranational‐ism’  should not  be portrayed as  some  remote wish  list. They are well documented  and  somewhat  canonised  in  real  existing  European  law: Member  States of  the Union may not  enforce  their  interests  and  their laws  unboundedly.  They  are  bound  to  respect  European  freedoms. They may not discriminate.  They may only pursue  ‘legitimate’  regula‐tory  policies  approved  by  the  Community.  They  must  coordinate  in relation to what regulatory concerns they can follow, and design their national  regulatory  provisions  in  the  most  Community‐friendly  way. What  is the meaning of all this,  for the relationship between European and national  law  in general, and the Europeanization of private  law  in particular? Two  complementary  patterns  of  legalisation,  of  Verrechtlichung, and responsibilities  for the law, may be differentiated. All of the above principles  and  rules  substantiating  a  ‘deliberative  suprnationalism’ affect how we deal with differences between laws. They  impose a duty on Member States to take into consideration ‘foreign’ affairs and inter‐ests. To European law, they have assigned the task of making sure that national  law  is  compatible  with  Community  principles.  In  that  sense, the law of the Community is a  ‘choice‐of‐law’ (‘Kollisionsrecht’). It does more  than  traditional  PIL,  in  that  its  decision‐making  criteria  are  not there to identify the geographically closer or factually preferable law or decide between colliding interests in the application of the law. It does not  work  on  the  assumption  that  between  equally  involved  national laws  a  choice  should  be made.  Rather,  it  requires  national  laws  to  be made  Community‐compatible  through  innovation  and  modification, and the development and observance of principles and  rules,  in order to  organise  the  differences  between  them.  All  these  factors  impose limits on national sovereignty.  In addition, Union  citizens are afforded rights  that  are  directly  applicable  in  their  own  as much  as  in  foreign Member States—forcing a duty on  the national  legislator  to  justify  its actions in a European forum. 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Member States are being asked to make changes to their legal sys‐tems—changes  that  should  in  principle  take  place  there,  for  them  to effectively guarantee that Europe’s innovative impact will help national legal systems to evolve sensibly.81 However,  this  is but one side of  the process. Building on just those measures that are promoting free trade and  the  Europeanization  of  our  markets  and  rejecting  the  individual states’  interests  and  orientations,  European  transnational  governance structures  have  developed  and  unfolded  their  own  logic  and  signifi‐cance. This  holds  true  for  all  domains  of  regulatory  policy82—including the  traditional  realm  of  ‘private  law’,  at  least  indirectly.83  And  in  all those fields where private  law  instruments are being deployed for the organization  of  transnational  activities,  suitable  arrangements  are likely to establish themselves. Regulatory politics have seen an  intense debate for some time on the question of how these new forms of trans‐national  governance  can  be  conceptualised  legally  (‘constitution‐alized’). Discussions are equally  intense in the area of competition pol‐icy after its ‘modernization’ in Regulation 1/2003.84 85 It is only a matter  of time for those discussions to reach private law. 
III. Juridifying the Europeanization Process Private  law  cannot  ignore  the  postnational  constellation  it  finds  itself placed  in.  It cannot pretend there  is still a set of autonomous national legal systems. It can do equally little about the fact that Europe is not a state, and is not on  its way to statehood. All it can do is  try to bind po‐litical processes to  legal principles and to  influence  law making  in the European  multi‐level  system.  The  literature  on  Europeanization  of private  law  talks too  little  about these  framework conditions.  It  is not obvious which  legislative  institution  in Europe would be competent to write a Civil Code that could absorb the rich diversity of European legal traditions.  It  is  not  obvious  how  any  such  Code  could  keep  pace with the evolutionary dynamic of  regulatory politics.  There are no  signs of an expansion of the European judiciary, yet an expansion seems indis‐
 
 81. See the remarks in note 28 and also Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition versus Har-
monisation in European Company Law,’ Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2 
(1999), 231. 
 82. See Joerges, Europarecht 2002, 17. 
 83. See above B. III. 
 84. OJ L 2003/1 of 4 January 2003. See also: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition 
/antitrust/legislation/proceduraI_rules/comments/ 
 85. The Commission home page gives an impression: http://europa.eu.int/comm/com-
petition/antitrust/legislation/proceduraI_rules/comments/ 
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pensable, if the new law is to enjoy effective validity.86 The status quo is anything but  ideal. Europeanization takes place  in an  incremental  and fragmented  fashion.  Citizens  seeking  to  enforce  their  legal  rights  are being subjected to unacceptable burdens. Yet, over all we are facing an innovative process full of opportunities. Typically,  the  most  problematic  amongst  the  case  law  constella‐tions analysed  in part two is the one that rigorously brings to bear the principles  emerging  from  the  formative  period  of  European  law.  The ECJ  ‘s  thesis  that the provisions of  the Product Liability Directive have effected a ‘complete harmonisation’, undeniably ignores that if product liability law is to be applied sensibly, it should be placed in the particu‐lar context of elements of fault and liability, objective standards of neg‐ligence,  product  safety  legislation and  self‐regulation  (standardization and  certification).  It  is  hard  to  imagine  how  the  ECJ  could  not  have taken these circumstances into account, but equally difficult to see how its punctual intervention could contribute sensibly to the Europeaniza‐tion of product liability and product safety law. Things  are  different  for  company  law.  Here  the  ECJ  pronounced clear and consistent orientation points  in a way that is manageable  for secondary  Community  law  as  well  as  national  legal  systems.  The  ECJ has conferred political rights on the ‘market citizen’, without affording either  the market  or market  citizens  law‐making  powers.  The  Court’s findings  on  the  privatisation  of  public  services  appears  to me  equally productive.  Legal  traditions,  social  expectations,  political  preferences, administrative  know‐how  and  market  innovation—all  these  are  very different  between  Brittany  and  Estonia,  between  Faroe  Islands  and Sicily. Europe seems destined to  institute  innovation and to encourage social  learning.  It  is not Europe’s  job to subject  the continent to a uni‐tary regime. The incrementalism of the Europeanization process is challenging but  also  full  of  opportunities.  Europe  is  no  polity  in  the  way  nation states are.  It will have  to  live with  its  complex diversity  illustrated  in the  case  law  above:  primary  law  granting  fundamental  freedoms  and basic  rights;  transnational  governance  arrangements  in  numerous 
 
 86. ‘Kommt die Geschäftswelt nicht ganz gut zurecht?’—‘but isn’t the business world 
doing quite well?’—Ernst Steindorff asked more than a decade ago (see the report of the 
symposium ‘Alternativen zur legislatorischen Rechtsvergleichung‘ by Oliver Remien in Rabels 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht 56 (1992), 261 ff., 300 ff.], just to 
re-pose the question now (Aufgaben künftiger europäischer Privatrechtssetzung angesichts 
deutscher Erfahrungen, Festschrift Peter Ulmer 2003, 1393, 1407, note 63) and to add to its 
context: those who lobby for greater legislative ambit in Europe should also ask for a corre-
sponding expansion of Europe's judiciary’s powers which nobody will be eager to finance. 
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fields of regulatory politics; legislative and judicial interventions affect‐ing only a section of the national legal systems and leading to irritation. This diversity  creates by no means a comfortable situation. Maybe we will  find  that  its  complexity  exceeds  our  learning  capacities.  But  I  am confident  that  it makes  no  sense  simply  to  imagine  a more  simplistic legal landscape. 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Emerging Patterns—the EU, Iraq, Afghanistan…* 
 
Chibli Mallat** 
 I. INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONALISM’S INTERNATIONAL DRIVE Amongst  the  furthest  encompassing  contemporary  reflections  on  law stand  the  works  of  Paul  Kahn.  In  a  contribution  to  a  Latin American/New England  seminar  on  law and violence  in 2003, he had this to say about the EU:   The political project of the EU, for example, is about displacing a sacrificial politics with a set of bureaucratic arrangements for the  administration  of  markets  and  social‐welfare.  If  the romantic  element  in  Western  politics  has  been  in  its attachment  to sacrifice of  the body,  the EU project  is  just  the opposite:  it  is politics as management of  the well‐being of  the body.  The  bureaucrat  in  Brussels  is  the  very  opposite  of  the romantic  politician.  The  longing  to  join  the  EU  among  the countries  of  Eastern  Europe  is  not  just  about  economics,  but also about depoliticalization, i.e., about an emerging perception of sacrificial politics as a form of pathology. Indeed, the entire effort of the international human rights movement is rooted in this  vision  of well‐being.  No  one,  on  this  view,  should  die  or suffer for politics.1 
 
 *   The Third Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke 
University School of Law, Sept. 28, 2004. Reprinted with permission from CONSTITUTIONS FOR 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, EMERGING PATTERNS: THE EU, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN…, in THE LAW 
APPLIED, CONTEXTUALIZING THE ISLAMIC SHARIA’A 194 (PERI BEARMAN, ET AL. EDS., I.B. TAURUS & 
CO LTD, 2008).   
 **   Presidential Professor of Law, University of Utah, Jean Monnet Chair in Law, EU 
Centre of Excellence, University Saint Joseph. Principal, Mallat law offices, Beirut. This is a 
lightly footnoted version of the Third Herbert L. Bernstein Annual Memorial Lecture in 
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updated the text slightly considering the important changes in both the EU and Iraqi 
constitutional scenes; the central argument has not changed. 
 1. Paul W. Kahn, “Sacred Violence,” SELA 2003, 13. SELA, acronym of Seminario en 
Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y Democracia, brings together a group of leading 
academics mostly from Latin American and North American law schools, who meet usually 
Chibli Mallat, Constitutions for the 21st Century: Emerging Patterns—the EU, Iraq, Afghanistan…, 1 Duke L. CICLOPs 
41 (2009) 
Duke Law CICLOPs | Chibli Mallat  Vol. 1 
 
42 
There are several strands  in the Kahnian view which will appear elusive  for  those  who  have  not  followed  his  fertile  search  for  the triangle love‐law‐religion, and the meanings relevant to the triangle for such  issues  as  war  and  international  relations,  the  body,  or  human rights.  In a vision which tends to be overall bleak, the silver  lining  is a peculiar  form  of  legal  optimism,  which  is  of  significance  to  anyone interested in reform despite the less humane aspects of human beings.2 Here we need to bifurcate: One bifurcation regards the EU and constitution‐making, the other is Kantian, and regards constitutions and war. Strong  moments  in  constitution‐making  often  result  from traumas—sacrificial  politics,  amongst  which  the  archetype  stands  as Abraham’s offer to sacrifice his son for God in order to save his people, religion and nation. The case of the EU, which is universally considered a triumph of Europe over its 20th Century most tragic traumas, two World Wars  for the Europe of 6,  the Cold War for Europe of  the 25 to 30,  is a living,  acknowledged  example,  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  another.  Nothing defines trauma for Afghanis and Iraqis more than war, internal and inter‐national, for over a quarter of a century, and their most lasting response, if war  is  to be transcended, will be a working constitution. Here stands the  contribution  of  Kahn  at  its  best:  21st  century  constitution‐making conceived  as  a  response  to  the  failures  of  the  20th  century,  and  a  new prism—the love, religion, law triangle—to go beyond comparing the trite and the insignificant, or the incomparable, or the hard to compare. This chapter  follows a similar quest. Rather than looking at these three  perforce  unique  constitutions  simply  through  black‐letter  law,  I shall  try  to  look  beyond  the  arrangements  of  the  respective constitutional texts for the emerging patterns of constitution‐making. Before  that,  a  brief  word  off  the  Kantian  bifurcation  in  its  leg which  is  not  totally  unrelated  to  the  argument  of  this  chapter—that there  is  a  core  common  thematic  constitutional  horizon  across  the planet. That leg is the subject of a separate “work in progress.” As Kahn also  says,  “after  Einstein,  we  are  all  Kantians,”3  and  no  person  has 
 
once a year under the auspices of the Yale Law School. SELA is animated by Professor 
Owen Fiss. I read here Depoliticization instead of Depoliticalization. 
 2. We find Kahn bleak on the intersection of psychology and law (Law and Love: The 
Trials of King Lear, New Haven, 2000) and international law (“Universal Jurisdiction and the 
Rule of Law,” in John Borneman ed., The Case of Ariel Sharon Case and the Fate of 
Universal Jurisdiction, Princeton 2004, 131–145); more positive on domestic law, The Reign 
of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America, New Haven 1997; Legitimacy 
and History: Self-Government in American Constitutional Theory, New Haven 1992. 
 3. Kahn, “Sacred Violence,” 3. 
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written a more meaningful treatise on war, constitutional treatises and international law than Immanuel Kant. On the occasion the bicentenary of Kant’s death, the Goethe‐Institut has been particularly inspired in its depiction  of  the  2004 Zeitgeist  through  the  poster which  puts,  on  the one side, the 300+ wars that have befallen mankind since 1804, on the other  the  text  of  his  Treatise  for  a  Perpetual  Peace.4  That  dimension belongs to a separate work, in progress, on Kant’s TPP, but it cannot be totally shorn from our present reflection, so much steeped in war those societies  working  out  these  constitutional  texts,  and  so  menacing  to both domestic and international peace if they fail their promise. Should Iraq,  Afghanistan  and  the  EU  roll  their  constitutions  back,  and  the political trend seems to indicate that they have, much of the promise of peace will fall by the wayside. In  Europe,  the  new  constitutional  order  was  designed  by  Jean Monnet to prevent a repeat of World Wars I and II, both classic wars. A collapse of the Afghani and Iraqi theatres of violence in the so‐called “war on terrorism,” a sui generis development increasingly dubbed as the third or  fourth  world  war,  will  have  incalculable  consequences  first  for  the peoples of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also for the rest of the planet.5 So while that part of  the Kantian bifurcation would appear at  first glance  to  stand  outside  the  pale  of  the  present  study,  constitution  as antidote to war suffuses it throughout: already the inside‐outside image of constitutions is breaking at the seams. Traditionally, constitutions are eminently sovereign texts, made by people to rule themselves by them‐selves.  This  is  no  longer  the  case.  The  fiction  of  a  self‐organized  Iraqi constitution,  or  of  a  self‐organized  Afghani  constitution,  might  be naturally  peddled  by  the  Iraqi  and  Afghani  governments,  few  believe their constitutional input and output isn’t international. As for the Euro‐pean  Union,  even  a  fiction  encompassing  the  15  Member‐States,  or indeed  the additional  ten delegations  from  the enlarged  continent who attended  the  Constitutional  Convention,  makes  the  effort  by  nature  a particularly non‐national one. More  importantly,  the  international drive 
 
 4. All the major wars are listed on a poster published on the anniversary of Kant’s 
double centenary’s death in 2004 by the Goethe-Institut. Kant’s famous treatise, Zum Ewigen 
Frieden. appeared first in 1795. 
 5. James Woolsey, CIA director during the first Clinton Administration, is to my 
knowledge at the origins of the description of the post-September 11 era as “fourth world 
war.” For a robust legal debate on the contours of the new “war,” see Bruce Ackerman, “The 
Emergency Constitution,” 113 Yale. L.J. 1029 (2004) and the forum devoted to the responses 
of David Cole, “The priority of morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot,” 113 Yale 
L.J. 1753 (2004), and of Laurence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge, “The Anti-Emergency 
Constitution,” 113 Yale L.J. 1801 (2004), together with the rejoinder of Ackerman, “This is Not 
a War,” 113 Yale L.J. 1871 (2004). 
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of  E.U.  constitutionalism  is  now  formally  enshrined  in  the  European Union’s “proximity policy.” Proximity is not only about Turkey, the immediate next‐door giant of  the EU. The most  intriguing, perhaps the most  interesting article  in the  European  Constitution  in  terms  of  emerging  patterns—read  here challenges—of the 21st century appears in Part I, Title VIII of the text,  Title VIII, The Union and its Neighbours Article I‐57: The Union and its Neighbours 1.  The  Union  shall  develop  a  special  relationship  with neighbouring States, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and  characterised  by  close  and  peaceful  relations  based  on cooperation.6  Much  has  been  built  on  this  seemingly  innocuous  article,  on different levels. On the political plane, a full and daring proximity policy was announced and followed through,  from a European perspective, by the former head of the Commission, Professor Romano Prodi. This policy suggests  including  any  willing  neighbouring  state  in  the  EU  system, except  for  the  institutions.  Short  of  voting  and  being  represented  in Brussels,  “everything  else”  could  be  common,  European.7  On  the  aca‐demic  plane,  I  have  tried  to  develop  this  concept  as  a  solution  to  the Arab‐Israeli problem by way of a Hegelian‐style Aufhebung resting on the freedom  of  circulation  and  establishment  through  the  new  immense territory constituted by the EU + its Mediterranean neighbourhood.8 The EU as solution to the hundred‐year conflict over Palestine is one striking illustration,  following  which  the  right  to  return  for  Palestinians  would find  its  application  in  their  freedom  of  movement  over  the  new  “EU” territory that includes Israel. For Israel, the fear of a destabilizing influx would be tempered by its opening up to a European space where part of its security would be naturally one shared with the EU. 
 
 6. EU Constitution, final draft as agreed in Dublin, June 2004 (Text widely available on 
the internet, hereinafter EU Constitution). 
 7. Romano Prodi, “L’Europe et la Méditerranée: venons en aux faits,” Louvain-la-
neuve, 26 Novembre 2002 ; Romano Prodi, “L’Europa più grande: una politica di vicinato 
come chiave di stabilità,” ECSA conference, Bruxelles, 5-6 Décembre 2002, COM (203) 104, 
Bruxelles 11 Mars 2003. Mallat, “Des relations privilégiées entre l’Union et les pays voisins,” 
ECSA 2002, 5 December 2002, forthcoming as EU Commission publication. 
 8. See Mallat, “George Weidenfeld’s bright idea,” The Daily Star, 16 July 2003; “L’UE 
entre déficit démocratique et Méditerranée en feu,” L’Orient-Le Jour, 21 June 2004. 
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This  is  a  long  shot,  a  generation  at  least  away.  Still,  if  emerging patterns for the 21st century are to be sought, one can see how the EU has now  internalized,  in  the  revolutionary  text  of  Art.I‐57,  that  pattern  of constitutional  internationalization. While  it sounds excessive to think of it in such grandiloquent terms as the chance of a peaceful Mediterranean, more  specifically  a  solution  to  the  Arab‐Israeli  conflict  much  in  the manner  that Europe has  “solved”  the Northern  Ireland problem, one  is staring in Art.57 the promise of a century, not just of a few years. And if the  Good  Friday Agreement marks  a  real  turning  point  in  Irish history conceived in its four‐centuries long pattern of violence, it is undoubtedly the result of European integration. For it can hardly be conceived outside the framework of the concept of regionalization—and the hankering for a realization of subsidiarity across Europe and within its regions, the well‐established as well as the contentious ones.9 II. SIMPLIFIERS: PERSISTENT MONTESQUIEUIAN ISSUES So much  for  constitutionalism’s  international  drive.  Let  us  take  a  step back, and indulge in a few simplifiers. By simplifiers I mean those trusted mileposts which are the basics of constitutional making, and which any drafter needs to contemplate in accordance with a received vision which is  essentially  an  eighteenth  century  legacy  of  political science/constitutionalism, more specifically a Montesquieuian one. This is  the  concept  of  separation  of  powers,  or  the  checks  and  balances  in American  lore, coupled with the concept of  federalism to accommodate regional disparities. Such vertical and horizontal division of powers is the stuff of any constitution‐making, arguably since Plato and Aristotle,10 and goes  along  a  number  of  classical  questions  from  both  sides  of  society. Seen  from  the  top,  how  solid  and  impermeable  are  the  boundaries between  powers  in  the  state?  This,  reduced  to  its  simplest  expression, raises the need to make a choice between a presidential and  legislative constitution,  and  a  choice  between  a  federal  system  and  a  centralized one.  What  are  the  powers  of  federated  states,  and  if  there  are  no federated  states,  how  is  power  devolved  and  exercised  by  regional entities? Seen from the bottom, what voting power does the citizen have, as  individual  and as member  of  a  collectivity? What  recourse  does  the individual have in case of infringement on his or her rights as enshrined in the text? 
 
 9. For some of the extensive treatments in this vein of Northern Ireland and Palestine, 
see e.g. the works of Gideon Gotlieb and Donald Horowitz. 
 10. Central reference to Plato’s Republic ix, Aristotle’s Politics, chapter 1, Cicero’s De 
Republica, chapters 1 and 2. 
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Now even simplifiers can make life complicated when comparisons are exercised  in dual  terms,  let  alone when  three nascent  constitutions are being compared. National systems of  law,  the  first year  law student learns  quickly,  are  self‐sufficient.  In  a  fiction  which  is  essential  to understanding its realm, law operates outside history as well as outside geography.  Legal  history  might  explain  much,  but  it  works  in  a  way irrelevant  to  the  substance,  or  content,  provided  by  a  given  law. Comparative law is an additional luxury: use of comparative law may be edifying, enlightening or enriching, even persuasive; it is never decisive. Yes,  there are  increasing exceptions  in global  law.11 But  legal history, as well  as  comparative  law,  remain  luxuries.  The  law  stands  for  what  it disposes hic et nunc, not for how it came about, or what country it com‐pares with beyond the realm of the jurisdiction in which it holds sway. It therefore makes sense, from the vantage point of simplifiers, at the overall architectonics of our three constitutions, with each as a self‐contained arrangement. 
Afghanistan.  Starting  with  the  simplest,  the  Constitution  of  “the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” as defined in Article 1. Simplest because it  has  now  been  adopted  (24  January  2004);  the  other  two  remain transient, either getting superseded by repeated amendments as in Iraq, or frozen, as for the EU after the rejection of the agreed text by a majority of  the  French  and  Dutch  citizens.  Simplest  because  it  is  an  essentially presidential constitution, with a person—Hamid Karzai—in mind draw‐ing  the  constitution  and  implementing  it.  Simplest  because  there  is  no federalism  in  the  text.  Simplest  because,  despite  the  international convulsions in the modern history of Afghanistan, the non‐Afghani input, unlike for Iraq and the EU, is limited. Simplest, finally, because there does not  seem  to  have  been  too  much  work  behind  it.12  By  contrast,  the emergence  of  the  Iranian  Constitution  in  1979  has  left  constitutional scholars a formidable trail of constituents’ minutes.13 
 
 11. Progress in comparative law within the US Supreme Court can be read in Stanford 
v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2001) cert. denied 71 USLW 3236 (S.Ct. 2002), decided on 
October 7, 2002 (execution of juvenile offenders) and in Atkins v. Virginia, No. 00-8452, 
decided on 20 June 2002. (execution of mentally retarded defenders). The trend is 
adumbrated and developed in Harold Koh, “Paying ‘Decent Respect’ to World Opinion on the 
Death Penalty,” 35 UC David L R 1085–1131, at 1104. Judith Resnik, “Law’s Migration: 
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry,” 115 
Yale L.J. 1564 (2006). 
 12. The little available can be found in a report by the Secretariat of the Constitutional 
Commission of Afghanistan, ‘The Constitution-making Process,’ 10 March 2003. Henceforth 
reference to “Afghani Constitution,” text available as pdf in English, Pashtu and Dari on the 
internet, e.g. on http://www.loc.gov/law/guide/afghanistan.html. 
 13. They can be found in two series of official documents, of three and four volumes 
respectively, entitled Surat-e mashruh-e muzakarat-e shura-ye majles-e barrasi-ye niha’i-ye 
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Composed  of  a  preamble  and  one  hundred  and  sixty  articles,  and divided into twelve neat chapters, the Afghani Constitution was written in Pashtu and Dari,  two of  the several  languages  recognized by Article 16.14 Following  a  familiar  and  didactic  terrain,  the  Constitution  presents  the main  attributes  of  the  State  of  Afghanistan  in  the  Preamble  and  first chapter—flag, languages, religion, economic traits and state responsibility for citizens’ welfare, education, place in the international order—followed by  the  citizens’  fundamental  rights  (chapter  2).  The  organs  of  the  state cover  chapters  3  to  8:  presidency,  government,  national  assembly,  Loya Jirga,  judiciary,  administrative  divisions.  “Special  dispositions”  are enshrined  in the  last  four  chapters,  including the state of  emergency and the amendment process. Most significant in terms of separation of powers is  the establishment of Afghanistan as a  centralized presidential republic, where the head of the executive is elected directly by popular suffrage if he or  she  gets  over  50  percent  of  the  vote.  The  two  candidates  with  the highest vote in the first turn, as in France, fight it out in a second turn.15 “No one can be elected as president for more than two terms.”16 The  president  is  extremely  powerful  under  the  Constitution,  as  he heads  the  Cabinet—there  is  no  Prime  Minister.  The  list  of  presidential prerogatives  is  long  and  wide‐ranging,  to  which  should  be  added  the prerogatives of a cabinet which cannot be brought down by Parliament by a  vote  of  confidence,  with  the  exception  of  individual  ministers.  The president  is  even  entitled  to  name  some  of  the  members  of  the  Upper House (the Elders’ House). Parliament under the Constitution is composed of  two  houses,  to  which  should  be  added  the  Loya  Jirga,  originally  a congregation  of  tribal  leaders  in  which  the  Constitution  vests  some historical mantle of  sovereignty.17  In  reality,  the Loya  Jirga  consists  of  all the  parliamentarians,  to  which  are  added  provincial  and  district  council heads, and the members of government. The Loya Jirga is supposed to deal with the supreme interests of the country, but it is again the president who is entitled to convene it. Presumably, it can in some cases meet of its own 
 
qanun-e asasi-ye jumhuri-ye islami-ye iran (Tehran 1985-89) and Surat-e mashruh-e 
muzakarat-e shura-ye baznegari-ye qanun-e asasi-ye jumhuri-ye islami-ye iran (Tehran 
1990). 
 14. Afghani Constitution, Art.16:  “Pashtu and Dari (which is a variation of Persian) are 
the official languages of the state.” 
 15. Afghani Constitution, Art.61. 
 16. Afghani Constitution, Art. 62. 
 17. Afghani Constitution, Art.110, Loya Jirga as historical “manifestation of the people of 
Afghanistan,” see the classic work of the late Louis Dupree (d. 1989), Afghanistan, Princeton 
1980. 
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accord, since it is also entitled to pass judgment on the president in case he dramatically fails his duties, such as committing crimes against humanity.18 Loya Jirga and “crimes against humanity,” a phrase which appears in several  articles  of  the  Afghan  constitution,  provides  the  comparative lawyer with the most original concepts in the text. The bottom line is about centralized  presidential  power,  where  the  battle  will  be  fought  for  the foreseeable  future,  for  Afghanistan  as well  as  for  Iraq,  and,  to  an  extent which we need to dwell also upon, in the European Union. The place of the president  as  chief  executive  rallying  the  country  is  the  more  important locus  of  constitutional  attention  since  the  Afghani  and  Iraqi  experience, despite  sharing  common  “international”  inputs,  underline  the  difficult  of agreeing  on  the  place  of  the  head  of  the  executive  branch  under  a Montesquieuian  scheme  of  things.  In  Afghanistan,  as  the  text  stands,  the president  trumps  the  rest  of  the  Constitutional  arrangements,  be  they central  or  federal.  This  may  be  unwise,  especially  since  the  incumbent owes his position to “being the smallest common denominator” picked by the  UN.19  The  battle  for  executive  power  will  continue  to  define constitution‐making  in the 21st  century,  as  it has  from time  immemorial. This is a certainty. Whether it is wise is a different matter. 
Iraq.  In  Iraq,  the  battle  for  the presidency has  taken another  shape, despite  a  similar  international  input,  including  the  same  UN  envoy.  It played itself out differently, and the idiosyncrasies of history got the upper hand on planning.20 Unfortunate Iraqis, trying to find some peace after thirty five years of  solid  dictatorship,  including  the  longest  Middle  East  war  in  20th century  history,  and  two  or  three  invasions,  that  is  their  invasion  of others,  and  others  invading  them,  plus  a  twelve year  sanctions  regime followed by occupation: in the midst of which mayhem they put together a  “wonderful  new  Constitution.”21  It  is  true  that  the  Iraqis,  who  forge 
 
 18. Afghani Constitution, Arts. 110 to 115. 
 19. As explained by the UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi, who supported Hamid Karzai’s 
nomination on the basis that his name appeared on all the lists requested from the various 
leaders and lawlords of Afghanistan. 
 20. For some of these highly unusual circumstances, Mallat, “Malgré tout, une leçon de 
démocratie à Bagdad,” L'Orient-le Jour, 2 June 2004. 
 21. The description of the Constitution as “wonderful” is owed to the editors of the New 
York Times who propped up the comment I submitted into excessive enthusiasm, “East 
Meets West, at Least on Paper,” New York Times, 11 March 2004. Here I discuss what 
became know in English as the Transitional Administrative Law, TAL (Qanun idarat al-dawlat, 
literally the law for the governance of the country, agreed on March 1, 2004 by the Iraqi 
Governing Council, and published by the Coalition Provisional Authority on 8 March as “Law 
of Administration for the State of Iraq for the transitional period.”) The TAL, which preceded 
the “final” Constitution of 2005, exhibits similar trends. The “final” Constitution of 2005 
mentions that it needs to be completed, and so its finality is relative even on its own accord. 
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ahead  with  a  Constitution  against  the  odds,  deserve  a  burst  of enthusiastic  kudos.  But  one  should  perhaps  remain  reserved  on  such elusive  matters  for  fear  of  ridicule—getting  “mugged  by  reality”  is  a fashionable term. In  the midst of  so much violence, how did  they do  it  in  Iraq?  They, here,  are  a  hapless  though  talented  duo:  Iraqi‐”international”  (chiefly American). One must realize what constitution‐writing means in Iraq 2004, and  it means a  lot of English, not only because a U.N. Security Resolution had  consecrated  a  governor  of  Iraq  who  is  solely  American‐English speaking,  and  so wields  the  ultimate  signature upon  any  text  Iraqis may want  to  turn  into  law,  but  more  fundamentally  because  the  legal  and judicial  body  politic  of  Iraq  is  simply  inexistent.  It  is,  unfortunately,  as tragic as it sounds: so destructive of any judicial independence has the rule of  the  former  Iraqi dictator  been  that  Iraqi  jurists who  remained  in  Iraq simply  lost  confidence  in their  job and themselves. Not that there are no talents, dedication or competence: chapters of judicial and legal resistance in  the  Iraqi  dictatorship  are  yet  to  be  written.  Polyglottism  (especially Western. . .) was a mark of treason for dark, fascist Arabism in the heyday of  the  long  Baathist  night.22  The  systematic  destruction  of  Iraqi  legal culture,  its  lawyers,  judges  and  law  schools,  meant  that  constitution drafting was left to those coming from the outside. There simply aren’t so many people capable of writing up a constitution  in English words which are also Arabic, and occasionally, Kurdish. So  hail  to  the  two  drafters,  and  their  advisors.  Friendship  being involved  here  on  both  the  drafting  side  and  the  advising  side,  all  shall remain  nameless.  The  result  is  what  matters  for  the  purpose  of  the present chapter, and that result is a longish text, with a didactic effort (62 articles  in  nine parts).  The  Transitional  Administrative  Law  self‐erased when  the  elections  planned  for  January  2005  resulted  in  a  Parliament which was tasked with writing the ultimate text and putting it to the vote. Meanwhile,  some  constitutional  landmarks  have  been  posted  for  Iraq. While  buffeted  by  barbaric  violence  on  a  scale  which  knows  few  such precedents  on  the  planet,  the  process  moved  decisively  forward  in textual terms. Three matters draw the TAL reader’s attention: the first is the place reserved for women, who were to constitute a quarter of Parliament. The second is the open reference to federalism. The third is the care given to 
 
 22. Conversation with the late Hani Fukaiki, May 2002, in Kurdish Iraq, who, as a former 
active member of the Baath leadership, explained to me how knowledge of a Western 
language was suspicious and frowned upon as a sure mark of “treason.” 
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the  protection  of  the  individual’s  right.  All  three  remained  in  the  2005 Constitution. If  Iraq  wished  to  remain  at  the  forefront  of  Middle  East  (ME) democracy—a  position  which  it  will  continue  to  pretend  to,  despite  it being rocked by violence, both in terms of the freedoms it carries, and the fact  that  those  in  power  owe  it  neither  to  dynasty,  nor  to  the  ME‐dominant  self‐extension  of  presidential  mandate—then  Iraqi  society needs  to  protect  those  two  achievements,  women  representation  and federalism.  This  will  not  be  easy.  As  for  the  judicial  protection  of  the person’s basic rights, it will come only after Iraqi society overcomes the violence that plagues it, and finds a way to stand on its two feet without foreign armies dictating the terms of social peace. Much of  this commentary  is arguably hypothetical, but the morass of  Iraqi politics should not mask the forest  for the trees. In Iraq, consti‐tutionalism  has  forged  ahead  in  the most  delicate  of  all  arrangements, that is the attempt for a constitution to be inclusive of two dominant and competing  national  identities—Kurdish  and  Arab—and  two  dominant and competing religious sects, Shi’i and Sunni Islam. Even under the most elaborate constitutional schemes, which Donald Horowitz has dissected in many different approaches over three decades of scholarly attention to “discrete  and  insular  minorities”  across  the  world,23  one  would  find  it difficult  to  draw  a model  near  enough  accommodating  the  Iraqi  socio‐historical  set‐up.  Nor  have  the  Iraqi  constituents  succeeded  yet  in convincing their people, and the world at  large,  that they are out of  the woods  of  overwhelming  sectarianism  in  the  individual  politician’s political expression. 
The European Union.  The Constitution  finally  agreed upon by  the European  Council  (of heads of  states) meeting  in Dublin  in  June 2004 stands  outside  any  recognizable  model  in  the  field:  This  for  obvious reasons owing to the history of European integration. But it also stands out  for  technical  reasons  obtaining  from  its  fissiparous  genesis:  the Constitution makes no sense for the reader outside the accumulation of texts  since  the  six  European  communities  came  together  on  the  so‐called common market in Rome in 1957. This accumulation of treaties, and of  legislative,  judicial and administrative acts,  is known as “acquis communautaire.” In  any  appreciation  of  constitution‐making,  it  would  not  be appropriate  to  mark  solely  progress.  There  also  are  setbacks.  One certain  failure  in  the  EU  text  concerns  its  style.  However  hard  the constituents tried to make the text of  the Constitution palatable to the 
 
 23. See e.g. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, Berkeley 2001. 
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educated  but  non‐specialist  reader,  this  effort  was  a  failure.  Even Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the head of the Convention which drafted the text, discourages the reader from dealing with Part III of the text, which is  the  longest  and most  detailed.24  The  Economist  rightly  ran  a  cover page  when  the  European  constitutional  project  was  disclosed suggesting to “bin it.”25 Could it have been otherwise? It is true that one distinguished former Minister of Justice in France did write in 2002 a model constitution which had the advantage of being short and more palatable, including actually most of the provisions which found their way to the text.26 It was possible to do better. But there is no point  in  trying  to  rewrite  history,  and  there  are  already  a  number  of reader‐friendly  editions  and  short  commentaries,  of  which  the introductions of Giscard and a Que Sais­Je  by Professor Christian Philip stand  their  ground  in  terms  of  clarity  and  comprehensiveness.27  One problem  is  the  type  of  “consolidator  Treaty” which  integrates  previous texts as so many layers, and the mechanisms in the Convention which, for sake  of  including  the  largest  number  of  proposals,  fails  to  devote  a stylistic  effort  which  could  have  brought  together  the  text  in  the  US‐concise manner of 1787. It is true also that the US constitution is a unique text  in  the  excellence  of  its  constitutional  style,  hardly  matched elsewhere on the planet. The  EU  Constitution  consists  of  four  parts,  and  a  number  of protocols  of  which  two  are  important.  Starting  with  the  end,  a  brief Fourth Part deals with amendments and transitional measures. A Third Part  consolidates  all  previous  treaties  and  is  therefore  the  longest  and most verbose. A Second Part  integrates  the bill  of  rights known as  “the European  Union  Charter  for  Fundamental  Rights,”  which  had  been approved in Nice four years earlier. The First Part is the most novel one, on which  I shall mostly dwell  to discern meaningful  trends  in 21st  Cen‐tury constitution making. Let me  suggest,  for  the  sake of  argument,  an  extreme  critical  line that  flows  from  the  universally  acknowledged  “democratic  deficit”  in Europe. Managing the 27–nation‐strong E.U. by 2009 does create in and 
 
 24. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, “Introduction à la lecture du projet de constitution pour 
l’Europe,” La Constitution pour l'Europe, Paris 2003, 75: “Je ne pense pas qu’il y ait lieu pour 
vous, lecteur, d’entreprendre la lecture en continu de cette troisième partie.” (Hereinafter, 
Giscard, ‘Introduction’.) 
 25. The Economist, 19 June 2003. 
 26. Robert Badinter, Une Constitution Européenne, Paris 2002. 
 27. Giscard, “Introduction,” Christian Philip, La Constitution Européenne, Paris 2004 
(Hereinafter Philip, La Constitution Européenne) The literature on the draft treaty known as 
the European Constitution is extensive. Most interesting are the minutes of the debates 
during the Convention, especially specialists’ reports, available on the EU convention site. 
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by itself problems which have been dealt with in the EU constitution as it could best: the creation of enhanced cooperation, which allows a group of EU countries to go forward with integration without being hampered by slow or reluctant member states. The Euro system is the most successful application of that principle, which does not include Britain and Sweden. Already  the  EU  operates on  a  system  of géométrie  variable,  and  this  is fine as long as it does not burst at the seams. Even bursting at the seams has already been envisaged, and happily dealt with, when Austria found itself in the throes of a government dominated by racist extremism. From that  emerged  a  “freezing  out”  procedure,  which  has  worked  well  to temper  extremism within Austria, without  the  EU  exploding  altogether under the shock. Of course, should one country turn so undemocratic as to  threaten  not  only  being  frozen  out  of  the  EU,  but  also  engaging  in military  hostilities  against  it,  the  issue would  become  grave  to  say  the least; but  even a major  country or  two  turning  in  this nasty way at  the same time would not unravel  the system, and that scenario might even be a privileged way to consolidate it. More immediate is the risk that new countries bring in their weak democratic system of deliberation, as is the case  of  Rumania  or  the  Republics  of  former  Yugoslavia.  But  the remarkable democratic strides of Turkey to bring its legal system, both in terms of its books and, more importantly, in the application of its laws, up to EU standards, are testimony to the immense leverage at the disposal of the  EU  for  smaller  countries.  Indeed  the  annual  reports  that  the Commission prepares on Turkish alignment with EU legal and economic standards  may  be  one  of  the  most  innovative  tools  for  the  spread  of democracy, human rights and the rule of law across the world since the collapse of the Soviet system.28 No,  the  problem  of  EU  democratic  deficit  does  not  lie  in  its expansion, and one can argue the exact opposite, namely that the world EU‐fashion, and more specifically the Middle East EU‐fashion, is a unique opportunity  allowed  by  the  emergence  of  a  unified  Europe.29  No,  the problem  of  the  EU  democratic  deficit  has  been  building  up  since  the Treaty of Rome, and that problem is constitutional, more specifically one of  separation  of  powers.  In  eighteen  months  of  deliberation,  the  E.U. Constitutional Convention simply failed to address it successfully. This  problem  is  eminently  Montesquieuian,  and  results  from  the vesting of  legislative and executive powers  in a strange EU mixture of a triangle  Council‐Commission‐Parliament,  in which  the  two  first  institu‐
 
 28. Commission reports on Turkey since 1999, available on the EU Commission’s site. 
 29. Original reflection in Robert Fossaert, chapter entitled “Le Monde façon Europe,” in 
his Le Monde au 21ème siècle: une Théorie des Systèmes Mondiaux, Paris 1991. 
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tions are dominant. Those who are elected “Europeanly,” that is the E.U. MPs, represent at best a fifth wheel in the carriage, as the French motto has it. You can take most of the EU Parliament away, the maximum lost is a  faint  forum  for  deliberation,  and  an  even  fainter  one  in  terms  of legislation.  While  the  legislative  process  has  been  time  and  again redrawn at the margins in order to enhance its powers, any person famil‐iar with  the  institutional working of  the EU knows  that Parliament  is  a place  for  occasional  protest,  possibly  elaborate  and  meandering “comitology,” not a power that anyone seriously takes into account. Now  the  Council,  being  composed  of  governments  who  are representative  of  their  people,  is  indispensable.  It  is  indispensable because  it  does  represent  the  people  within  the  Member  States,  and brings  into  the  federal  European  model  the  voice  of  the  constituent peoples.  The  Council  is  also  indispensable  because  even  if  it  does  not contribute a federal voice, one can hardly imagine how laws enacted by the Union could be binding within each country, in that ever wider field of  European  competence,  if  implementation  were  not  carried  by  the Council’s governments at home. How about the Commission? The Commission has real power. This 
is  the problem,  since the Commission has no popular  legitimacy, and  its members are appointed by the Council to play a European role. To make matters worse,  the  Constitution has managed  to  establish  a  number of new high positions,  including a would‐be president  for the Council who fights, over terms of preeminence, with the president of the Commission, much  as  the  High  Representative  for  the  Common  Foreign  Policy  and Security  has  already  fought  it  out  with  the  Commissioner  in  charge  of foreign affairs; this is a sorry sight indeed. The result, inevitably, is more muddle,  and  with  poor  legitimacy  at  that  for  the  new  bicephalous institutions. None of these positions will be filled by direct popular vote. No, the only serious step to bring democracy to Europe would have been  to  scrap  the  Commission  and  to  give  Parliament a  real  legislative role. One would still remain in the throes of the federal problem, but the democratic deficit would have been tackled head on, in a way that would have made it finally meaningful to vote for a European MP. It is now alas mostly  a  waste  of  time,  and  the  electors  are  far  savvier  than  the institutional  cooks  of  Europe  give  them  credit  for.  They  simply  do  not bother to vote for Parliament, nor do they show the slightest interest in what it does. To  underline  further  the  democratic  deficit  in  the  EU  version  of separation of powers, an “error” in the text is telling: no doubt attentive 
Duke Law CICLOPs | Chibli Mallat  Vol. 1 
 
54 
to the subdued role of Parliament,  the constituents entrusted EU MPs, as the text goes, with “electing” the president of the Commission.30 This  is further detailed under Article  I‐27, on the President of the European Commission:  1. Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament, and  after  having  held  the  appropriate  consultations,  the European Council, deciding by qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for the President of the Commission.  This  candidate  shall  be  elected  by  the  European Parliament by a majority of  its members.  If he or she does not obtain the required majority,  the European Council, acting by a qualified majority,  shall within one month propose a new can‐didate  who  shall  be  elected  by  the  European  Parliament, following the same procedure.31 
 A  strange  concept  for  an  election  indeed,  in  which  there  is  no contest. Behind  the awkward wording  stands a battle  for  legitimacy on the European level for the head of the executive, be s/he the president of the Council or the president of  the Commission. “Which president?”  is a good  question.  One  can  imagine  the  confusion  about  the  presidency, much in the way the confusion over who is Mr. Foreign Policy today, the Commissioner in charge, or the Council’s High Representative. Or indeed the president of the Commission. Maybe the ruse of the constituents was deliberate,  and  some  comments  suggest  that  an  ideal  situation,  which was  purposefully  left  open  by  the  Convention,  forced  the  bicephalous anomaly of two presidents, a president of the Council and a president of the  Commission,  so  that  they  end  up  being  one  and  the  same  by  the inevitable process of their redundancy.32 Nothing bars such a possibility in  the  text.  The  problem  remains.  Both  positions  result  from  a  choice exercised  by  the  Council,  not  by  an  election  between  competing candidates. So  back  to  basics  of  the  democratic  deficit:  the  Constituents were unable  to  see  boldly  enough  into  the  strange  system  of  separation  of powers they were perpetuating since the Treaty of Rome. They tinkered with it, by establishing a president of the Council who would conceivably stay in his or her position five years, instead of the current rotation of six 
 
 30. EU Constitution, “Article I-20: The European Parliament: 1. The European 
Parliament … shall elect the President of the Commission.” Emphasis added. 
 31. Emphasis added. 
 32. Philip, La Constitution Européenne, 92–93. 
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months  which  was  made  impossible  by  the  enlargement.  They  also tinkered with the presidency of  the Commission by  suggesting  that  the person  in  charge  would  be  elected  by  Parliament,  whereas  the candidate—only one—is nominated by the Council. This  leaves  little  democratic  legitimacy  in  the  choice  of  both executive  and  legislative  powers  in  Europe,  if  indeed  we  mean  by legitimacy the direct election of their EU leaders by the people of Europe. Both the presidents of the Council and of the Commission are nominated by the Council.  In the case of  the Council’s president,  the parliamentary representatives  of  European  voters  have  no  say.  In  the  case  of  the Commission’s  president,  parliamentary  function  is  at  best  perfunctory, despite  the  constitutional  language  intimating  his  “election”  by  Parlia‐ment. And to top it all, Parliament does not legislate. III. ACID TESTS AND EMERGING PATTERNS In  this  search  for  emerging patterns  in 21st  century  constitutionalism,  I would like to introduce another concept which has been of assistance in writing on family and gender issues: acid test.33 Acid is a metaphor which conjures up for different people and different cultures so many different images.  One  image,  at  least  in my western‐life  generation,  is  that  of  a powerful mind distorter which clouds one’s miserable life with a worldly vision  induced  by  hallucinogenic  drugs.  For  Iraqis  emerging  from  35 years  of  dictatorship,  acid  is  a  far  more  material  reality  as  the  most harrowing method  of  torture  used  by  the  former  regime—said  to  be  a specialty of the elder Hussein son—which consists in lowering the victim on a pulley into a basin of acid, first the toes, and drawing back the pulley up and down repeatedly. One shudders at the image, and we should leave it at that. What the small Oxford English Dictionary says about “acid tests” is  that they are “severe and conclusive.”  In an Iraqi context, one has no doubt they are conclusive. In all cases, acid tests are certainly severe, the more severe as they include faith‐based, and for all intents and purposes, “irrational”  convictions  imbued with  religions  that have competed with each other at least since God became word. Let  me  pursue  comparatively  three  such  acid  tests  which  I  have found  to  be  at  the  heart  of 21st  century  constitutionalism,  forming  is  a number  of  legal‐constitutional  fields which  bring  people  literally  up  in arms:  religion,  federalism,  two  areas  that  did  not  constitute  such  a contentious arena of constitutionalism in the 20th century, and to which is added the perennial issue of who is to be master: the presidency. 
 
 33. Mallat, “The Search For Equality in Middle Eastern Family Law,” al-Abhath 
(American University of Beirut), 48-49, 2000-2001, 7–63. 
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Religion.  Maybe  the  most  trying  of  all  acid  tests  is  the  place  of religion in the constitution. The “law and religion complex” operates as acid test not merely in an Eastern, Muslim context. It was, and continues to be, a central point of disagreement  in  European  constitution  making.  For  those  who  have followed  that  particular  aspect  of  the  debate,  suffice  to  see  the discrepancy between the German and French texts  in the translation of the  Preamble  to  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  in Nice  in  2000,  a discrepancy which  is,  in  constitution‐writing, unprecedented. While  the French text acknowledges the “spiritual” tradition in Europe, the German version renders it “religious.” The European constituents eventually succeeded in preventing that acid test from blocking the whole process. Thanks to the Irish ironically, they  finally  produced  a  version  which  leaned  towards  the  French disposition. Much  to  the  dislike  and  vocal  protests of  the  Vatican,  they declared the cultural heritage of the peoples of Europe in common, skip‐ping the mention of Christianity, religion and spirituality altogether. Now how does one deal with such a difficult test, the religion of the land  in  a  constitution? Of  tons  of  ink  spilled  on matters  constitutional, one would venture this is the issue of unique portent in the United States as well as in Europe and the Mideast, bringing religious affiliation in the domestic context from born‐again Bible belts to international “clashes of civilisations” defined religiously. The concern is not about to abate. To  make  some  progress  in  the  shape  of  religion  in  21st  century constitutionalism, a literary detour into the quasi‐universal law of indivi‐dual psychology, much in the vein of Sigmund Freud’s Oedipus Complex, may help: it is acknowledged that adolescence generally, if not a later age, raises a form of religious libido in each and every individual on earth. Of that experience two literary expressions are particularly telling. The first is by Bertolt Brecht, whose alluring though not likeable character, Mr. K., was once asked about whether there was a God:  Einer fragte Herrn K. ob es einen Gott gäbe. Herr K. sagte: “Ich rate dir, nachzudenken, ob dein Verhalten je nach der Antwort auf  diese  Frage  sich  ändern  wuerde.  Würde  es  sich  nicht ändern, dann können wir die Frage fallenlassen. Würde es sich ändern,  dann  kann  ich  dir  wenigstens  nich  soweit  behilflich sein,  dass  ich  dir  sage,  du  hast  dich  schon  entschieden:  Du brauchst einen Gott.34 
 
 34. “Die Frage, ob einen Gott gibt (on the question whether there is a God),” in Bertolt 
Brecht, Kalendergeschichte, Geschichte vom Herrn Keuner, Brecht Werke, V, Suhrkamp 
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 That adolescent part of  the argument  fits well with a rigid view of separation  between  church  and  state,  and  can  be  comforted  with  all kinds  of  citations,  including  from  the most  canonic  sources,  to  wit  the words of Christ to the effect of keeping to Caesar what is Caesar’s, or the lapidary  injunction  in  the Qur’an  about  “no  compulsion  in  religion.”  As one makes his peace with God or religion on this basis, acknowledging in the  process  that  there  is  more  to  it  than  Brechtian  need  or  Qur’anic rejection of state force to deal with one’s professed faith, another citation sticks in mind, that of the Levantine poet admonishing his children about the  penumbra  of  dignity  that  religion  brings  to  the  believers,  “wa  la 
tata’assabu  abadan  li­dinin,  fa  kullu  ta’assubin  yushqi  wa  yurdi/  likullin 
dinuhu wa likulli dinin masunu karamatin ta’ba al­ta’addi.”35 This  is  more  subtle  than  Brecht,  because  of  the  consideration  of one’s religion as shield, and not as sword,  to borrow a distinction from English  contract  law.36 The positive use of  religion  to shape  the state  is one  thing,  the  defence  of  religion  against  aggression  and  other  such humiliations  is another.  In our respective constitutions,  this  is generally the position adopted by the constituents: the state, or group of states in the  EU,  is  not  so  much  neutral  about  religion,  which  is  the  classical position of a rigid doctrine of separation between state and religion, as it acknowledges a heritage which  in the case of Europe  includes churches receiving  constitutional  recognition—and eventually tax relief  and  sub‐sidies;37 and in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, a role for Islam which is not militant. Islam is to be perceived as shield, and not as sword.38 The  formulation  in  both  the  Iraqi  and  Afghani  constitutions  is alluring.  In  the  first  case,  “No amendment  to  this Law may be made  to affect Islam.”39 Article 7 of the Iraqi TAL is equally protective:  
 
1997,  original written ca 1929–30, 218 (“One asked Mr. K. whether there was a God. Mr. K. 
answered: ‘I advise you to reflect first on whether your behaviour would change depending on 
the answer to that question. If it doesn’t change, then we can leave the question behind. If it 
does, then I can at least tell you that you have already decided: you need a God.’”) 
 35. Chibli Mallat (“Poet of the Cedars,” d.1961), Diwan (collected Poems), Beirut, 1952, 
vol. 2, 521: “Never follow a religion fanatically, all fanaticism brings misery and death/ to each 
his religion, and to each religion a penumbra of dignity that dislikes being attacked (and in a 
variation ta’ba al-tahaddi, that dislikes being challenged).” 
 36. Lord Denning, in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. 
[1947] K.B. 130. 
 37. Article I-52 of the EU constitutional project: “Status of churches and non-
confessional organizations. 1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under 
national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States.” 
 38. Expressed in Art. 17, Afghani Constitution as the duty of the state to “organise and 
improve mosques, madrasas and religious centres.” 
 39. Afghani Constitution, Art.3. 
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Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed  tenets  of  Islam,  the  principles  of  democracy,  or  the rights  cited  in Chapter Two of  this Law  [i.e.  the bill  of  rights] may  be  enacted  during  the  transitional  period.  This  Law respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and  guarantees  the  full  religious  rights  of  all  individuals  to freedom of religious belief and practice.  In  Afghanistan,  the  more  specific  formulation  of  compatibility between Islam and law is similar: “No law can be contrary to the sacred religion  of  Islam  and  the  values  of  this  Constitution.”  In  comparative Middle Eastern constitutionalism, where the acid test has generally taken the form of Islamic law being considered “the” in opposition to “a” source for  the  Constitution,  this  novel  formulation  upholds  a  conception  of religion as shield  in ways that shift  the terrain of  the debate onto areas which may relieve the test from some of its acid severity. This is not the end of the matter, however, as the law and religion complex  in modern  constitutionalism must  be  perceived  increasingly, in 21st century constitutionalism, on a far more elusive register: namely the  absence  of  religion—as  religious  affiliation—in  the  constitution. The problem  is no  longer whether  Islam  is  “state”  religion or not,  but how  collectivities  which  identify  themselves  on  the  basis  of  religious affiliation can stand  ignored by the constitutional set‐up.  I had several occasions  over  the  past  years  to  discuss  this  vexing  issue  in  modern constitutionalism,  so  I  will  not  pursue  it  further  here,  except  to  note that even the EU, secular as it may pretend to be, was unable to escape some form of recognition for established churches.40 
Federalism. Directly related to the issue of collective identification to  a  given  religious  denomination  is  the  problem  of  sectarianism,  or communitarianism  as  Indian  constitutionalists  call  it.  This  is  an  issue which conjures up an eminently federal mirror. Federalism  acts  as  an  additional  acid  test  in  21st  century constitutionalism, albeit in a muffled way: of the three constitutions, only the  Iraqi  TAL  mentions  the  word,  and  it  may  well  be  the  most courageous. In Afghanistan, one will also not find the word federal in the Constitution, but there is mention of peoples, tribes and “men” in various 
 
 40. Above n. 38. See also my “Du fait religieux dans les institutions,” in Mallat ed., 
L’Union Européenne et le Moyen-Orient: Etat des Lieux, Beirut 2004, 83-95. 
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articles.41 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing explains in his Preface how the word “communitarian” came to replace the word “federal” in Article I.1 of the Constitution,42 bringing an end to the heated debate between European federalists  and European  sovereignists  among  the  constituents. A more “federalist”  form  of  government  than  the  European  one  it  is  hard  to conceive, and the refusal  for the constituents to get drawn by the word indicates areas of “irrationality” getting into the public discourse in ways typical  of  acid  tests,  as  English  and  French  national  forms  of  the  Anti­
Federalist  get  pitted  against  mostly  German  and  more  recent  Spanish adhesion to the concept as a perfectly acceptable one constitutionally. Even a perfunctory approach of EU, Iraqi and Afghani constitution‐making  shows  that  all  these  issues are very much alive.  Indeed  the  “F” word is as much of a hot potato in Europe as it is in Afghanistan or Iraq, and  federalism could  indeed  represent a  line of  approach which brings together the inchoate world of 21st century constitutionalism: buckets of ink  have  also  been  spilled  over  European  federalism,43  and  those  of political  inspiration  are not  the most  interesting.  It might  have  proved expedient  for the constituents to have finally avoided the word  in their would‐be founding text, for they knew they were all practicing federalism like Molière’s character speaking in prose without knowing it. In Iraq, the battle for the inclusion of the word is far from over: I have often  opined  to  Iraqi  colleagues  that  constant  resort  to  sui  generis categories may not be useful (in this case the use of the concept of wilayat under Ottoman fashion to avoid using the Arabic fidirali). The advocacy has even found its way to Security Council Resolution 1546, which included the word in part upon my insistence with the Iraqi foreign minister. This has a story, and the jury is out on whether it is preferable to practice federalism à la  Molière,  or  whether  some  more  courage  would  not  be  amiss  for  the enrichment of the debate and its integrity.44 
Presidency. Lest we lose our bearings, constitutions are about who is  to be master. Put  in  less crude terms, 21st century constitutionalism 
 
 41. Afghani Constitution, Introduction paragraph 5, “aqvam wa mardum,” Art. 6, “aqvam 
va qaba’el.” 
 42. Giscard, Introduction, 34: “Aussi, dans le texte que j’ai préparé pour le Praesidium, 
ai-je substitué l’expression ‘sur le mode fédéral’ la formule ‘sur le mode communautaire.’” 
 43. Most heated was the celebrated debate in 2001–2002 between German foreign 
minister Joschka Fischer (EU as federation), president Jacques Chirac and his foreign 
minister Dominique de Villepin (EU as assembly or confederation of nations), and former 
president of the EU Commission Jacques Delors (EU as people’s federation sui generis). 
 44. On my intervention with Iraqi foreign minister Hoshyar Zibari for the inclusion of 
federalism in Security Council Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004), see the account in “2004, le 
Moyen-Orient en quête de non-violence: Un parcours personnel,” published in Mallat, 
Presidential papers, Beirut 2005. 
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does  not  escape  the  battle  about  leadership  and  its  democratic credentials since the dawn of history. Here appears the most muddled pattern  in  the  present  comparative  exercise:  in  Afghanistan,  the tailoring  of  the  constitutional  text  to  fit  a  particular  person  is  simply wrong,  and  the  sacrifice  of  real  checks  and  balances  to  presidential power, one can alas confidently predict, is a recipe for trouble to come. In  Iraq, matters  are  still  in  a  situation  of  flux,  owing  to  the  duality  of President‐Prime Minister  in  the  Transitional Administrative Law  (and in the 2005 “final” Constitution), but also to the real  test of  federalism as it is wont to develop—or get smothered by authoritarianism and/or chaos, both equally capable of marking the death of constitutionalism in the country for another generation. In the EU, the gross emptying of the concept  of  election  with  regard  to  the  choice  of  the  president  of  the Commission is indicative of a major problem yet to be solved. So  what  does  this  tell  us  about  that  long‐standing  acid  test,  the headship of executive power? The president as  leader voted  in directly by the people underlies the central problem of constitutional theory, which is couched, perhaps even papered over since Montesquieu, as a natural result of a doctrine of  separation  of  powers.  The  Montesquieuian  scheme  has  arguably always  been  in  crisis,  and  its  difficult  birth  remains  upon  us,  as troubling  in  the 21st century as  it was  in the second half of  the 18th.45 Separation  of powers,  in  that  description,  is  a way  to  say  that  society cannot vote  in  its parliament under universal  suffrage,  and vote  in  its president  also  in  universal  suffrage,  without  having  to  explain  why there  should  be  two  bodies  so  elected.  The  solution was  a  functional one, based on the idea that the first legislates, and the second executes. Power  becomes  therefore  segmented  functionally,  but  such segmentation  is  a  human  construct  which  divides  up  power  in  a disturbing and incoherent manner: for what does it mean issuing a law, as opposed to executing it? Federal arrangements are more convincing, because they point to a horizontal way in the division of powers which is based on a tangible division of  territory and  land. Horizontal devolution of power  is more coherent than the  functional division of powers between a parliament that enacts laws, a president/PM which applies them, and the judiciary which arbitrates conflicts arising from that application. Federalism as a 
 
 45. This is developed in Mallat, “Droit comparé au 18ème siècle: Influences françaises 
sur la common law,” Revue Historique de Droit Français et Etranger, 3/1994, 383-400 
(arguing that Montesquieu and Lord Mansfield understood separation of powers in a manner 
profoundly different from the way it became operational). 
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successful  constitutional  arrangement,  a  comparative  reading  of  the three  constitutions  suggests,  has  far  more  credentials  than  the domestic  functional  division  of  powers  extant  in  21st  century constitutionalism. While the Montesquieuian scheme lags behind, there is  no  decidedly  convincing  route  out  of  the  conundrum,  which  is illustrated  in  the  three  questions  by  the  absence  of  a  convincing mechanism that resolves it. EPILOGUE The  federal order;  Religion’s proactive  challenge  to  constitutionalism; the confusion in the tripartite separation of powers underlying the role of  the  presidency  and  its  legitimacy;  these  are  three  problem  areas which  define  the  shape  of  things  constitutional  in  the  21st  century. Beyond the natural disparity in the respective traditions and conditions of emergence of the three constitutions, it may be helpful to end on the special  form  of  internationalism  which  seems  to  mark  21st  century constitutionalism. One  needs  to  reflect,  in  a  planet  that  no  longer  recognizes  the domain of  internal  affairs  as  a  self‐contained one, on  the mechanisms which may ensure that domestic problems do not spill  over regionally and internationally. Even more positively, the question of constitutions as  model  can  no  longer  be  avoided:  the  world  after  Europe,  in  the fashion  adumbrated  by  the  so‐called  proximity  policy  of  Art.I‐57  is  a case  in  point,  but  there  is  little  doubt  that  success  in  Afghanistan and/or  in  Iraq  will  make  constitutional  standards  affect  an  immense area, reaching into India through Pakistan and Kashmir, and across the Middle East and North, including Palestine‐Israel. There  is  no  harm  putting  the  matter  into  the  first  leg  of  the Kantian bifurcation that the chapter opened onto, with the contrasting vantage  points  drawn  from  Kant’s  Treatise  on  Perpetual  Peace:  its failure  on  the  ground  since  1795,  and  its  continuous  success  in  the battle of ideas  in ways that compel us to rediscover the Treatise again and  again  at  key  junctures  in  human  history—the  French‐Atlantic Revolution, which saw  its birth,  the  failed attempts  in the Congress of Vienna  to  go  beyond  the  Westphalian  paradigm  of  sovereign  nation‐states,  through  the  collapse of  the Wilson vision  in Versailles,  and  the shortcomings of the UN in the wake of World War II. The  constitutions  just  examined  constitute,  through  their  birth and potential projections beyond  their borders,  an attempt  to  include Kant’s cosmopolitan law into their  frame. This is halting and timid, but the pattern  is  there  for the discerning, whether  in terms of  federalism for  Iraq,  a  unique  novelty  in  the Middle  East  (and  Europe),  crimes  of 
Duke Law CICLOPs | Chibli Mallat  Vol. 1 
 
62 
war  as  a  constitutional  category  in  Afghanistan,  or  transnational projections of the EU, both federal and international. I would  like  to  conclude  on  yet  another  horizon, which  conjures up, in converging ways two millennia apart, Aristotle and Paul Kahn. At its simplest, the issue is one of “man”—less so woman, and this in itself is telling—”as a political animal”:  “The entire effort of the international human rights movement  is rooted  in this vision of well‐being. No one, on this view, should die or suffer for politics.” One could read this in the most  exciting  acknowledgement  of  the  Preamble  to  the  interim  Iraqi constitution: the people of Iraq, it says, “reject violence and coercion in all  their  forms,  and  particularly when  used  as  instruments  of  govern‐ance.” One can also hear it plainly in a more relative, but potentially more “applicable”  utterance  interspersed,  in  a manner which  seems  novel  in constitution‐writing,  in  the  repeated  references  throughout  the Afghani text  to  the  scourge  of  “crimes  against  humanity.”  In  both  Iraq  and Afghanistan, societies which have been bled white through three decades of  continuing  horror,  are  showing  the  way  to  others,  even  to  Europe, where  the  constituents  remain  behind  in  terms  of  the  crucial  task  of preventing crimes against humanity from remaining unpunished.46 This  points  to  the  meta‐conclusion  of  our  emerging  patterns, which is the next horizon of constitutionalism. How can human beings structure  their  domestic  and  international  world  to  make  politics redundant?  Depoliticisation,  I  would  like  to  conclude,  is  the  ultimate horizon of comparative constitutionalism, that moment in history when it  matters  little  what  politics  and  politicians  say,  because  they  have become by‐and‐large irrelevant to the happiness of the citizen. But this is better left to constitution‐making in the 22nd century. 
 
 46. Mallat, “Des relations privilégiées,” supra n. 8, section discussing transnational 
justice. 
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Comparative Law as a Bridge Between the  
Nation-State and the Global Economy  
An Essay for Herbert Bernstein*  
Richard M. Buxbaum**  I. INTRODUCTION: COMPARATIVE LAW IN A TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMY What should, what might be the role of comparative law as the regionali‐zation  and  globalization  of  many  segments  of  formerly  national economies  proceed?  I  hope  to  propound  and  weave  together  three strands of my approach to that question.1 The first has to do with the fact that  while  organized  economic  life  increasingly  is  transnational,  much law bearing on the economy still is national law. I say “much law” but the second strand, not surprisingly, has to do with the recognition that much national law, as indeed it has begun to do, must move up one step. This second strand—and second step—concerns the increasing federalization or regionalization of previously national law, as well as the inevitable and perhaps  even  legitimate  lag  of  that  process  behind  the  regionalization and,  at  least  in  its  financial  aspects,  the  globalization  of organized  eco‐nomic life. The third strand bears on the characterization of that part of the  law—be  it  national,  regional,  or  even  global—that  focuses  on  the economy; that is, it bears on the slippery notion of “economic law”, an ill‐defined concept straddling private  law and public  law. For reasons that arise from that exploration, I also propose a mission for comparative law that  I  label  the  “coordination”  mission,  which  in  my  view  promises  a 
 
*  Fourth Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke Uni-
versity School of Law, Sept. 27, 2005. 
** Jackson H. Ralston Professor of International Law, Boalt Hall, University of California 
Berkeley School of Law. Note from Author: An expanded and slightly footnoted version of the 
Fourth Herbert Bernstein Memorial Lecture given at Duke on September 27, 2005. With some 
exceptions, this version has not been updated to take account of more recent developments. 
I thank Ralf Michaels for his inestimable help in this conversion, even if I did not always follow 
his advice. 
 1. Right away I violate one of Herbert Bernstein’s central injunctions: “Innumerable 
comparatists have felt the urge to marvel over…our discipline. My plea…is: Resist [the urge]. 
What we need much more than such soul-searching is hard–nosed comparative work on 
clearly defined specific institutions or subject-matter areas.” Book Review, 40 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 261 (1992). On the other hand, even he yielded to the temptation once, if only in the form 
of a review essay: Herbert Bernstein, “Rechtsstile und Rechtshonoratioren,” 34 RabelsZ 443 
(1970). 
Richard M. Buxbaum, Comparative Law as a Bridge Between the Nation-State and the Global Economy: An Essay for 
Herbert Bernstein, 1 Duke L. CICLOPs 63 (2009) 
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more fruitful role  for comparative  law in this contemporaneous context than do earlier missions as understood by the first generations of mod‐ern comparative‐law scholars. Given  both  Herbert  Bernstein’s  and my  experiences,  the  legal  re‐gimes  I  am  comparing  are,  not  surprisingly,  the  US  and  European Community/Union regimes. That, however, only becomes relevant as we move to the second‐mentioned strand, that of the possible federalization or regionalization of national law, since it is there that the differences be‐tween  the two  “federal”  (in quotation marks) hierarchies—those of  the United  States  and  those  of  the  European Union—become  relevant.  Let me foreshadow the significance of  this difference to the not‐yet‐defined coordination mission of comparative law: what is important here is that the horizontal coordination of national law within the EC is more impor‐tant  as  a mission  than  is  the  shrinking  need  for  a  similar  coordination mission among the states of the American Union. II. PRIVATE LAW AND ECONOMIC LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY All of this suggests that my presentation will be more about the European than the American scene. Therefore,  let me begin with some brief com‐ments  about  the  situation  in  the  European  Community  (EC),2  because there one can see the third strand more clearly; namely, how the strug‐gles over  the definition of  “economic  law” matter more there than how they matter—though they do—in the United States. Specifically, the rela‐tively  recent  European  focus  on  “private  law”  (as  distinguished  from “public  law”)  arose  and  has  flourished  because  the  heavily  top‐down harmonization  of  laws  considered  essential  to  the  establishment  of  a genuine  Internal Common Market had  to move  into other  spheres than governmental regulation of business—and that of course problematized the distinction between the two sub‐disciplines of  law, as the very con‐cept of “economic law,” straddling them, suggests. 
A. The Focus on European Private Law The origins and motivations of  the current  focus on a European core of private  law  are mixed  and  hard  to  disentangle. Whether  the  relatively new energy pulsing on the private‐law side stems from a defensive strat‐egy against the unsystematic incursions of EC directives and regulations into the national legal regimes, whether it stems from the related effort of the European Court of Justice to provide a modicum of systematic order 
 
 2. I refer to “European Community” rather than “European Union” because my focus on 
economic law suggests the traditional pre-Maastricht division of powers rather than those 
new federal powers added by the additional pillars associated with the “European Union.” 
2009  Comparative Law as a Bridge  
 
65 
to  its  interpretative  jurisprudence,  or  whether  it  stems  from  the  re‐sponses of legal scholarship to the various Decisions and Action Plans of the organs of the EC,3 beginning with the 1989 Decision of the European Parliament  to  support  research  into  the  harmonization  of  the member states’ private  law and culminating for now in the Commission’s Action Program of 2004:4 whatever its origins, the result is clear. The decades‐long monopoly of public‐law scholarship in the European Community is over. European  Private  Law  has  been on  the  agenda  for  over  a decade now, and has developed a dynamic of its own that transcends the various reasons for its original appearance. The mission of the proponents of this expansion or incursion also has varied and evolved. At one end of the spectrum lie efforts to integrate those new  federal  regulations  that  adhere  to  the  classic  codes  like  barnacles without being  integrated  into them.5 The notorious Products Liability Di‐rective is the classic example.6 At the other end lie the ambitious efforts to develop,  if  not  an entire European Civil Code,  at  least major elements of one. The so‐called Lando Principles of European Contract Law is an often‐cited  example of  this  ambition.7 A different mission  is  that of developing principles of adjudication that permit a  greater  integration of varying na‐tional  code  provisions  through  interpretative  techniques,  an  approach 
 
 3. Good examples of this literature include An Academic Green Paper on European 
Contract Law (Stefan Grundmann & Jules Stuyck eds., 2002) and The Harmonisation of 
European Contract Law: Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal Prac-
tice (Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2006). 
 4. Commission, “European contract law and the revision of the acquis: the way for-
ward,” COM (2004) 651 final, October 11, 2004; Communication of July 11, 2001, COM 
(2001) final, OJ C255 of Sep 13, 2001; Action Plan of [Feb. 2] 2003, COM (2003) final, OJ C 
63, of 15 March 2003. 
 5. This criticism is a major theme of Karl Riesenhuber, System und Prinzipien des Eu-
ropäischen Vertragsrechts (2003). 
 6. Supra n. 2. The various directives pertaining to consumer protection, in particular 
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (No. 93/13 EEC, in OJ 1993 L95/29), also have given rise 
to system-breach criticism–in this case further conflated with disagreement over the values of 
“weaker-party” protection.  As to the former see, e.g., Geraint Howells & Thomas Wil-
helmsson, EC Consumer Law Aldershot 1997, 19ff, esp. 22; to the latter, Peter Hommelhoff, 
Verbraucherschutz im System des deutschen und europaischen Privatrecht (Heidelberg 
1996) is instructive. 
 7. The Principles of European Contract Law (Ole Lando & John Beale, eds., Dordrecht 
1995). An important if contested additional program is that launched through the Commis-
sion’s Action Plan of 2003 for a “Common Frame of Reference” in the field of contract law 
that would identify the commonalities of national systemic and linguistic usage as an aid to 
courts, legislators, and the private bar. See most recently the Commission’s Communication 
of October 11, 2004, “European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way For-
ward,” COM (2004) 651 final; and the sympathetic explanation of this project in “Uniform 
Terminology for European Contract Law (Gianmaria Ajani & Martin Ebers, eds., Karlsruhe 
2005). 
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found  already  in  1991  in  the  Symposium  of  the  Hamburg  Max‐Planck‐Institute on “Alternatives to Legislative Unification of Law.”8 
B. The Challenge from Economic Law For some time in the 1990s, the effort to position this unification of pri‐vate law in a contemporary version of the usus modernus pandectarum, an  effort  associated  above  all  with  Reinhard  Zimmermann  and  the 
Zeitschrift für europäisches Privatrecht he co‐founded, claimed much at‐tention.9  It  was  always  challenged,  however,  by  another  and  older movement  that  insists on  the  centrality of  economic  law as  the  legiti‐mate and perhaps (though this may be only my view)  limiting basis of any  unification  of  private  law  the  European  Community  should  strive for.  This  focus, which  hews more  closely  to  the  still  largely  economic functions and legitimation of the EC, even in this day of the new pillars of  defense,  security,  environment,  justice,  etc.,  is  not  a  narrow  one. Rather, it is what its proponents in the 1970s titled it: a challenge to the very  concept  of  private  law.10  And  this  tension,  the  challenge modern economic law poses for private law, is my subject today.11 Like Herbert Bernstein, it is a European subject; but, also like him, it illuminates the historic  tension between the (apparently) resolutely un‐systematic  Anglo‐American  conception  of  law  and  the  (apparently) resolutely systematic conception of law associated with the Civilian legal families. This tension is apparent in the very label “economic law.” 12 It is unfamiliar to the US academy, and the very notion that it is a challenge to private  law perplexes us,  if only because the  label “private  law”  itself  is not a significant feature of US legal discourse.13 No teacher of Corporation Law, for example, would worry whether it was a private‐law subject and therefore consider omitting treatment of civil litigation under Rule 10b5; and definitely we would not be concerned about the contours of such an 
 
 8. “Alternativen zur legislatorischen Rechtsvereinheitlichung,” 55 RabelsZ 215 (1992). 
 9. He describes this approach in Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary 
Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford 2001). 
10. Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Gert Brüggemeier, Dieter Hart & Christian Joerges, Wirt-
schaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts (1980). 
11. As it was for a previous Bernstein Lecture: Christian Joerges, “The Challenges of 
Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline,” 14 Duke J. 
of Comp. & Int’l L. 149 (2004). 
12. A digression: In my first year of teaching in 1961, the Italian scholar, Rodolfo de 
Nova, was a visitor at Berkeley. He told me of having met Chief Justice Charles Evans 
Hughes in the mid-1920s, while a young visiting scholar at Yale. In response to Hughes’ gra-
cious question of what he was doing, de Nova told him he was studying the US legal system. 
Hughes responded in turn and apparently without irony: “My goodness; I didn’t realize we had 
a system.” 
13. For the “public-private law” distinction, see n. 40 below. 
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amorphous and pervasive notion as “economic law” in the context of de‐ciding  where  to  place  its  components  in  our  curricular  divisions.  If anything, we have the opposite problem: the dominance of the economic analysis of law across the curriculum is so advanced that, like Voltaire’s Monsieur Jordain, we all speak economic law without knowing it.14 Given this situation, namely,  that  legislating and ruling about mat‐ters  concerning  the economy are a  far  larger part of  the  legislative and judicial tasks of  the past century than they were during the  laissez­faire era,15  and given the  further  fact  that  the  competencies delegated  to the federal  level  of  the  European Union  are  precisely  these economic mat‐ters, it seems to me that the role of Comparative Law in moving any legal agenda  along  deserves  a  new  look.  The  notion  that  economic  law  is  a challenge to private law has a largely European or Civilian flavor about it. But  the  notion  that  economic  law  is  a  challenge  to  traditional  under‐standings about the competencies of units of a federal system is as much an American notion as it is a European one. After all, it was Justice, then Professor, Felix Frankfurter who said of  the Dormant Commerce Clause that so far as the states were concerned, in the absence of federal action 
laissez­faire was the only permissible regulator.16 III. THE VERTICAL DIVISION OF POWERS This brings me to the second strand of  this presentation; namely,  to a comparative (i.e., EC‐US) look at the classic division of powers. Any ar‐gument that national law needs to remain relevant at a  time when the transnational  economy  in  facilitative terms increasingly demands, and in regulatory or redistributive terms increasingly should be required, to accept a transnational legal order has to begin there. Why national law nonetheless should remain relevant, however, will be the final element of this discussion. 
A. Coordination—the Third Function of Comparative Law The term I have elsewhere used to highlight this  function of compara‐tive  law  is  that  of  “coordination.”17  It  joins,  and  supplements,  the  two 
 
14. Another digression: The “it” in that sentence bears two meanings. Many of us, my-
self included, often speak of economic law in this analytical sense without knowing what we 
are talking about. 
15. Its proportional importance during the age of mercantilism is another matter. 
16. Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite (Chapel 
Hill 1937) 65f. 
17. Richard M. Buxbaum, “Die Rechtsvergleichung zwischen nationalem Staat und in-
ternationaler Wirtschaft,” 60 RabelsZ 201 (1996). The similarity of that title with the present 
one is no coincidence, even though the present paper expands the inquiry into dimensions 
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traditional functions of comparative law as these have been accepted in academic discourse  for now almost  two centuries; namely,  the  instru‐mental function of identifying “other” law that might be considered, via appropriate adaptation,18 for one’s own legal order and the visionary or legal‐cultural  function  of  showing  the  path  towards  a  universal  legal order.  The  historian  of  comparative  law  might  associate  Mittermaier with the former,19 Wigmore20 and Kohler21 with the latter function. Coordination implies a horizontal function; specifically, that of the adaptation of a state’s  laws to those of another  formally equal state.  It suggests  a cooperation of  equals within a system  that  is either hierar‐chical in the sense of federal‐state structures or networked as a web of formally equal sovereigns in a structure without a more or less authori‐tative center. In comparative terms, this issue of coordination of course is much more salient  for the European Community/Union than for the United  States.  Despite  the  10th  Amendment  and  the  sputtering  states’ rights discourse, the legal orders of our states exist at the sufferance of the national legal order as authoritatively interpreted, in constitutional terms,  by  our  Supreme  Court.  “Puppy  federalism”  is  Edward  Rubin’s term  for  this  arrangement,22  and an apt  term  it  is,  given  the powerful preemptive  role  of  the  Supremacy  Clause,  especially  in  economic  law. What  little horizontally developed uniformity our  states have  seemed to achieve voluntarily through this coordination function was only vol‐untary in the sense that they acceded to the requirements of the market in  preference  to  what  otherwise  would  surely  have  been  imposed  as national  law;  the  Uniform  Laws  headed  by  the  Uniform  Commercial Code  and  the Model Laws headed  by  the Model Business Corporation 
 
not considered more than a decade ago. 
18. These transplantation problems of course are a favorite subject of comparatists, but 
they are not for today. 
19. The Kritische Zeitschrift fuer Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslan-
des, which Mittermaier co-founded in 1829, in its title [Critical Journal for Legal Science and 
Foreign Legislation] and in his foreword to the first issue, “Ueber den Zweck dieser Zeitschrift” 
[Concerning the Purpose of this Journal], id. at 1, suggests his–and this–“practical” approach. 
A recent appreciation of this approach is that of Heinz Mohnhaupt, “Rechtsvergleichung in 
Mittermaiers ‘Zeitschrift fuer Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslandes,” in Juris-
tische Zeitschriften (Michael Stolleis, ed., Frankfurt 1999) 282. 
20. On Wigmore’s similar aims, see Annelise Riles, “Encountering Amateurism,” in Re-
thinking the Masters of Comparative Law (Annelise Riles, ed., Oxford 2001) 94. 
21. Josef Kohler, who wrote on almost everything, is noted for his aim at universality 
and the evolution of a world law through the study of comparative law. See, e.g., his Das 
Recht als Kulturerscheinung (Würzburg 1885). For an appreciation see, e.g., Günter Spendel, 
Josef Kohler. Bild eines Universaljuristen (Heidelberg 1983). 
22. Edward L. Rubin, “Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America”, 574 Annals of 
Am. Acad. Of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 37 (2001). 
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Act  illustrate  the point.23  To put  it  another way: what  some states en‐acted as obstacles to the inevitable and inevitably legitimate corporate form of economic activity may not have been removable via the Privi‐leges  and  Immunities  Clause  but  were  rendered  irrelevant  by way  of the Commerce Clause.24 The  European  Community  is  not  yet  at  that stage,  and  its  Supremacy  Clause  has  not  yet  been  lowered  to  room height. The concept of limited delegated powers still is taken relatively seriously, and one of the principal reasons for that constraint bears di‐rectly  on  the  coordination  concept  I  am  proposing  as  a  function  of comparative law. That reason is the so‐called “democratic deficit,”25 the fact  that  the  one  body  directly  elected  by  the  peoples  of  the member states,  the European Parliament,  to  this day  is not yet  a parliament  in the classic sense. Despite the increase in its role of co‐legislator, the leg‐islative  initiative  of  the  EC  remains  with  the  Commission,  an  organ whose  members  are  appointed  by  the  executive  branches  of  the  na‐tional governments represented in the EC’s Council of Ministers. In  this  framework  of  significantly  attenuated  lines  of  democratic legitimation via the aggregate of national electorates,  in which at  least two tiers of  government  lie between any given national polity  and the EU’s  principal  legislative  bodies,  unification  or  harmonization  of  law from  the  top  down  suffers  two  potentially  negative  consequences.  In comparative terms, only one of these also weighs on top‐down unifica‐tion via national  legislation  in  the US,  and even  that one weighs more heavily on the European  law‐making mission than  it does on ours. Let me describe these so that these abstract concepts gain some context. 
B. The Remaining Relevance of National Law The first consequence, the one common to both regions in kind if not in degree,  concerns  the  benefits  of  experimentation  and  flexibility.  The near  consensus on  the benefits of  regulatory  competition,26  or  at  least on using the states as  laboratories,  is applied today to challenge much national or centralized  legislation.  In the United States,  that  is more of an  academic  than  a  practical  argument,  in  part  for  the  reasons  just 
 
23. The uniformity dictated by the quasi-constitutionalized Internal Affairs Doctrine in 
corporation law, leading to the squatter sovereignty of Delaware, is a variant on this theme. 
24. See Richard M. Buxbaum and Klaus J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the Business 
Enterprise (Berlin 1988) 36ff. 
25. Works on this subject are legion; for a recent entrant providing the variations on this 
theme, see Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Christian Joerges, Inger-
Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner, eds., Oxford 2004). 
26. For a respectful critical view of its role for legal scholarship, see Eva-Maria Ki-
esinger, Wettbewerb der Privatrechtsordnung im Europäischen Binnenmarkt (Tübingen 
2002). 
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mentioned. The essential uniformity of US economic law, based on the essential unity of the US economy, has narrowed the field of application in which that desideratum has much purchase;27 and,  to repeat Frank‐furter’s axiom, that competition in any event can only be a race for the bottom in a non‐pejorative sense, that is, it can only be a race to provide market‐supporting facilitative law. The European Union  situation does vary  in degree  if not  in kind from  that obtaining  in  the United  States. The EC member  states’  laws, reflecting  its member states’  less complete economic unity, evidence a higher degree of differentiation. Regulatory variation—not only regula‐tory  competition—will  have  more  bite  there,  and,  given  the  less rigorous  application  of  the  EU  version  of  the  Dormant  Commerce Clause, be less controllable. In this situation, the attraction of top‐down unification,  demanded  now  both  by  the market  and  the more  regula‐tion‐oriented  member  states,  will  be  harder  to  resist.28  As  a  result,  a somewhat peculiar situation will arise, indeed already has arisen. Mar‐ket  pressures  push  for  positive  central  legislation,  but  that  is  a  less desirable solution than the solution the proponents of regulatory com‐petition envisage. Even for those, like myself, who are less convinced of the unalloyed benefits of this beneficent version of the race for the bot‐tom, there  is a concern with some of  the more practical consequences of  top‐down unification  in  the European  context.  The  legislative proc‐ess  is  clumsier  than  in  the  United  States,  the  formal  structure  of directives  with  their  need  for  national  adoption  and  concretization paradoxically  leaves  significant  room  for  resistance  at  the  national level,  and  the  flexibility  needed  for  adaptation  to  changed  circum‐stances is less than optimal.29 The  second  consequence  of  top‐down  unification  or  harmoniza‐tion, the already mentioned democratic deficit, is unique to the EU, and may  be  the  more  significant.  The  coordination  of  lawmaking  among sovereign  states  of  equal  formal  status,  and with  an  identical  need  to adapt to the realities of an economic system that more and more tran‐
 
27. Justice Brandeis’ famous comment in dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 
US 262 (1932) is less regnant today. Consider the battles California had to fight to gain some 
autonomy over regulation of automobile emission standards. 
28. Whether the battle over control of the Delaware phenomenon of mobile corpora-
tions, provoked by the European Court of Justice’s use of the Treaty’s Establishment Clause 
in the Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art cases is an invigoration of a type of Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence or only the beginning of a new round of centralized regula-
tion permitting only a limited range of variation, or of both, is not yet determinable. See 
Richard M. Buxbaum, “Private International Law and Regulatory Competition in Comparative 
Perspective,” RabelsZ (forthcoming 2009). 
29. Buxbaum & Hopt, supra n. 24 at 242f. 
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scends their particular boundaries, offers a better chance of eliminating this  politically  volatile  deficit  than  does  top‐down  harmonization.  It also  provides  a  further  benefit;  namely,  the  power  inherent  in  such  a coordinated  state  network  to  control  the  race  to  the  bottom  faced  by states  standing  in  isolated  and  non‐communicative  competition  with one  another. While  that  sounds  like  a  cartel  of  states,  and  thus  anti‐thetical  to  the very notion of  regulatory  competition,  it  is,  in  terms of accommodating  a  “decent”30  level  of  regulation  and  perhaps  of  redis‐tributive policies, a virtuous cartel. This can profitably be compared with the current effort of the po‐litical  organs  of  the  EC  to  achieve  a  similar  goal  by  combining  the principle of subsidiarity with the principle of minimum common stan‐dards.  Absent  minimum  standards,  the  so‐called  Cassis  de  Dijon principle,31 mandating full faith and credit to the laws of the home state of a legal person whose behavior is sought to be controlled, leads to the market‐driven facilitative law we associate with this race to the bottom. To control this drift, the concept of minimum common standards is su‐perimposed  on  the  subsidiarity  concept, much  as  the  new mandatory minimum  standards  of  the  Sarbanes‐Oxley  Act  are  superimposed  on state  corporation  law  in  certain  sensitive  fields.  Here,  too,  however, some of  the  concerns  just discussed  remain  relevant. While minimum common  standards  are  a  coarser  mesh  than  fully  centralized  law‐making,  they,  by  definition,  cannot  avoid  ossification  and  inflexibility over time, and of course they also still suffer some of  the problems of the described democratic deficit. To  end  this  introduction  to  the  coordination  mission,  one  addi‐tional insight, blindingly obvious, nonetheless is worth making. Market pressure  for  bottom‐up  harmonization  essentially  is  little  more  than pressure  for  uniform measures  facilitative  of  transactions.  To  the  ex‐tent policy disputes exist as to the outer boundaries of  facilitation,  the “market”  solution  taken  in  isolation  only  represents  the  net  power  of the winners of those debates; that is, usually, the private sector provid‐ers  of  the  goods,  services,  and  investments  at  issue,  and  among  them the net power of  the more organized participants (for example, banks 
 
30. I put this in quotes to avoid having to define it. 
31. Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [Cassis de Dijon], [1979] 
ECR 649. The application of this mutual-recognition principle, mitigated by the mentioned 
possibility of uniform minimum standards, was made a keystone of Community legislative 
policy through The White Paper Completing the Internal Market, Com. (85) 310 (June 1985) 
and has found significant application in the free-movement-of-capital and financial-services 
sectors. See the brief overview in George A. Bermann, Roger J. Goebel, William J. Davey & 
Eleanor M. Fox, Cases and Materials on European Union Law (2d ed. St. Paul 2002) at 1175 
f., 1186 f., 1194 f. 
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over  merchants).  Plenty  of  examples  come  to  mind:  the  battle  over shrinkwrap licenses in the failed UCC effort to create an Article 2A; the internecine  battles  over  priorities  in  creditors’  remedies;  the  battle over  labor  codetermination;  the  battles–and  they  are  constant–over appropriate capital market legislation. Market failure, in this context, is a  political  standoff  between  the  proponents  of  discordant  policies; market  success  represents  the  lack of politically  significant policy ob‐jections to facilitative norms. IV. THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC LAWS 
A. The Challenges of Economic Law for Comparative Law Before this coordination mission, with its asserted benefits, can be mean‐ingfully  applied,  its  necessary  attributes  need  to  be  specified,  a requirement  that  returns  us  to  the particular  concept  of  economic  law and  its  mix  of  facilitative  and  regulatory  elements.  Three  assumptions about  the  addressees  of  economic  law  introduce  this  brief  discussion. First, in the present era, the transnational economy is built upon the pri‐vately  (not  state)  owned  business  firm,  a  firm  that  is  hierarchically organized and plans its activities even if they have to exist within a more or  less unplanned economy.  Second,  in  the  short  run,  trade and  invest‐ment  is  largely,  though  of  course  not  totally,  concentrated  at  the  next level above the national economy, the regional economy of blocs, rather than  immediately at  the  fully  global  level. Third,  regional  legal  regimes, preeminent in the EC, of course, with widely different levels of the verti‐cal  division  of  powers  will  exist  but  only  partially  shadow  the  level  of regional economic integration. Following on these assumptions, the central elements of economic law  (and  thus  of  its  coordination)  can  be  better  understood.  Two  ele‐ments stand out. First, despite the tendency to think of the harmonization of private law, the essential core of comparative law will move more than previously towards public law.32 That is in part, of course, due to the sim‐ple definitional assumption that economic law is more than private law. It also, however, is due to the fact that any single state’s effort to legislate about  cross‐border economic matters  in which other states also have a legislative interest needs to consider that legislation’s prescriptive reach across its borders, which by definition means to step beyond the private‐law realm since  that  incursion may meet other policy bases than those 
 
32. For a full review of the current state of that definitional problem and its contexts, see 
Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, “Private Law Beyond the State: Comparative Perceptions and 
Historical Observations,” 71 RabelsZ 345 (2007). 
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supporting the home state’s laws. And as regional legal regimes follow in the  path  of  regional  or  global  economic  regimes,  these  regional  law‐making bodies will have to engage even more fully in these coordination efforts.  Since  they  have  no  higher  hierarchy  to  speak  of,  they  are  con‐demned  to  follow  this  path  to  “doing”  comparative  law  if  they  are  to engage  in  the  process  at  all.  Here  even more  than  on  the  purely  inter‐state level, issues of policy analyses and of the appropriate reach of pre‐scriptive jurisdiction will be essential. Second, the significance of economic and other social‐science ele‐ments  underlying  or  influencing  law‐making  in  any  given  state increases as the substantive differences between different economic or other policy  judgments of other  states  increase. This  impels  compara‐tive law practice to be deepened and contextualized through what one might  call  comparative  social  science  practice.  Put  another  way,  the cryptotypes that Rodolfo Sacco has explored so fruitfully in his study of Legal  Formants  concern  not  only  the  hidden  forms  that  support  legal doctrines but also the hidden forms that support the social‐science or policy judgments underlying those doctrines.33 The uncovering of these cryptotypes thus is inescapably a function, a social‐science function, of comparative  law.  Its  importance cannot be underestimated. At  the do‐mestic  level,  the  various  ideological,  political,  and  economic  conflicts that underlie all law‐making can be left more or less unarticulated, em‐bedded as they are  in the historically contingent path of the particular polity. At the inter‐state level, however, they need to be articulated—to be  translated  and  made  transparent—if  transnational  facilitation  and regulation of economic activity and economic actors are to be success‐fully coordinated. A small example from the extensive debate about the contestable  convergence  of  national  capital  market  laws  comes  to mind:  assumptions  about  the  coming  victory  of  the  US model  of  this type of regulation34—informational  transparency and adequacy  in  lieu of  substantive  regulation—rest  on  more  or  less  articulated  assump‐tions about the depth and liquidity of the American capital markets; i.e., 
 
33. Rodolfo Sacco, “Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law,” 39 
Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 343 (1991). For earlier insights into that issue, both connected with the 
institute with which Herbert Bernstein was long connected, see Andreas Heldrich, “Sozialwis-
senschaftliche Aspekte der Rechtsvergleichung,” 34 RabelsZ 427 (1970); and, early in his 
career, Ulrich Drobnig, “Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtssociologie,” 18 RabelsZ 295 (1953), 
esp. at 304. 
34. An aggressive version of this argument is that of Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kra-
akman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Georgetown L. J. 439 (2001), reprinted in 
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Jeffrey Gordon and Mark Roe, eds., 
Cambridge 2004). 




B. Don’t Talk About ItDo It So the question is fairly posed: can the process of comparative law provide this network of states with the benefits of politically legitimate and  economically  responsible  law‐making  that  can  meet  an  increas‐ingly  globalized  system  of  economic  actors—on  its  own  terms,  so  to speak—while escaping these two pitfalls of lack of adaptability and lack of  democratic  accountability?  With  this  question  I  return  to  Herbert Bernstein’s injunction: don’t talk so much about what comparative law is; start doing it. My case study, a  foolhardy term for the following few remarks, of whether “doing it” is possible is a project that has been un‐der way  for over a  decade  now,  the  Trento  ‘Common Core’  Project of European Private Law.36 This project is based, in turn, on the approach the  late  Rudolf  Schlesinger  took when  in  the  1950s  he  developed  the subject of comparative  law in terms of  its practical utility  for the  legal profession, judiciary, and legislature;37 in other words, following the in‐strumental  mission  of  the  subject.38  Both  began  at  the  bottom,  with close  study  of  the  law  on  the  books  and  the  law  in  action  in  specific fields; Schlesinger’s on contract  law,  the Trento Project on private  law 
tout court. The former’s approach was perhaps too microscopic; in any event,  given  its  limited  resources  it  essentially  exhausted  itself with a definitive, if too narrow, study of the formation of contracts. The Trento Project has had the resources to support a  larger ambition, as  its  title, “The Common Core of European Private Law,” suggests. The most recent substantive study produced by the Project, Eva‐Maria Kieninger’s thorough report on European national law governing non‐possessory security interests in moveables, provides my example.39 
 
35. For recent scholarship recognizing these issues in the field of corporate and capital-
markets law, see John Coffee, “Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and 
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance,” 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1757 
(2002) and Ronald Gilson, “Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or 
Function?,” 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329 (2001). 
36. For a description see Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, Making European Law: Essays 
on the “Common Core” Project (Trento 2000). 
37. Formation of Contracts: A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems (Rudolf B. 
Schlesinger, gen. ed., Dobbs Ferry 1968). 
38. In this he followed his bent towards the practical-analytical; but his larger mission, a 
reflection of his personal history, was an idealistic one closer aligned to the ”universal-law” 
mission, if never ostentatiously trumpeted as such. 
39. Security Rights in Moveable Property in European Private Law (E.-M. Kieninger, ed., 
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First  of  all,  it  is  a  classic  example  of  the  awkwardness  of  fitting  eco‐nomic  law  into  the  standard  private‐public  dichotomy.40  Creditor‐debtor  law,  including  this  sub‐set,  is  a  subject  that  only  exists  inside two very powerful bookends of classical public law—between the con‐sumer protection bookend and the insolvency bookend.41 In that sense, it reveals exactly the challenge and the potential success in seeing com‐parative  law  work  as  a  work  of  coordination;  after  all,  for  policy reasons stemming from different national views of these bookends, the actual doctrines almost  inevitably differ—will have to differ—no mat‐ter  how  strongly market  forces  seek maximum  facilitative  framing  of these  credit devices  in  the applicable  law.  Consider only  the  listing of the issues Kieninger identifies as representing continuing substantially divergent positions:  the publicity requirement  for the creation of non‐possessory proprietary rights; the derogation by contract of mandatory rules of property law such as the retention of title approach to the secu‐rity interest in newly manufactured goods; lease forfeiture in the event of the lessee’s insolvency; the assignability of security interests and the related issue of the notification of the debtor or the public; the validity of  floating  charges  that  cover  all,  even  after‐acquired  property,  of  the debtor;  above  all,  perhaps,  the  variously  mandatory  or  less‐than‐
 
with the assistance of M. Graziadei, Cambridge 2004). Note that this subject is categorized 
as private law in traditional terms, thus implicitly questioning my offhand characterizations in 
the immediately preceding text. 
40. This is—finally—the place at which to look at the contestable private/public law 
distinction in comparative terms. Early assumptions about its dichotomous nature and its 
variously located roots in Roman, Westphalian or 19th century soil have been discredited; see 
in lieu of other citations the thorough study of Martin Bullinger, Öffentliches Recht und Pri-
vatrecht (Stuttgart 1968). Putting aside its remaining power as a means of cartelizing the 
internal distribution of teaching and research chairs, it survived into the 20th century in one 
shorthand form: public law is that whose substantive expression either includes the state as a 
party or the role of state’s institutions in any law’s enforcement, i.e., constitutional and admin-
istrative law in the former case, civil procedure and bankruptcy law in the latter. In the United 
States, the only possible dichotomous classification would have to be an indirect one: if the 
substantive law is enforceable privately (i.e., through contractually authorized arbitration), it is 
private law; if not, it is public. 
But that shorthand classification no longer works, for the same reason that the Civilian 
distinction no longer works. In the first two-thirds of the last century, the state’s increasing 
engagement in providing social goods and curbing private power “publicized” much formerly 
private law and diminished the value of the Civilian distinction. In the last third, the state’s 
increasing disengagement from both the provision of social goods and the regulation of eco-
nomic life diminished the value of the American version of the distinction (almost all “public 
law” is arbitrable today). 
41. “Classical” in the American sense–consumer protection once was non-arbitrable. It 
was not classical in the Civilian sense, since consumer protection did not fit within the formal 
definition of public law (see the preceding footnote). But consumer protection is, in both sys-
tems, a policy limit on the freedom of contract; and in that sense it will display national 
variation as national policy responses to the issue vary. 
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mandatory  rules of private  international  law when  the goods  in ques‐tion cross borders; and more. Transparent communication of individual states’ doctrines and un‐derlying policies among themselves, as equals,  is what the coordination mission of comparative law is about. Its advantages over top‐down har‐monization  lie,  first  of  all,  in  the  inherent  flexibility  of  the  preferred approach. An example taken from the Kieninger volume: Finnish law ap‐parently permits the secured creditor to obtain only 50% of the value of the property covered by a floating (or “enterprise”) charge in the case of the debtor’s  insolvency—a rule that  itself  is a good example of how the typical conflict between institutional lenders and trade creditors arguing over the body of the commercial debtor produces ad‐hoc legislative com‐promises.  Putting  aside  the  actual  fact  that  the  EC  Council  of Ministers did  not wish  to  force  a  reconciliation  of  numerous  such  differences  by forcing a common compromise down the throats of recalcitrant Member States,42 the choice between a top‐down solution and a coordinated inter‐state one seems to me to lie with the latter. A directive or regulation “cur‐ing” (again  in quotes) one or even a series of random variations simply lays  one  patchwork  over  another,  compared  with  the  preservation  of domestic‐level  systemic  and  political  harmony  that  results  when  any given country  is persuaded by this exercise  in comparative  law to coor‐dinate its laws with its fellows through smoothing out its own lumps and bumps.  Those  bumps may  be  simply  the  contingent  result of  historical accident;  they may be the remnants of  local political bargains now ren‐dered  obsolete  by  changing  circumstances,  including  of  course  the development  of  the  common  internal  market  itself;  or  they  may  be needed even today in the context of today’s political bargains. In the last case only, a separate calculation may have to be made whether the local aberration indeed distorts internal‐market conditions to an extent justi‐fying  federal  intervention;  but  in  all  other  cases,  coordinating  local responses within this network frame seems to me a far sounder way to expend  scholarly  and  policy‐making  energy  than  to move  immediately towards imposed unification. Unification may in the end be the preferred solution, but not on an a priori basis. This  may,  of  course,  strike  some  as  simply  “bargaining  in  the shadow of the ruler,” much as we have semi‐coerced market‐driven har‐monization  or  unification  in  what  otherwise  seems  like  open  and voluntary bottom‐up harmonization.43 That objection, however, is not at 
 
42. Kieninger, at 22ff. 
43. The semi-coercive role of the pseudo-constitutional conflicts norm that the law of the 
state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of the corporation is a homely domestic ex-
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all relevant if coordination of law in a system without a hierarch is at is‐sue, and only marginally relevant if the hierarch is not yet omnipotent, as in the EC, rather than all‐powerful as  in the US. And the objection does not touch at all on the two pitfall points I have raised, those of flexibility and  democratic  legitimation,  which  the  state‐based  coordination  ap‐proach largely avoids. Within the context of the world we live in, a multi‐storied economy living in a number of one‐story state houses, a new look at  the missions  of  comparative  law  is  appropriate. Mine,  I  hope,  is  one such look that may open some new approaches to our work. The  coordination mission  of  comparative  law  I  have  suggested  is specifically relevant to economic law and I do not know whether it can be readily applied to those fields of the law that the economic world of Sys‐tem  graciously  permits  the  Lebenswelt,  the  world  of  non‐instrumental actors  like  families  and  friends,  to  govern.44  The  private‐law  norms  of that life‐world also have their overarching policy frame, even if it derives more from what once was unabashedly called “organic life.” What is clear is  that  the  private‐law  norms  of  the  world  of  the  instrumental  actors never have been only that. To the extent the Trento Project belies its self‐professed  “private  law”  core,  to  that  extent  it will  be a  success and  re‐main,  for now, my prime example of  the  comparative advantage of  the coordination mission of comparative law. V. CONCLUSION I suspect that Herbert Bernstein would have been happier had my exam‐ples  come  from  that  Lebenswelt;  after  all,  family  law  was  one  of  his favorite subjects, and the theme of  the Habilitation he abandoned in or‐der  to  come  to  the  new world.  But  it  was  not  his  only  interest,  as  his doctoral dissertation on workers’ compensation45 and his study of the ef‐fects of East German nationalization decrees on the extraterritorial life of those nationalized companies46 demonstrate. Indeed, even his family‐law project was not without  its public‐law overlay, since  it analyzed the  im‐pact of constitutional equal‐protection and non‐discrimination doctrines on  traditional  private  international  law  treatment  of  foreign marriages and local divorces.47 Herbert Bernstein was a widely read, broadly inter‐
 
ample, as already suggested. 
44. This distinction, derived from the phenomenological literature, is fruitfully used in our 
context in Jürgen Habermas, “Law as Medium and Law as Institution,” in Dilemmas of Law in 
the Welfare State (Gunther Teubner ed., Berlin 1985) at 203. 
45. Herbert Bernstein, Schadensausgleich bei Arbeitsunfällen (Karlsruhe 1963). 
46. Herbert Bernstein, Corporate Identity in International Business: The Zeiss Contro-
versy, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 299 (1972). 
47. Herbert Bernstein, “Ein Kollisionsrecht für die Verfassung,” 19 Neue Juristische Wo-





chenschrift 2273 (1965). Left incomplete, it was aptly characterized as a “drumroll without 
symphony” in the review essay of Franz Gamillscheg, “Gleichberechtigung der Frau und Re-
form des Internationalen Eherechts, 33 RabelsZ 654 (1969), at 701f. 
79 
Foreword* 
Political Parties in China’s Judiciary 
 
 
Jonathan K. Ocko**   To have Zhu Suli, Dean of Peking University Law School, deliver the Fifth Annual Herbert  Bernstein Memorial  Lecture  in  International  and  Com‐parative Law on November 2, 2006, was especially apt. His address not only  commemorated  Professor  Bernstein,  it  also  commemorated  the twentieth  anniversary  of  Professor  Bernstein’s  first  foray  into  Chinese law  at  the  1986  Law  and  Contemporary  Problems  Conference  on  “The Emerging  Framework  of  Chinese  Civil  Law.”1  Moreover,  Zhu’s  lecture touched on one of  the  central  issues  raised at  that  conference; namely, the extent to which German and other  foreign models had  influence on and were of  value  to China. At  the  conference,  and  in a  later  essay,  the late Tong Rou, a law professor at People’s University Law School and one of the drafters of the General Principles of Civil Law, acknowledged that he and his colleagues had not created the civil law anew. However, stressing the  singularly  Chinese nature  of  the document  and  its  reflection  of  the particular  Chinese  experience,  he  emphatically  resisted analyses,  Bern‐stein’s among them, that he perceived as over‐emphasizing foreign influ‐ence. To understand the distinctive national character of the law, argued Tong, one had to consider “broadly the social structure, all political eco‐nomic phenomena, and the entire legal system.”2 In his lecture, Zhu Suli echoes Tong Rou’s concerns. Zhu welcomes comparative analysis of Chi‐nese contemporary law, but he sees it as having value and cogency only in so far as the comparatist first grasps the realities of China and remem‐bers that no comparative framework is intellectually neutral. 
 
* Fifth Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke Univer-
sity School of Law, Nov. 2, 2006. Reprinted with permission from The Duke Journal of Com-
parative and International Law: Foreword to Zhu Suli, Political Parties In China's Judiciary, 17 
DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 527 (2007).  
** Adjunct Professor of Chinese Legal History, Duke University School of Law; Professor 
and Head, Department of History, North Carolina State University. 
 1. The Emerging Framework of Chinese Civil Law, 52 Law & Contemp. Prob. (Jona-
than K. Ocko sp. ed., Spring-Summer 1989). Herbert Bernstein, The PRC’s General Princi-
ples From A German Perspective, 52 Law & Contemp. Prob. 117 (Spring-Summer 1989). 
 2. Jonathan K. Ocko, Preface, The Emerging Framework of Chinese Civil Law, 52 Law 
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Zhu  Suli’s  scholarly writings are  substantial  and wide‐ranging,  con‐tributing to the literature on rule of law, law and public policy, legal sociol‐ogy,  law and society, and  legal education. Though largely  in Chinese, they are  indirectly  accessible  in English  through an analytical  summary of his work by Hong Kong University law professor Albert Chen3 and a review of his recent monograph, Sending Law to the Countryside: Research on China’s 
Basic  Level  Judicial  System4 by New York University  law professor Frank Upham.5  Accordingly,  rather  than  reprise  still  another  account  of  Zhu’s work, I will restrict my comments to several brief observations. First,  Zhu Suli  is not  simply one of Peking University  (Beida) Law School’s more  distinguished  alumni;  he  is  also  one  of  its  proudest  and most  loyal  alums.  Zhu’s  decanal  remarks  to  incoming  and  graduating Beida law students demonstrate his deep, emotional attachment to Beida Law School and his passionate feelings about the role that it and its stu‐dents can and should play in China’s evolving legal system.6 Yet he tem‐pers  his  prideful  affection  for  both  his  school  and  his  students  with reminders that this well‐known brand stands for nothing by itself. Beida law students must give  it meaning and  substance by being  individually accomplished and committed to the social responsibility for the greater good that they undertake as a concomitant of their legal education. Second, Dean Zhu is above all else a pragmatist. For him, “there is no absolute  knowledge…  Law  is  for  solving  practical  problems.”7  As  Zhu 
 
 3. Albert H.Y. Chen, Socio-legal Thought and Legal Modernization in Contemporary 
China: A Case Study of the Jurisprudence of Zhu Suli, in Law, Legal Culture And Politics in 
The Twenty First Century 227-49 (Günther Doeker-Mach & Klaus A. Ziegert, eds., 2004). 
 4. Zhu Suli, Songfa Xiaxiang: Zhongguo Jiceng Sifa Zhidu Yanjiu [Sending Law To The 
Countryside: Research On China’s Basic Level Judicial System] (2000). 
 5. Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if He Stays with His Sheep? Justice 
in Rural China, 114 Yale L. J. 1675 (2005) (reviewing Zhu Suli, Sending Law To The Coun-
tryside: Research On China’s Basic Level Judicial System (2000)). 
 6. See, e.g., Zhu Suli, Nide shi you chuxide haizi, zai beijing daxue faxueyuan biye di-
anlishangde zhici [You are Children with a Future, Remarks at the 2005 Graduation Cere-
mony of Peking University Law School] (June 29, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://lawthinker.com/show.asp?id=2775); Su Li, Diyige mengxiang chengzhen, Su Li 2005 
nian beida faxueyuan xinxuesheng zhici [The First Dream Becomes Fact, Su Li’s Fall 2005 
Remarks to Peking University Law School’s New Students] (Sept. 14, 2005) (transcript avail-
able at http://law-thinker.com/show.asp?id=2855); Zhu Suli, Xuanze Beida, Su Li 2006 nian 
beida faxueyuan xinsheng ruxue zhici [Picking Beida, Su Li’s Remarks at the Matriculation of 
Peking University Law School’s 2006 Entering Class] (September 2006) (transcript available 
at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID 
=34429); Ni ruoruandi xiangqilai zhege xiaoyuan Political Parties In China (zai beida faxue-
yuan 2006 jie xuesheng biye dianlishangde zhici, 2006/6/23) [Your Tender Thoughts of this 
Campus, Graduating Remarks at the June 23, 2006 Commencement Ceremony for Peking 
University Law School] (June 23, 2006) (transcript available at http://law-thinker.com/ 
show.asp?id=3277). 
 7. Chen, supra note 3, at 231 (quoting Zhu Suli). Zhu Suli frequently uses the pen 
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makes  clear  in  Sending  Law  to  the  Countryside,  foremost  among  these problems is the absence of law and legal services in rural China.8 How, he asks in a recent essay on a celebrated rural judge, can China be a rule of law  country  when  the  sixty  percent  of  its  population  that  lives  in  the countryside is largely without law, that is, without affordable legal serv‐ices and dedicated adjudicators?9 Thus, he  calls  for China’s  legal  educa‐tion to be less theoretical and more practical; for there to be more former judges and litigators among its law professors; and for legal academics to worry  less  about  developing  ideal models  and more  about what  is  ap‐propriate and what works. Unlike his Beida  colleague, He Weifang, Zhu sees no  inherent problem  in using  former military officials  as  judges  in courts of first instance.10 Certainly, at the intermediate and higher courts, there  should  be  an  emphasis  on  professionalization  and  specialization. But at  the basic  level rural court, where disputants are  looking for sub‐stantive  justice  and  are  more  likely  to  agree  to  mediation  than  urban residents,  proceduralism  can  be  an  impediment.  Zhu  sees  enormous value in drawing judges from practically experienced government cadres, especially if they themselves have rural backgrounds, can explain matters simply and in local dialect, deploy discretion adeptly and fairly, and draw their authority from personal qualities rather than from the trappings of the  courtroom  and  judicial  garb.  He worries  not  about  there  being  too many  such  judges,  but  rather  about  who  will  replace  them  when  the current ones retire. The task, then, for legal academics, concludes Zhu, is to encourage their students to bring  law to the countryside;  to conduct detailed  local  studies  that  identify what works  and what  does  not  and which  rural  judges  are effective  and why;  to distill  the  implicit  logic  of rural adjudicators; to express it in generalizable academic language, sys‐tematize  the  knowledge,  and  suggest  creative  ways  to  deploy  diverse forms of  law that suit  the needs of a nation experiencing wildly uneven development. 
 
name Su Li. 
 8. In an article on legal education, Zhu cites a finding that twenty percent of China’s 
counties lack even a single lawyer. Su Li, Dangdai Zhongguo faxue jiaoyude tiaozhan yu jiyu 
[The Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Contemporary Legal Education], 2006 FAXUE, 
no. 2, at 9 (2006). 
 9. Zhu Suli, Zhongguo nongcun dui fazhide xuqiu yu sifa zhidude huiying—cong Jin 
Guilan faguan qieru [China’s Villages Need for Rule of Law and the Judicial System’s Re-
sponse—The Example of Judge Jin Guilan] (2006), available at http://article. chinalaw-
info.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=32785. 
10. See generally Zhu Suli, Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Interna-
tional and Comparative Law: Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 
533 (2007). 
Duke Law CICLOPs | Jonathan K. Ocko  Vol. 1 
 
82 
Third, as the above suggests, Zhu Suli  is a contrarian who relishes playing the role of intellectual “bad boy” and provocateur. (Perhaps this inclination explains why he is so attracted to the work of Judge Richard Posner, who is much easier to peg  ideologically than Zhu, but who, Zhu notes, is an anti‐Marxist libertarian, whose analytical approach has much in common with Marxists’ historical materialism11). Of Chinese and West‐ern commentators who complain about the Communist Party’s influence on and interference  in the judicial system, Zhu asks:  in terms of China’s modern  history, what  did  you  expect?  China’s modern  political  parties antedated the modern state. Indeed, the Communists (like their erstwhile competitor for political power, the Guomindang, Zhu boldly notes) estab‐lished a party‐state in which the party was explicitly privileged over the state. Moreover, while certainly problematic, the Party’s influence is not utterly reprehensible and sometimes produces the desired substantively just result even as its interference violates procedural justice. Yet Zhu is no apologist for the Party and openly defends the valuable social role of the  public  intellectuals  who  criticize  its  missteps  and  overreaching.12 Zhu’s most contrarian stance is his critique of legal academics’ emphasis on rule of  law, especially on a purely modern model of rule of  law.  It  is not  that  Zhu  is  opposed  to  rule  of  law.  Rather,  he  objects  to  its  being treated as a decontextualized panacea, and he objects to legal profession‐als cutting themselves off from ordinary people by not listening to them and  by  speaking  in  overly  specialized  language.13  Zhu’s  paradoxical couching of  some of  this  critique  in Western high theory has  led Frank Upham  to  characterize  Sending  Law  to  the  Countryside as  “important,” but also as “irritating and fun.”14 Zhu’s own stature as a widely read pub‐lic  intellectual  indicates  that  Upham’s  characterization  can  arguably  be applied to most of Zhu’s prolific writing. Fourth, Zhu Suli is a scholar who reads voraciously, broadly, and in‐tegratively—his  latest book, a study of  law and  literature, draws widely from Chinese literature as well as from Chinese and Western scholarship on the subject15—but one who is, like Clifford Geertz,16 also finely attuned 
 
11. Su Li, Falu Yu Wenxue: Yi Zhongguo Chuantong Xiju Wei Cailiao [Law And Litera-
ture: Using Materials From Chinese Traditional Plays] 14 (2006). 
12. Xiao Qiang, Zhu Suli on Public Intellectuals, China Digital Times, Jan. 15, 2005, 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2005/01/zhu_suli_on_pub.php. 
13. Zhu Suli, Fazhi yu gonggong zhengce meizhou pinglun’ kaimushide pinglun [Com-
ment at the Opening Ceremony of the Weekly Discussion on Rule of Law and Public Policy] 
(Apr. 2, 2007) (transcript available at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article 
_display.asp?ArticleID37854). 
14. Upham, supra note 5, at 1677. 
15. Su Li, Falu Yu Wenxue, supra note 11. 
16. Clifford Geertz, Law as Local Knowledge, in Local Knowledge (3d ed. 2000). 
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to  the problems of  commensurability  and comparison as well  as  to  the purpose of comparison.  Is  its purpose to denote one system as the per‐fect universal model, others as aspiring but still imperfect emulators, and others as inherently incompatible with the model? Or is it to use the per‐spective of one system to cast new light on the processes of another, to use  one  to  understand  the  strengths  and weaknesses  of  the  other? Or, finally, is it to prepare for the task (impossible in Zhu’s view) of grafting one legal system onto another?17 In his provocative, pragmatic, penetrat‐ing essay that follows, Dean Zhu attempts to answer the question: what is the proper frame of reference for a comparative legal analysis of contem‐porary Chinese law? 
 
17. Zhu Suli, Zheli meiyou budongchan—faluyizhi wentide lilun shuli [Here There is No 
Real Property—Theoretical Parsing of the Problem of Legal Transplantation], (2007) avail-
able at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=38679. Pre-
sented in the southwest corner of Western China’s Qinghai province, a predominantly Tibetan 
area, this essay argued that a legal concept, such as real property, cannot be transplanted in 
vacuum. To have meaning and be effective, it requires the transplantation of the entire 




Political Parties in China’s Judiciary* 
 
Zhu Suli**  I. THE ISSUE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE The Spring 2005  issue of  the Yale Law Journal published a  lengthy re‐view by New York University Law School Professor Frank K. Upham1 of my  book,  Sending  Law  to  the  Countryside.  Professor  Upham’s  central criticisms are two: first, my “uncritical acceptance of a linear version of modernization theory,”2 a criticism that I will not address in this essay; and  second,  my  “greatest  flaw,”  “the  absence  of  politics  and  political power.” My work, he  says,  “is  reticent  to  the point of  timidity when  it comes to politics,” “[a]side  from the small­p politics,”3 by which he ap‐pears  to mean  the  internal  conflicts  and  interpersonal  quarrels of  the workplace. I emphasize these words to show that Professor Upham in‐tends to make his point absolutely clear and forestall any possible mis‐understanding of the word by readers. Moreover, his choice of the word “timidity”  implicates  the  author’s  academic  honesty  in  the  political dominance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Contrary to Professor Upham’s characterization, my book actually repeatedly  reveals  the  influence on  the  judiciary of politics,  especially the CCP’s policies,  including  local Party organizations’ multifarious  in‐terference in cases. This coverage is most evident in Part I of the book, 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comments and suggestion of participants of the conference and Jonathan Ocko, Adjunct Pro-
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1.  Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if He Stays with His Sheep? Justice 
in Rural China, 114 Yale L. J. 1675 (2005) (reviewing Zhu Suli, Sending Law To The Coun-
tryside: Research On China’s Basic Level Judicial System (2000)). 
 2. Id. at 1700. 
 3. Id. at 1698, 1703 (emphasis added). 
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which  analyzes  the  influence  of  politics  over  judiciary  from  macro, middle,  and micro  levels.  Chapter  I projects  the  sending of  the  law  to the countryside as an extension of the power of the nation‐state to the basic level of society and points out that the judicial system in contem‐porary China assumes a political role. Chapter II discusses how the po‐litical  control  over  judicial  affairs  is  possible  through  the  judicial administration within the courts and the judicial system. Chapter III fo‐cuses  on  the  adjudication  committee  (shenpan weiyuanhui),  a  judicial organization within each court designed to deal—at  least according to statutory law—with hard and important cases, and analyzes the multi‐ple function of this micro institution within courts. Other chapters also have  abundant  analysis  of  politics  and  political  power.4  Thus,  while  I may not meet Prof. Upham’s expectations about how much discussion there should be of politics and political power, his judgment that there is none at all is without foundation. Certainly, such analyses may not be enough and should be extended by other research. However, I want to emphasize that I wrote the book in Chinese for a Chinese audience and never intended it to satisfy the politi‐cal and ideological tastes of any foreign readers; Professor Upham’s frus‐tration or dissatisfaction is therefore understandable. Nevertheless,  Professor  Upham’s  review  attracted  my  attention and  needs  to  be  countered,  not  because  he  has  any  new  insights  or makes any contribution to the study of law in China, but rather because his  errors  in  methodology  are  typical  of  some Western  observers  of China and are influential in China. Such errors reveal not only the deep ideological bias that  is  central  to  the “moral authority” of  the Western notion of the autonomy of law and “rule of law” (a shaky authority that has evaporated after 9/11), but also a theoretical mistake that is com‐mon in comparative or implicitly comparative studies of China. In other words, it  is the impact of these and similar errors on recent legal stud‐ies in China over the recent decades that has prompted me to write this response. Moreover, precisely because Upham’s errors are characteris‐tic of the shortcomings in analyses of Chinese law, this essay is not sim‐ply  a  response  to  Upham’s  book  review,  but  also  a  paper  of  its  own independent significance. II. IS A DISTINCTION NECESSARY? Professor Upham’s criticism of my work as failing to address politics and political  power  is  internally  illogical  and  contradictory  because  his  re‐
 
 4. Zhu Suli, Sending Law To The Countryside: Research On China’s Basic Level Judi-
cial System chs. 7, 10, 14 (2000). 
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view also acknowledges,  at  least  implicitly,  that  I did analyze  the  influ‐ence of various social actors,  including the Party and government, upon the operation of basic  courts.  So, what  then  is Professor Upham’s  com‐plaint? A careful reading suggests that what troubles Professor Upham is my  failure  to  devote  a  chapter  or  chapters  to  a  relatively  systematic analysis of the CCP’s interference in the operation of basic level courts. As I already noted, this charge is untrue. However, even if the criticism were valid, we need to note that it is based on three implicit presuppositions: first, that there is a unique political influence that comes purely from the CCP; second, that it is possible to create a standard model of a judiciary free from political influence or meddling; and third, that it is possible and necessary  for  researchers  to examine and measure  independently  such influence. All three presuppositions are unrealistic. In my  own  view,  and  in  the  view  (explicit  and  implicit)  of many Chinese and foreign scholars, the CCP’s influence and control is ubiqui‐tous;  it  penetrates  every  aspect  of  society.  Despite  the many  political differences between  the CCP and  its  former arch‐rival,  the Nationalist Party (known as the Guomindang or GMD) and despite the fact that the CCP never used the GMD’s often deployed concept of the “party‐state,” in  practice,  the  CCP  inherited  the  political  tradition,  initiated  by  Sun Yat‐sen5 and pursued by the GMD, comprised of a “party construction of the state,” “party rule of the state,” and “party above the state.” Indeed, eventually,  the  CCP’s  influence  over  society  and  the machinery  of  the state would far exceed that achieved by the GMD. The evidence is abundant. First, during the GMD’s rule of mainland China (1927–1949), political  control of entire regions remained  in the hands of provincial strongmen or warlords, and the GMD’s unification of  China was more  symbolic  than  real.6  Second,  the  same was  true  of political parties. Whether or not the GMD wanted to recognize it at the time,  even  during  the  GMD’s  rule,  the  CCP  occupied  a  considerable amount of territory, enjoyed the support of a large number of the peo‐ple, and  controlled  independent armed military  forces. There were, as well, some other smaller political parties. Third, in the Nationalist gov‐ernment, even within the GMD itself, there was a group of relatively in‐dependent  and  socially  influential  scholars  and  technocrats.  Fourth, because  of  the  GMD’s  weakness,  to  a  certain  extent  the  traditional model  of  social  control  being  exercised  by  a  combination  of  imperial 
 
 5. Sun Yat-sen was the first President of the Republic of China, and founder and 
leader of the Gmd. Sun Zhongshan, Sun Zhongshan Quanji [Complete Works Of Sun Yat-
sen], vol. 8, at 267–68, vol. 9, at 103-04 (1986). 
 6. 2 Deng Xiaoping Xuanji [Selected Readings Of Deng Xiaoping] 299 (2d ed. 1994). 
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(central) and gentry (local elite) power persisted, with the central gov‐ernment  having  rather  weak  influence  in  rural  China.7  In  conclusion, the GMD built only a superstructure and did not, because  it could not, implement its will and policies down to the lowest levels of society.8 In‐deed,  this  inability  to achieve  its  goal of  social  transformation  is what led to the GMD’s loss of the mainland in 1949. In  the  judiciary,  too,  the GMD  fruitlessly  sought  to establish  total control. From its earliest years, even before it had established national political  control,  the  GMD  insisted  on  “partyization  of  the  judiciary” (sifa  danghua).  Subsequently,  it  continued  to  adopt  systematic meas‐ures  in this regard,9 and there  is evidence to show that  in some cases, the GMD exercised strong direct  control.10 However,  this  insistence on partyization  demonstrated  that  the  GMD’s  control  and  influence  over the judiciary was not complete. Because of this reality, it would be pos‐sible, though still very difficult, to distinguish GMD influence from other political or governmental influence. In the years immediately following the CCP’s assumption of power in 1949, such a distinction became impossible—not because the CCP’s influence weakened but rather because it was too strong. First the Peo‐ple’s Republic of China (PRC) became a modern, nationalist state with a high degree of political, economic and cultural unity. Only Taiwan was under the control of the Nationalist government, and there were no re‐gional strongmen. Second, although there were other  legal, democratic parties, they all existed under the leadership of the CCP. Even after the space for these democratic parties’ political activities expanded follow‐ing  the  reform  and  “opening  up”  in  1978,  the  1982  constitution  pro‐
 
 7. Fei Xiaotong, Huangquan He Shenquan [Imperial Power And Gentry Power] (1988). 
 8. Some historical researchers testify that conflicts between GMD local branches and 
local governments always ended with the victory of local governments during the GMD’s rule. 
Cf. Wang Xianzhi, Kangzhan shiqi guomindang zuzhi jianshe yu zuzhi fazhan de jige wenti 
[Issues on GMD’s Organizational Construction and Development During the Anti-Japanese 
War], 1990 Jindaishi Yanjiu, no. 2, at 230-50 (1990); Zhongshen & Tang Sengshu, Shilun 
Nanjing guomin zhengfu xunzheng qianqi (1928-1937) de difang dangzheng jiufeng [The Lo-
cal Party-Government Conflicts in Early Tutelary Period (1928–1937) of Nanjing National 
Government], 1999 Shixue Yuekan, no. 2, at 53-58(1999). 
 9. The earliest recorded statement available referring to partyization was made by Xu-
qian in 1926; Ju Zheng, a founding member of GMD and later Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of National Government, elaborated it in 1934. According to Ju Zheng, partyization has 
three criteria: all judicial personnel must be GMD’s members; GMD policies must be applied 
in adjudications; and all the judges must accept the Three People’s Principles (the political 
ideology of GMD). Ju Zheng, Sifa danghua wenti [On Partyization of the Judiciary], 1934 
Dongfang Zazhi, no. 10 (1934). 
10. Cf. Wo Suo Zhidao De Hanjian Zhou Fuhai [Traitor Zhou Fuhai, As I Know] (Wen 
Fei ed., 2005); Wo Suo Zhidao De Hanjian Chen Gongbo [Traitor Chen Gongbo, As I Know] 
(Wen Fei ed., 2005). 
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vides  that  the  system  is  still  one  of  cooperation  and  consultation  by multiple  parties  under  the  leadership  of  the  CCP.11  Through  various formal  (for  example,  the  Chinese  Political  Consultative  Congress)  and informal irregular meetings with non‐party figures and institutions, the CCP gathers and selectively adopts the political advice of other political parties.  Some  leaders  of  these  democratic  parties  are  also  CCP mem‐bers.12 Third, the vast majority of social elites, whether in government, universities,  commerce,  or  social  organizations,  are  party  members. Other elites who are not party members accept the political leadership of CCP and most of them are staunch communists.13 Finally, within the CCP are some “radicals,” whose political views might be considered dis‐sident by Westerners.  In this sense, though the Party consistently pro‐claims itself to be the vanguard of the proletariat and the working class, and describes its highest ideal and ultimate aim to be the realization of communism,14  even  before  the  declaration  of  “the  three  representa‐tives,”15 the Party also emphasizes that it was the vanguard of the entire Chinese  people  and  that  it  sought  to  represent  the  interests  of  the greatest number of people.16 In this sense, the CCP is another “national‐ist” party. Its political program, despite having suffered mistakes of the right and the left (including the serious mistake of the Cultural Revolu‐tion), is widely accepted by the people. Owing  to  the  CCP’s  political  program  and  tight  organizational structure,  its  influence  is ubiquitous at every  level and  in every aspect of contemporary Chinese society; it determines the direction of society and government. Though there may be differences and conflicts within the party‐state, there is no external influence on the government other than the Party:  there  is no such thing as government policy  independ‐
 
11. Xian Fa [Constitution] pmbl., para. 10 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
12. As far as I know, the former or current leaders of such political parties as Democ-
ratic League, China National Democratic Consultation Association, Zi Gong Party, and Tai-
wan Democratic Self-government League were or are CCP members. 
13. Two examples are the late and only non-CCP Vice Presidents of PRC: Song Qin-
qlin, wife of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, applied and was approved for membership in the CCP right be-
fore her death; and Rong Yiren, China’s leading “red capitalist,” was identified in a New China 
News Agency obituary as a “solider for communism.” 
14. 16TH CCP Nat’l Conf., Constitution Of The Communist Party Of China general 
princs. (2002) [hereinafter CCP Const.]. 
15. It is emphasized that CCP represents the fundamental interests of the overwhelming 
majority of the Chinese people, represents the development trend of China’s advanced pro-
ductive forces, and represents the orientation of China’s advanced culture. It is widely con-
sidered an important change of CCP in terms of its organizational constitution and political 
ideology. 
16. Cf. 7th CCP Nat’l Conf., Constitution Of The Communist Party Of China (1945); 8th 
CCP Nat’l Conf., Constitution Of The Communist Party Of China (1956). 
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ent  from  the  CCP;  there  is  nothing  else  truly  influential,  not  even  the military policy  imagined by Western scholars. In this view, as a matter of fact, the CCP is not only the strength at the core of every undertaking in China, it is also the mechanism for the mobilization, integration, and political  representation of  all  social  forces  and  classes  of  PRC.  In  con‐temporary China, nearly every political force has either been integrated into  the  CCP,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  former  and  present  capitalists, counter‐revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists during the Cultural Revolution  (1966–1976),  denied  political  expression. However,  in  the more than two decades since China began its reform and “opening up” in 1978, and especially following the inclusion of the concept of the “the three  representatives”  in  the  party’s  and  PRC’s  constitutions,  the  CCP has pursued becoming a governing party  that  represents  the basic  in‐terests of the greatest number of people and that has daily strengthened its ability as a governing party.17 Therefore, distinguishing the status of party and government offi‐cials  is  truly  not  that  important.  At  every  administrative  level  in  the PRC, the head of the administrative unit is not only a party member, but the number two leader (for example, the deputy party secretary) of the party organization at  that  level, while  among the deputy  leaders of an administrative unit (for example, Vice Mayor of a city), only one person is  generally not  a party member.  Party and governmental officials  are interchangeable:  for example, most governors eventually assume a po‐sition as provincial Party secretary, and many provincial Party secretar‐ies  have  previously  served  as  governors  or  other  officials.  This  is  the pattern  from  the  center down  to  the  lowest  level.  Indeed, historically, few officials who have specialized in or worked only in Party affairs and never  in  the  government  enter  the  highest,  core  policy‐making  posi‐tions of the Party organization. This pattern holds true across all the branches of government and administration  regardless  of  the  breadth  of  their  responsibilities.  For example, at all levels of government, from the municipal to the national, the chairs of the People’s Congresses and People’s Political Consultative Conferences, as well as the chiefs of all but a few government agencies, are the party secretaries of the leading party group18 in those units.19 The  institutions  charged with  administering  justice  (the People’s Courts  and  People’s  Procuratorates)  are  certainly  no  exception.  Since 
 
17. Xian Fa art. 1 (1982). 
18. A leading party group is a CCP organization set in a state organ, people’s organiza-
tion, and other non-party organization. 
19. Currently, probably the foreign ministry is the only exception. 
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1949,  all  the  Presidents  of  the  People’s  Supreme  Court  and  the  Chief Procurator  of  the Supreme  Procuratorate,  except Shen  Junru,  the  first President of People’s Supreme Court, have been CCP members and sec‐retaries of  the  leading Party group of  the organization. Although there is commonly a non‐CCP‐member Vice President or Deputy Procurator, they  are  all  carefully  selected  by  the  CCP  organizational  branch  and trusted  by  the  CCP;  in  some  particularly  important  policy  decisions, these non‐Party officials may  be  invited  to participate  in an expanded meeting of the leading party group of their institution. Given such a structure, it is not only hard to distinguish among so‐cial, administrative, or Party  interference  in the judicial system and its operation,  it  is  also unnecessary  to make  this distinction.  To  insist on the distinction  is to apply a standard Western model of a judiciary,  in‐apposite for China. It fits China into a procrustean bed, akin to “cutting one’s feet to fit shoes” or “marking a boat to see where one has dropped a knife in a river.” This sort of “research” is not only meaningless; it also blurs and confuses the real problems to be dealt with in the Chinese ju‐dicial  system  and  can,  moreover,  lead  to  mistaken  solutions.  In  my view, what  is  truly  important  is  for us to discover, examine, and study concretely  the  shortcomings  and  merits  of  influence  on  and  interfer‐ence in the legal system (whatever  its sources), and to determine how to adjust and  improve the performance of China’s  judiciary,  as well as make it just, efficient, and effective. It should be pointed out that because of the Party’s ubiquitous in‐stitutional presence and because of  the nature of  the social revolution in China, the Party’s organizations and leaders (through administrative and other agencies) have directly  and  indirectly  influenced,  interfered in,  and  even  at  times  manipulated  the  judicial  process.  However,  we cannot, indeed, we should not, simply look at this as unfair interference. To be sure, the Party’s mistaken interference in the judicial system and its  policy  errors  have  led  to  some  disastrous  consequences.  Yet  even during  the  most  extreme  moments,  such  as  the  Cultural  Revolution (1966–1976),  there were CCP organizations  and  officials, who, within the scope of their ability and influence, prevented and reduced the un‐fairness or radicalism in some cases, including instances in the judicial sphere. Although today it  is quite popular to attribute all the problems of  the  PRC  to  the  CCP  or  the  revolution  led  by  the  CCP,  it  is  hard  to imagine that the current state of Chinese society and the judicial system would  necessarily  be  better  off  without  the  modern  revolution  and economic development led by the CCP. This is counterfactual, and I will not develop the argument here;  I am willing to  let history be the  final judge. However, if one thinks the revolution led by the CCP was inevita‐
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ble and on balance improved China, then one has to accept the CCP and its modeling  of  China’s modern  judiciary.  Though we can argue about whether the costs are worth it, there are no benefits without costs. Today,  although  the CCP has adopted  “relying on  law  to  rule  the country”  (yifa  zhiguo)  and  judicial  independence  is  inscribed  in  the Constitution, party organizations and individuals persist in  influencing and interfering with the judiciary. However, although these interferers are sometimes leading cadres who “wave the flag” of the local Party or‐ganization,  it  does  not mean  that  this  individual’s  interference  repre‐sents the Party’s or that particular party organization’s interference. To the  contrary,  some  of  them  are  violating  CCP  principles,  policies,  and disciplinary  rules.  A  county  Party  chief  may  interfere  with  a  county court’s handling of a case; if he or she acts out of personal interest, it is illegal; if the action is driven by “local  interest,”  it  is at a minimum un‐fair  and  inappropriate.  The  Court  or  Procuratorate  has  a  basis  in  law and Party disciplinary rules to reject such  interference, and both  insti‐tutions have certainly resisted this sort of meddling, though not always successfully.20 Moreover,  sometimes  the  party’s  apparent  interference is merely issuing an opinion (pishi) as a response to a “hot” social issue. Even in the absence of this opinion, the relevant court, acting solely on the basis of the law, would have reached a similar result. In a sense, the Party’s issuing of an opinion is simply a necessary political or public re‐lations gesture by the CCP, acting in its role as the governing party that is serving the people. It is a necessary political strategy that shows re‐sponsiveness  to  outcries  from  the  people.  Such  gestures  certainly  do not  fit  the model  of  separation  of  powers  and  are  often  criticized  by many legal scholars who, based on their knowledge of Western judicial practices,  think  that  the  CCP  should  keep  quiet  about  a  case  awaiting trial.  Yet maybe  the  gesture  is  necessary  for  the  majority  of  Chinese people who are not interested in foreign comparisons, and want merely justice and social solidarity. From a legal perspective, I find the Party’s interference unjustified and am sometimes disposed to join in the criti‐cism.  However,  from  a  political  perspective  and  from  an  objective  or neutral  position,  I  do  not  see why  the  legal  perspective  is  necessarily more  moral  and  more  reasonable  than  the  political  perspective,  and why the judicial position should always be privileged over the political position. Perhaps, my position is tendentious and conflicts with my self‐interest as a legal professional. However, in my view, the Party’s inter‐ference may reasonably be seen as a performance of  its political  func‐tions of social integration and representation. 
 
20. See Zhu, supra note 4, at 129-31, where I analyze such cases. 
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Another difficulty in making a distinction is that an administrative agency’s  interference may  be arising directly or  indirectly  from a CCP decision or  policy determination.  For example,  in order  to attract  for‐eign  investment,  a  local  Party  organization,  the  local  government,  or government agencies may instruct (zhishi) the local court to “take care of” (zhaogu) a foreign investor in a particular case. Such actions do not comport with a pure model of judicial autonomy, but at  the same time, the local Standing Committee of People’s Congress or other government agencies may enact a local statute of general applicability that requires local  courts to  implement the CCP policy of encouraging economic de‐velopment.  Regardless  of  the  form  it  takes,  this  sort  of  interference cannot be said to come from the government rather than the Party be‐cause it is, in fact, reflecting the political judgments and decisions of the Party  center or  its  local  branches. When we  turn  to  the  real world  to look  closely at how such  influence  is  exercised, we  find an even more complicated  situation.  In  general,  one  can  say  that  the  final  decision making power lies in the CCP. However, at the level of everyday experi‐ence, whether  interference comes from the Party, the government, the People’s Congress, or the media, or individuals within them all depends upon the position and actual influence of the interfering party, upon the institutions he or she thinks is the most effective  instrument for  inter‐vening, and upon the actual channels he or she uses to affect the court’s judgment. It is not always a CCP organization that is the most influential in such matters. Like other people, the Chinese are very practical. They will try anything and everything they think might be effective at exert‐ing influence on the courts. Distinctions among the Party, government, People’s  Congress,  or  the mass  media  are  not  made.  Nor  are  distinc‐tions between lawful and unlawful methods, such as personal  connec‐tions with and even bribery of judges. Even  within  the  judiciary  (Courts  and  Procuratorates),  there  are various legal, semi‐legal, and illegal interferences, both legal and adminis‐trative  in nature.  Sometimes,  it  is hard  to determine whether the  influ‐ence  is  Party  or  non‐Party,  institutional  or  personal,  or  legal  or administrative. A Supreme People’s Court’s decision,  even a  judicial  in‐terpretation  from  its  adjudication  committee,  the most professional or‐gan within the Court, may still be a response to a policy decision by the Central Committee of the CCP. For example, in December 2003, Supreme Court President Xiao Yang announced that the Court had issued a “lead‐ing opinion” (zhidao yijian) following intensive study by the Court’s Party branch of a statement from Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP.21 In 
 
21. Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan, Oct. 13, 2003, at 20. 
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this case, it was not simply a matter of restating a CCP Central Committee policy. Rather, the decision addressed a real, pervasive internal problem of the court system. Moreover, a higher court judge or judges’ unfair re‐versal of a  lower  level decision may be a product of undue social  influ‐ences on those higher court  judges disguised with CCP rhetoric. Finally, even if the Party interferes in a particular case, for example, through the increasingly  less common practice of utilizing the Party secretary of  the politics and  law committee (zhengfa wei),  the  instructions,  though writ‐ten, are general rather than specific. Like any other texts,  they need  in‐terpretation.  Is  such  interference  an  interference,  and  in  what  sense? Actually, judges who try such cases may use such an instruction to hide their personal judgment, even their partiality. Accordingly,  I  conclude,  first,  that  the  influence  of  the  CCP  upon the judiciary is general and diffuse; it comes not only from party institu‐tions and party leaders, but also through many other avenues. Second, although the CCP has  its own ideology and exercises sig‐nificant influence on the judiciary, taken as a whole, this ideology is not necessarily incompatible with the general view of justice shared by or‐dinary people.  The organizational principles of  the CCP  are  in  conflict with the operation of professional logic in the legal/judicial system, but in  concert  with  China’s  social  development,  the  legal/judicial  profes‐sion  in China  is  institutionalizing  itself. Third,  as a  concrete, operating political party within  society,  the CCP  is not  essentialist;  every  sort of person,  interest  group,  and  political  force  may  try  to  use  the mecha‐nism of the Party to influence or interfere in the operation of the judici‐ary.  Their  actions  have  both  a  positive  and  negative  effect  on  the formation and development of the judicial system. Fourth, on the level of everyday  life, not only  is  it difficult  to  identify the pure party  inter‐ference,  it  is  also  important  to  note  that  such  interference  has  a strongly pragmatic and opportunistic character. Therefore,  I would ar‐gue  that  separating  Party  interference  from other  interference  cannot further our understanding of the operation of the basic  level  legal sys‐tem. Moreover,  other than exacerbating an  ideological and essentialist understanding of the CCP and China, such distinctions have no intellec‐tual significance. III. WHAT IS THE FRAME OF REFERENCE? Even it were possible to identify a purely Party influence, such research is untenable because of  the problem of  an  implied frame of reference. Indeed,  there  are  many  flaws  in  the  PRC’s  judiciary,  and  they  are probably attributable to the CCP’s  ideology. However,  I prefer to trace them  to  the  unprecedented  social  transformation  of  China  during  the 




Countryside was  to  try  to  identify  and  find  solutions  for  these  flaws. Perhaps, because my effort was insufficient, my analysis not trenchant, my  vision  too  narrow,  indeed  blind  in  places,  my work  has  its  short‐comings. Nevertheless, it is hard to construct, indeed even to imagine, a standard  frame of  reference, whether experiential or  ideal,  for  the po‐litical‐judicial  relationship  that  could  be  used  to  objectively  measure the CCP’s  influence and  interference at  the  basic  level  of  the  judiciary and then evaluate the pros and cons of such influence. All modern countries have political parties, which despite the com‐monly recognized principle of  judicial  independence,  influence or  inter‐fere  in  judicial matters  in various ways. The extent of  the phenomenon may be less than in China, but it is nonetheless fairly common. Actually, without  the  active  participation  and  influence  of  political  parties,  it  is hard to imagine the existence or perpetuation of an institutional judicial independence. My language may seem a bit cynical, but it describes a his‐torical and contemporary reality. Was it not out of loyalty to the Federal‐ist  Party  and  determined  resistance  to  the  Republic‐Democratic  Party that Chief  Justice Marshall  created  the  system of  judicial  review, which serves as the core of American judicial independence?22 Some may dismiss my example as characteristic of the early stage of  judicial  independence.  However,  even  in  many  Western  countries today, judicial independence depends on and indeed is guaranteed to a great extent by party politics. Without party politics there would be no judicial  independence  in  these  countries.  For  example,  in  the  United States,  the  two political parties exert  influence on the courts and  judi‐cial process  through  the  system  in which  the  Senate  advises and  con‐sents  to  the  President’s  nomination  of  federal  judges.  Also,  as  the example of the Warren Court shows, some American judges voluntarily make their judgments in accord with their party’s ideology. In addition, some  states  have  institutions  of  election  and  recall.23  To  different  de‐grees, all  these  institutions and practices are  influenced by party poli‐tics. Personally, I regard these political parties’ influence on the judicial system  as generally  acceptable and  lawful. Moreover,  I  recognize  that neither in degree nor character can they be equated to the political  in‐
 
22. Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall, in The Essential Holmes: Selections From 
The Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, And Other Writings Of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
206-09 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). I discuss the background of Marbury v. Madison in 
Zhiddu ruhe xingchengde? [How was the System Formed?], 1998 Bijiaofa Yanjiu [Res. In 
Comp. L.], no. 1 (1998). 
23. Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of 
the United States, England, and France 37-42 (7th ed. 1998). 
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fluence or  interference  to which Chinese  judges are  subject.  However, the acceptance by Upham and me, as well as by many others of the ine‐luctability of parties’ political  interference does not mean  that we can deny that it is indeed political influence. “Many” does not mean everyone or on all issues. In America, there have been  instances of what  Judge Robert Bork and other scholars re‐gard as egregious  interference—for example,  the  struggle  in 1987  be‐tween Republicans and Democrats over President Reagan’s nomination of Bork to the Supreme Court. At  least  Judge Bork regarded it as  inap‐propriate  interference,  or  in  his  words,  a  “political  seduction  of  the law.”24 Is this an overstatement prompted by Judge Bork’s anger? Let us imagine an alternative outcome in which a Republican‐dominated Sen‐ate  confirmed  Bork.  In  the  eyes  of  adamant  Bork  opponents  Senator Ted  Kennedy  and  Senator  Joseph  Biden  (who  in  the  Democratic‐controlled Senate was chair of the Judiciary Committee), would that re‐sult not  also have been political? Actually,  the  controversy over  Judge Bork’s nomination reveals only the tip of the iceberg of the influence of disciplined American  party  politics  over  judicial  affairs.  It  was  an  ex‐ceptional  case,  but  less  controversy  in  a  confirmation  case  does  not mean  the  absence  of  politics  and  political  influence;  politically  non‐controversial is not politically neutral or politics‐free.25 The nomination and  confirmation  of  federal  judges  in  the  United  States  is  becoming more and more political. Politics and political interference are evident not only in the proc‐ess  of  nominating  and  confirming  judges,  but  also  in  some  concrete cases. The  interference comes not only from politicians in their role as party  leaders,  but  also  through  the  willing  cooperation  of  politicians serving as  judges.  Sometimes,  such efforts may  be out  of  bounds. The most famous or infamous instance is Chief Justice John Marshall’s han‐dling  of Marbury  v.  Madison.26  In  that  case,  there was  no  party  leader 
 
24. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 
(1990). 
25. A recent empirical study found that “the more important the court, the greater the dif-
ficulty of having the person confirmed. Although the confirmation rates have fallen and the 
length of the confirmation process has lengthened dramatically, the ex-post facto measures 
of judicial quality of circuit court nominees…or judicial independence have been decreasing 
over time.…The most troubling results strongly indicate that circuit court judges who turn out 
to be the most successful judges…faced the most difficult confirmation battles . . .” The study 
speculates that “[p]ossibly, senators of the party in opposition to the President really care only 
about preventing the best judges from being on the circuit court because they will have the 
most impact.” John R. Lott, Jr., The Judicial Confirmation Process: The Difficulty with Being 
Smart, 2 J. of Empirical Legal Stud., 407, 443-47 (2005). 
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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demanding that he handle the case in a certain way, but his aggressive personality and firm party ideology motivated him to make perhaps the greatest decision in the American constitutional system. In the last fifty years,  the Berger and Rehnquist courts have,  to a certain degree, been much the same: more political than juridical.27 The most recent instance is the controversial case of Bush v. Gore.28 Please note that in no way am I saying that American political par‐ties’ influence on the operation of courts is the same as the CCP’s influ‐ence upon basic courts in China. The two are very different. The United States has a two‐party system, while in China, the “[Communist] party is the leader of all”;29 in the United States, political influence on the judici‐ary probably comes mainly  from judges’ self‐conscious  loyalty to party ideology and platforms, while in China the influence  is a function of the party’s  demands  on  and  disciplinary  control  over  judges;  and  in  the United States, with lifetime tenure and high salaries as protection, some judges will not hesitate  to  “rebel  against”  their party,30 while  in  China, judges, who are  civil  servants,  can  find  comfort only  in  the  supportive writings of a few scholars. Thus, I recognize that in terms of parties’ po‐litical interference in the judicial system, the differences between China and the United States are ones both of degree and character. Moreover, I want to point out that nothing I have said implies that in the course of  transforming  its  judiciary, China should not study the United States and other Western countries. To the contrary, the PRC is in  the midst of  studying  these  examples,  and out of  a  concern  for  the need to address China’s problems, I approve and support this effort. However,  the position I have taken above has nothing to do with the frame of reference issue with which I want to engage. The question remains:  what  is  the  proper  frame  of  reference  for  measuring  and evaluating  the  relationship  between  party  politics  and  the  judiciary. The American? The British? The German? The French? Or should I con‐struct a standard model based on  the  judicial practice of all of  the na‐tions in the world? But why should they be basis  for the standard, and is  that standard appropriate  for China? From where does such a com‐
 
27. Lucas A. Powe Jr., The Warren Court And American Politics (2000); Earl M. Maltz, 
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Dynamic (Earl M. Maltz Ed., 2003). 
28. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, The Constitution, 
and the Courts (2001); The Vote: Bush, Gore, and the Supreme Court (Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard A. Epstein Eds., 2001). 
29. 2 Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Zhuzuo Xuandu [Selected Readings Of Mao Zedong’s 
Works] 852 (1986). 
30. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985). 
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parative  law model  or  statistical  standard  derive  its  normative  force? From where does its justness come? If, as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Tip O’Neil said, “all politics are local,” why should local judicial politics adopt a universal standard? We cannot get to this form of universal standards unless I adopt a linear version of modernization theory, which  I steadfastly reject,  but Professor Upham believes I sup‐port. Should I dismiss all the empirical evidence and directly develop an ideal model  frame of  reference  by which  to  examine  the  relations  be‐tween the judiciary and political parties? This is, of course, possible and really not that hard. Or, should I derive such a model relationship from the separation of powers (with  its Western origins and cultural color‐ing) or other similar concepts? I believe I can do it quite well if practice is not considered. But then, unless we are essentialists who not only be‐lieve that there is one true, correct, universal, and transcendent defini‐tion of the relationship between political parties and the judiciary, but also believe that we have perfect access to that definition, we still can‐not  prove  that  this  ideal  or  deduced model  for  political  party‐judicial relations  is  indeed  legitimate.  Perhaps  it  is  possible  to  broaden  or loosen the standard a bit, consider the national context where a judici‐ary is located, and construct a “comparatively reasonable” relationship between  political  parties  and  the  judiciary.  But methodologically,  this would still be an artificial construct which would certainly deviate from the American standard  implicit in Upham’s critique, comparative  law’s ideal model, or the essentialist standard, because one would have to re‐turn  to  the  contextualized,  consequentialist,  functionalist  model  by which I abide in my book. One must come back to China’s social context, where  the  judiciary  operates,  and  evaluate  the  relationship  between party politics, the government, and the judiciary in considering the sys‐tematic consequences of such a judiciary in the Chinese society. Even if all  this  is possible,  it  is hard  to  avoid  innumerable  controversies over the  reasonableness  of  the  construct.  For  example,  I  consider  that  in 
Sending  Law  to  the  Countryside,  I  constructed  a  reasonable  analytical structure  and  frame  of  reference  for  evaluating  the  relationship  be‐tween the Party and the judiciary, and provided a focused discussion of a series of related  issues. However, Professor Upham finds  in  it an ab‐sence “of politics and political power.” Through numerous, useless pub‐lications,  we  could  debate  forever  the  reasonableness  of  the framework, but we will get nowhere. I say useless because not all debates end in agreement or intellec‐tual  enlightenment,  and  even  if  we  can  reach  an  agreement  over  the frame of  reference, does  this  frame have any practical  uses? Whether 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we deduce  it  from the general,  abstract  it  from empirical materials, or make a standard directly out of American or some other national expe‐rience, in the end, it mainly provides us with just another frame of ref‐erence for criticizing contemporary Chinese judicial practice, making us think that we have truth and  justice  in our hands. But  it does not help us either to understand China’s reality or to transform that reality.  In‐deed, we may be worse off than we started. This sort of frame of refer‐ence  is  doomed  to  fail  because  from  the  beginning,  the  current relationship  between  political  parties  and  the  judiciary  is  neither  de‐rived  from  a  concept or  ideology, nor modeled on  a  foreign  standard. The  current  state  of  China’s  judicial  practice  is  a  product  of  China’s modern historical and social development,  a social reality constructed from various social variables. IV. THE PARTY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE My response cannot stop here. Otherwise, readers may think it is not a strong response, but rather at most a defensive pleading for my meth‐odology that, even if successful, merely dodges Upham’s arrow. It might enhance  the  misimpression  about  the  relationship  between  the  CCP and  the  judiciary  within  China  and  the  implied  universal,  normative character of American‐type judicial politics. More importantly, such a brief response leaves unexplored topics that  are  inherently  deserving  of  further  consideration  and  it  is  there‐fore unfair  to Chinese contemporary history,  the CCP, and the Chinese judiciary to stop here. So, in this section, I want to engage in a thought experiment and argue for the contextual reasonableness of the relation‐ship between the CCP and the judiciary and for  its necessity in China’s social  transformation.  If my argument  is sound,  it will  further demon‐strate the problems with Professor Upham’s criticism of my book, not only in his methodology, but also  in his value judgments. Further, such a social science analysis of the relationship between Party and the judi‐ciary  may  provide  a  new  frame  of  reference  for  understanding  and evaluating the issue of the relationship between the CCP and the PRC’s judiciary. Even  if my effort  fails,  it will advance the academic research on China’s judicial system. The  relationship  between  the  party‐state  and  the  judiciary  in China  evolved  over  the  course  of  China’s  modernization.  Since  1840, China’s most important task has been to transform itself successfully—economically from an agricultural society to an industrial and commer‐cial society; politically  from a community unified by culture to a mod‐ern nation‐state unified by politics; and culturally  from a rural society dominated by Confucian humanities  to an urban one  led by  the  social 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sciences.31 In terms of key variables such as time, population, and geo‐graphic  size,  this  was  an  unprecedented  historical  transformation. Without  a  vigorous,  core  political  power,  it  is  unimaginable  that  this change  could  have  occurred  in  such  a  short  time  and  in  the  face  of  a fiercely  competitive  international  society.  The early history of  the  Re‐public of China is clear evidence. Only when the GMD and CCP appeared as  national,  revolutionary  parties  and  twice  cooperated,  did  Chinese society begin  its  first steps toward unification, and only  in  the Second World  War,  with  the  assistance  from  Soviet  Union  and  the  United States, did China win its first war against foreign invasion since 1840. It should be noted that the GMD and CCP are profoundly different, but  looked at  from another angle, whatever their differences, both are different  from  contemporary Western  political  parties.  Both  the  GMD and CCP were aware  that  the  task and historical burden of  the nation was the economic, political, cultural, and social transformation of China. To achieve this goal in the wake of imperial China’s collapse and in the face of an  intensely  competitive world,  they had to use every possible means to mobilize and integrate all political forces in the service of na‐tional  unity,  independence,  and  freedom,  which  are  preconditions  to social and economic development. What I have described is the process of jianguo, which is commonly translated as “state‐building.” I prefer to translate it as the constitution (or re‐constitution) of the nation‐state. It is in this historical context of constituting the nation‐state that the CCP and GMD came into being.  In contrast, the political parties in the West were  established  and  operated  within  already‐constituted  nations. They were political organizations  that  served as vehicles  for  common interests within these constituted nations,  and generally speaking, did not  confront  the  historical  problems  and  tasks  that  faced  the  Chinese political parties, nor did  they have  the  long‐term political  goals of  the Chinese parties. Because of this historical task, both the CCP and GMD were revolu‐tionary  parties,  rather  than  merely  political  parties  holding  power. They had to engage in armed struggle to gain the power, and then, even after they gained political power, they had to continue to play the role of  a  revolutionary  party,  leading  society  in  the  completion  of  social revolution,  land  reform,  and  industrialization.  All  of  these  historical tasks dictated that both parties be elitist: they had not only to be able to propose  national  reform,  but  also  to mobilize  and  lead  the masses  to 
 
31. Zhu Suli, Daolu Tongxiang Chengshi—Zhuanxing Zhongguo De Fazhi Of [All Roads 
Lead To Cities—Rule Of Law In A Transforming China] Intro. (2004) [Hereinafter Suli, All 
Roads Lead To Cities]. 
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accomplish  the  transformation  in  order  to  construct  or  constitute  a modern  nation‐state,  precisely  the  original  meaning  of  constitution. However,  this  task  could  not  be  accomplished  by  the  political  elites without the collective effort of the nation. Thus, both parties had to be capable of  integrating all kinds of other social  forces, representing dif‐ferent  interests,  and  in  this  sense,  they  became  the  parties  of  the masses.32 As a consequence of this historical context, the CCP and GMD developed not only strong political ideologies, but also strict party dis‐cipline and tight internal organizations to insure effective implementa‐tion  of  party  policy.  Their  party  structures  emphasize  “democratic centralism,”  “organized  democracy,”  and  “disciplined  freedom,” which all seem to be antinomies or oxymorons, but are actual practices within the  parties.  Party members who  violate  Party  discipline will  be  sanc‐tioned or even expelled.33 Therefore, such parties are not only an  important motivating and leading  force  for  social  change;  they  have  also  been  a  critical  institu‐tional  alternative  in modern  Chinese  society.  Before  they  take  power, they are organizational mechanisms and social mobilizers. The  party  organization,  party  leaders,  and  even  ordinary  party members are thus alternatives to the conventional bureaucracy and bu‐reaucrats.  Given  the  absence  of  the  professionals  and  bureaucrats China needed to order  its society, after taking power, besides continu‐ing their function of social mobilization and organization, the parties, to a certain extent, could not but assume the role of the bureaucracy, and in  the  course  of  that  process,  their members  became  the  bureaucrats that  modern  China  needed.  The  so‐called  party‐state,  or  rule  by  the party,  that  the  GMD  first  proposed  and  emphasized34  is  therefore  not only  natural,  but  also  inevitable.  The  CCP  always  opposed  the  GMD’s idea of “party‐state,” but in reality, such a pattern characterized the CCP both  before,35  and  certainly  also  after  its  victory  in  1949.  Indeed,  the CCP’s party‐state was even more pronounced than the GMD’s. Thus, ei‐
 
32. Cf. CCP Const., supra note 15, general princ. ; Const. Of The Guomindang preface 
[hereinafter Gmd Const.]. 
33. CCP Const., supra note 15, general princs. Gmd Const., supra note 32, arts. 3, 4, 5, 
ch. 12. 
34. In 1928, the Standing Committee of the GMD stated that the Party was the Supreme 
Tutelar of the nation. In 1931, the Nationalist Government invited selected representatives of 
rural society, labor, business, and the education sector to convene and draw up a Tutelary 
Period Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, Article 30 of which specifies that 
during the Tutelary Period, GMD will represent the National Conference to direct and super-
vise the National Government. Xu Juhua, Jiang Jieshi Chenbai Lu [A Record Of Jiang Jieshi’s 
Success And Failure] ch. 12. 
35. 1 Xiaoping, supra note 6, at 12. 
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ther the GMD or the CCP has been the most  important part of the con‐stitutional  and  governmental  structure  of modern  China  and  the  core force of that modernization. The Party’s objective  is social transformation. Accordingly,  it can‐not base itself directly on democracy—the people, after all have a ten‐dency  to  be  conservative  and  short‐sighted—but  must  insist  on  the central  role  of  the  Party’s  elites  and  leadership  group  in  guiding  the revolution and social transformation. But at the same time, in order to lead the masses,  the Party cannot abandon them. In order to be repre‐sentative,  both  the  GMD  and  CCP  had  to maintain  a  certain  degree  of internal democracy  (whether  it was  called  “democratic  centralism” or “democracy with organization”). Parties become a quasi‐constitutional structure  in another sense as they serve as an alternative for or a nec‐essary  stage on  the  road  toward constitutionalism:36 Within  the party, party discipline and guiding principles perform the function of law and statutes. In his analysis of the party‐state of China during the twentieth century, Harvard professor William C. Kirby pointed out that the goal of a party‐state  is not to  lead the government, but to reform the Chinese people  and  recast  them  into  citizens  of  new  nation‐state.  The  party‐state, he noted, is a political entity pursuing social and economic devel‐opment; its aim is complete mobilization of all China’s people and total industrialization.37 This historical task cannot be fulfilled within a short period, so the party‐state structure may last quite long since the taking over of power does  not  equal  constitutionalism,  nor  accomplishment  of  the  self‐imposed historical task. Parties want to accomplish their ideals through the coercive state and governmental powers under their control. How‐ever,  when  in  power,  the  requirement  of  effective  and  stable  govern‐ance will  force parties to gradually adjust  their policies;  to enact  laws; to establish conventional institutions, such as the National Congress or National People’s Congress; to recruit qualified civil servants and set up bureaucracy; and to establish a judiciary and improve its function. It is a  long process of  transformation  from  a  revolutionary  party  to a  gov‐erning  party;  a  process  of  transformation  from  a  pioneer  and  elitist party to a popular party. Because these processes of reformation of the 
 
36. Sun Yat-sen proposed three stages to China’s constitutionalism: the period of mili-
tary government, the period of political tutelage, and the period of constitutional government. 
See Sun Yat-sen, Guomin zhengfu jianguo dagang [A Constitutional Program of the National 
Government], in Zhongshen, supra note 5, at 126–29. 
37. William C. Kirby, Renshi 20 Shiji zhongguo [Understanding China of Twentieth Cen-
tury], 2001 21st Century, no. 10, 114-24 (2001), available at http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/ 
wk_wzdetails.asp?id=1523. 
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Party  and  institutionalization  of  modern  nation‐state  take  time,  they are still ongoing in the PRC. Thus,  it  is understandable why  in  contemporary China,  complete judicial  independence  is  impossible and why the relatively  low degree of party  interference  in the  judiciary  in the developed countries of  the West  is not  likely  to  be  systematized  in China. Actually,  in  contempo‐rary China,  the entire modern state apparatus,  including the  judiciary, consists of  inventions created by the governing political parties on the basis  of  their  political  ideals,  policies,  and  organizational  structures. The specific forms, such as the GMD’s “partyization of the judiciary,” or the  CCP’s  “sending  law  to  the  countryside”  and  political  and  judicial committee  (zhengfawei)  may  be  accidental,  but  the  comprehensive leadership, influence, and control of the parties was inevitable and per‐vasive. Thus, we have the phenomenon that  I have described above:  in contemporary  China,  it  is  well  nigh  impossible  to  distinguish  what  is and what is not the CCP’s influence and interference, for in fact the judi‐ciary is the CCP’s creation. Although GMD and CCP had some commonalities, there were also significant differences between them, most notably the different social forces  that  they  integrated  and  represented.  From  the  1920s onward, the GMD inherited most of the technocrats  from the late Qing dynasty, as well as the vast majority of professionals and mid‐ to upper‐level in‐tellectuals,  for,  as  the  party  in  power,  the  GMD  provided  them  with room for their knowledge and skill. Moreover, another major constitu‐ent force of the GMD was the group of military officers who had gradu‐ated  from  the  Huangpu  Military  College  and  who  served  as  another institutional alternative to the bureaucracy. By contrast, despite consistently seeking a united front during  its military  struggles,  the  CCP had no way  to attract  the  broad participa‐tion  of  such  groups,  not  only  because  it  had  no  space  to  deploy  their skills,  but  also  because  for  these  elites,  the  CCP  was  a  much  riskier choice, especially in  its military struggle for national power. Moreover, unlike the GMD, the CCP also did not have a captive military college to train its officers, who instead got their experience and skills on the bat‐tlefield. During wartime, most military officers of the CCP were trained in the battlefield. Thus, the CCP was less capable than the GMD of utiliz‐ing modern or Paramodern institutions and professionals. The CCP membership  came mainly  from peasants  and  other mid and lower social classes. Because of  the peasants’ mode of production, they  tended  to  be  less  modern,  less  disciplined,  and  less  likely  to  be long‐term thinkers. Thus, in order for the CCP to rely on this mass base to make a successful revolution, it had to develop stronger party orga‐
Duke Law CICLOPs | Zhu Suli  Vol. 1 
 
104 
nization  and  leadership,  stricter  discipline,  and  a  more  radical  ideol‐ogy.38  There  is  substantial  research  to  show  that  during  the  time  that the  GMD held  power  on  the mainland,  the  actual  political  power  and influence  of  its  party  organization  and  party  members  was  substan‐tially weaker than similarly situated CCP party organizations and cad‐res.  For  example,  the  GMD’s  propaganda  and  organization  ministers were much less influential than the CCP’s. Such evidence is abundant.39 The differences  between  the CCP and GMD  lie  in  the  social  conditions from which they were constructed; the ideological differences may not have been as important as many people think. The CCP’s stronger party organization and ideology compensated for  its  lack of  a bureaucratic system  for modern government, but they also  impeded the creation and development of such a bureaucracy. Of course, the CCP felt no urgent need for a bureaucracy, and long after it took  power  in  1949,  it  remained  a  revolutionary  party  in  character. There was  no  quick  transformation  into a  governing party;  there was no  effective  formation  of  a  decent  bureaucracy with  technocrats,  civil servants, and professionals, such as judges and lawyers. In all aspects of governance, the CCP played a decisive and dominant role. Political loy‐alty and  ideological purity  became  the  important  criteria  for  selecting government employees, including those in the judiciary.40 Not  until  the  1980s  did  the  CCP  began  to  emphasize  knowledge and human  talent,  seeking  to  create a  reformed  cohort  of  cadres who were more knowledgeable, professional, specialized, and younger. This trend was  fostered by  the steady, rapid development of higher educa‐tion and a dramatic  increase  in university graduates. The 1993 Provi‐sional Civil Service Act,41 which replaced recruitment through political channels with  selection  by open,  competitive exams,42  symbolizes  this 
 
38. Cf. 1 Mao Zedong, On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, in Selected Works of 
Mao Zedong, vol. 1, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1975. 
39. See supra note 8. 
40. Cf. Dong Biwu, Dong Biwu Faxue Wenji [Legal Works Of Dong Biwu] (2001). 
41. Guojia gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli [Provisional Civil Service Act] (promulgated by the 
State Council, Aug. 14, 1993, effective Oct. 1, 1993), available at http://www.china.org. 
cn/chinese/MATERIAL/385908.htm. On January 1, 2006, the Provisional Act was superceded 
by the Civil Servant Law (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongwuyuan Fa). For the Chinese 
version, see the website of the National People’s Congress, http://www.npc.gov.cn/ 
zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=337350&pdmc=110106. For an English language 
version, see http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/Basic 
Laws/t20060620_50863.jsp. 
42. For a discussion of this Act, which is compared to the Pendleton Act that created the 
United States Civil Service, see King K Tsao & John Abbott Worthley, Chinese Public Ad-
ministration: Change with Continuity during Political and Economic Development, 55 Pub. 
Admin. Rev., Mar.–Apr., 1995, at 169–74. 
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fundamental change. Similarly, the 1990s appearance of criticism of the practice of discharged military officers serving as judges43 was not acci‐dental. Though  it was  initiated  in academic circles,  it  found an echo  in the  court  system  itself,  indicating  the  rise  and  increasing  influence  in the judiciary of the first generation of post‐Cultural Revolution trained legal professionals (most of whom were around  forty years old). They constituted a challenge for the established institutional structure in the judiciary and led a series of judicial reforms.44 In  the  mid‐1980s,  the  CCP  proposed  separating  party  and  gov‐ernment, but progress has been neither  fast nor significant.45  It seems to me  that  a prominent  (though not  the only) problem  is  that parallel duplicative  systems address  the  same matter—the  Party and  the gov‐ernment have separate but corresponding organizations and personnel. Moreover, the logic of the Party organization impedes its becoming the logic  of  an  organization  with  specialized  functions.46  High  transaction costs sharply reduce work efficiency. Also, because of  the Party’s hold on  power,  opportunists  can  use  their  position  to  use  ideological  lan‐guage to expand their  influence and serve their self‐interest. Thus,  the Party  has  consistently  promoted  strengthening  and  improving  party leadership,47  as  well  as  establishing  a  new  relationship  between  the Party and the  judiciary.48 China still  faces an enormous task of reform, and its performance is still subjected to withering criticism from West‐
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ple’s Courts], 1999 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao, no. 6 
(1999). 
45. Deng Xiaoping raised this idea in June 1986. 3 Xiaoping, supra note 6, at 164. In 
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zhongguo tesede shuihuizhuyi daolu qianjin [Advancing Along the Road of Socialism with 
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primary task in reforming the political system. 
46. Su Li, Fayuan de shenpan zhineng yu xingzheng guanli [The Adjudicative Function 
of Courts and Administrative Management], 1999 Zhongwai Faxue [Chinese Foreign Juris-
prudence], no. 5 (1999). Su Li is a pen name used by Zhu Suli. 
47. Dang he guojia lingdao zhidu gaige [Reforming the System of Party and State 
Leadership], August 18, 1980, in 2 Xiaoping, supra note 6. 
48. For some of the most recent attempts, see Shenzhen jiangcheng dangzheng fenli 
zheng’gai xianfeng [Shenzhen at the Forefront of the Political Reform Separating Party from 
Government], Gongshang Shibao, Jan. 14, 2003. According to the article, this was the largest 
political reform since the Party took power in 1949. Its key component was the separation of 
the Party from the administrative and legislative systems, leading toward a Shenzhen munici-
pal government with a Western-style separation of powers, in which the municipal govern-
ment and the courts were in a mutual balance of power. 
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ern  governments  and  scholars, much  of which  is  driven  by  their  own ideology. I admit that some criticism is justified and deserves the CCP’s attention.  However,  historically,  functionally,  and  consequentially, China  under  the  CCP’s  leadership  and  governance  has  achieved  great success.  Most  notably,  the  CCP  created  a  unique,  innovative  path  to modernization in a country with a large peasant economy and no mod‐ern constitution or political institutions. Today, China’s political system may  not  entirely  meet  our  expectations,  but  the  practical  question  is whether abolishing the  current system of CCP leadership would make China better off and develop faster in the future, or, to put it as a coun‐terfactual, without the CCP, could China have accomplished what it has accomplished. I think not. In the  last thirty years, to an extent, the CCP actually has transformed itself and successfully led China’s reform and social modernization. This  statement  holds  true  for  the  judiciary.  Although  the  recent judicial  reforms  have,  to  some  degree,  been  in  response  to  pressures accompanying  economic  transformation,  the  real  organizational  and motivating force has been the CCP,  including  its leaders and intellectu‐als. Reform has been implemented as a consequence of Party principles and policies  and  through  the exertion of party organization discipline within the judiciary. I do not think every reform measure is good or de‐sirable,  but on balance  their benefits outweigh  their defects.49  For  ex‐ample,  although  the  CCP’s  control  seriously  compromises  the independence  of  the  judicial  system,  especially  the  independence  of judges, in the absence of alternative institutions that are not yet fully in place  during  this  time  of  social  transformation,  to  some  extent  Party control has limited the corruption, laxness, and partiality of the  judici‐ary. This last point, I should note, is the subject of considerable contro‐versy  among  lawyers  and  legal  scholars.  I,  personally,  respect  others’ criticism,  but  conclusions  about  China’s  judicial  system  cannot  be reached simply through debates; they will come as the result of empiri‐cal  research, which  requires  time.  I  do  not want  to  rush  to  judgment and am willing to be critiqued and  rebutted, but  if we are to research China’s modernization,  especially  the  relationship  between  the  Party, the  state,  and  the  judicial  system,  then we  must  look  at  the  question with an open mind and take  into account the historical and social con‐text  of  these  institutions.  Evaluations  and  judgments  based  solely  on Western experience or ideology or out of the strategic considerations of Western politicians have no academic value or possible practical appli‐cability.  From  the  perspective  of  democratic  theory  and  evolutionary 
 
49. Suli, All Roads Lead To Cities, supra note 31. 
2009  Political Parties In China 
 
107 
economics, valid  institutional development and innovation arises from competition. The vicissitudes along the road of social development are not predetermined. The  same  is  true  for  the evolving  relationship be‐tween the party‐state and the judicial system. It is therefore critical for us to examine this relationship as scholars and not as ideologues. V. A NEW MODEL FOR THE STUDIES OF CHINA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM Once we understand the role that the CCP has played  in modern China in social mobilization and representation, in nation building, and in the creation  of  institutions,  then we must maintain  a  degree  of moderate academic  vigilance  against  the  apparently  successful Western  experi‐ence with the judiciary and rule of law. Vigilance is not hostility. Rather, simply because of current Western  institutions’ ostensible success, we should not take them as a decontextualized standard when they are  in fact  embedded  in  and  abstracted  from  particular  historical  and  theo‐retical  contexts. And  then, once China  fails  to  comport with  this  stan‐dard,  it  becomes  an  object  for  politicized  academic  criticism  and reform.  Such  an  approach  is  fairly  common  among  both Western  and Chinese scholars. I am not accusing them of intentionally using ideology as a critical standard. Many of them work hard to understand China and wish  it  well.  However,  their  social  experience  imperceptibly  impedes them  from placing  themselves  in  the position of  the Chinese and  con‐sidering China’s current situation from a value‐neutral perspective. In‐evitably,  our  life  experience  impedes  and  defines  the  scope  of  our imagination. Beyond their social environment and history, what has also influ‐enced Western  scholars,  and  through  them  some  Chinese  scholars  as well,  is  Western  scholarship  on  the  relationship  between  the  party‐state and the judiciary in the former Soviet Union and communist coun‐tries in Eastern Europe. This scholarship and its underlying theoretical framework may have prevented them from realizing the uniqueness of China’s experience.  In the Soviet Union and  formerly communist East‐ern  European  countries,  the  major  function  of  the  Communist  Party was seen to be, and indeed is, to control the bureaucracy, including the judicial  professionals  who  had  been  in  place  before  the  Communist Party existed. This research not only enhanced the notion of an  inher‐ent  separation  of  and  conflict  of  interests  between  the  Communist Party and the bureaucracy, it also left the impression that the bureauc‐racy always came first and that Party control followed. This conclusion is reasonable and, considering the  context of  these  countries, possibly correct. For example, in the Soviet Union’s early years, many Red Army generals,  such  as  the  famous  Marshal  Mikhail  Nikolayevich  Tuk‐
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hachevsky and the hero of World War II, Marshal Georgy Konstantino‐vich Zhukov, were previously military officers of  the Tsar.  In order  to secure  its  leadership  and  control,  the  Communist  Party  sent  political commissars  to  ensure  the  implementation  of  the  party’s  lines  in  the Red Army. The Party  followed the same approach in many enterprises and  governmental  agencies,  and  this  practice  was  followed  by  other Eastern European countries. China, however, was not like this. Long before CCP took power  in China,  its leaders clearly understood that China was different  from the Soviet  Union.  In  1936,  when  a  presidium  political  commissar,  Yang Chengwu,  was  reappointed  as  the  military  commander,  Mao  Zedong explained the difference between the Soviet Red Army and the Chinese Red Army:  in  the  Soviet  Union,  political  commissars were  sent  to  su‐pervise military officers, most of whom were  former White Army offi‐cers,  while  in  China  all  the  military  officers  and  political  military officers  in  the Red Army were  trained  by  the CCP and  experienced  in combat.50 Yang Chengwu later became one of the most famous generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but few knew that he had previ‐ously served as a political commissar; Yang was not unique in the PLA. His career path,  like that of indi‐viduals in other professions, was common. Therefore,  the model  abstracted  from  the experiences of  the  for‐mer Soviet bloc  is not entirely appropriate  for modern China.  In mod‐ern  China, whether  the  GMD  or  the  CCP,  and whether  before  or  after one of these parties held power, to varying degrees the general pattern was  that  the  party  preceded  the  government,  the  judiciary,  and  the armed forces. Before the GMD and CCP, there was hardly a modern na‐tion‐state, government, judiciary, and army.51 There is some truth in the CCP  propaganda,  “without  the  CCP  there  is  no  new  China.”  Thus,  the time sequence of  the appearance of  the Party and the modern  institu‐tions of China demand a new framework or model of research. As  I  have  said,  this  paper  aims  partly  at  Chinese  scholars  of  the current legal system because some of them avoid any discussion of po‐litical parties. It may be from disgust with the extreme leftist politics of the  Cultural  Revolution,  fear,  or  excessive  sensitivity.  However,  as  I have argued in this essay, their unwillingness to deal with the CCP may 
 
50. Yang Chengwu, Yang Chengwu Huiyilu [Memoirs Of Yang Chengwu] 334 (1987). 
51. The first national conference of the GMD convened in 1924, and the first military col-
lege, Huangpu Military Academy, which became the major source of soldiers for the national 
army under the GMD, opened in 1925. The national government of the GMD took power in 
1927. The first national conference of the CCP convened in 1921, the Chinese Red Army was 
founded in 1927, and the CCP national government took power in 1949. 
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also simply reflect their practice of labeling the particular experience of the West  as  a  universal  theoretical  framework  for  legal  systems.  This approach  leads  to  two  sorts  of  responses  in  dealing with  the  issue  of Party influence. One is to list examples of the glorious history of judicial independence in foreign countries. Either they think that they will per‐suade the Chinese people,  government, and Communist Party to  carry out  judicial  reform  or  even  revolution  on  the  basis  of  the  Western model, or they hope that by not talking about Party influence on the ju‐diciary, it can be made to gradually disappear. This is not an unreason‐able  strategy  for  pushing  judicial  reform,  but  I  doubt  that  it  can  be successful  and  find  it naïve.  It  cannot  be  successful because  the  Party and  government’s  influence  are  a  historically  constructed  and  estab‐lished fact. Whether one likes  it or not, the Party is an integral compo‐nent around which the judicial system revolves. If one wants to reform the legal system, then one has to face this situation directly. Another common approach by some Chinese scholars is to oppose the Party’s  involvement and treat  it as a historical mistake rather than understand how the current system happened. They do not look for or do not see the variables that constitute the causal relationship that ex‐plains China’s current system. Because they insist on using an idealistic historical point of view rather than a materialist one from which to un‐derstand  the  history  of  the  judicial  system,  they  cannot  see  that  the Party was, from the outset, an external force in the system, but one that is now fully  integrated. They persist in  imagining the glorious moment in which an unsullied legal system emerged and thereafter and forever remained innocent, flawless, and pure. This sort of hope is very impor‐tant  in  establishing  the  courage  and  commitment  for  judicial  reform, but it is of little advantage in successfully accomplishing that reform. Against these two approaches, I would argue that in studying con‐temporary China, one must treat either the GMD or CCP as a constituent element  of  the  political  and  legal  system  or  as  a  constitutional  struc‐ture. That implies that no matter how much it deviates  from “the stan‐dard”  or  the  experience  of  Western  countries,  the  system  should  be seen as something normal and not as  a  freak or an anomaly produced by mistaken theories and viewpoints. And despite the current system’s weaknesses,  problems,  and  even  mistakes,  nearly  all  of  which  are  in some way directly or indirectly connected to the Party’s influence, one cannot  ignore  the  Party’s  positive  contributions,  which  are  often  the flip‐side of what is perceived as negative. Without question, what was reasonable and  ideal yesterday does not necessarily  remain so today. Today,  in the wake of China’s reform and  development,  the  relationship  between  the  Party  and  the  judicial 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system certainly needs adjustment and reform. Whether the path to re‐form  is  the  1980s  approach  of  separating  Party  from  state,  Jiang Zemin’s  “three  representatives”  (sange daibiao) approach of  enlarging the party’s representativeness, or something else, they all require care‐ful,  attentive,  long‐term work  from  those  involved with  the  law. How‐ever, the effect of history means that we cannot start anew. If we cannot treat seriously China’s adjudicature of yesterday,  then there  is no way to understand  its adjudicature of  today or to anticipate what  it will be in the future. The past is one of the variables in the current system and will certainly influence tomorrow’s. For the sake not only of legal schol‐arship, but also of legal practice, the Party’s role in the judiciary and in administration  of  justice  must  be  objectively  understood  and  not treated as an abstraction. I  am  not  making  a  value  judgment  about  whether  the  Chinese model of the Party as preceding and shaping government, judiciary, and even the army is good or right. What I am suggesting  is  that we revise the theoretical model  for studying and understanding the relationship between the Party and modern China and base it on the Chinese expe‐rience.  My  aim  is  to  make  effective,  practical,  and,  most  importantly, constructive  suggestions  for  China’s  social,  political,  and  judicial  re‐form. Even though I am expecting  to be criticized or even condemned by people from both the left and right for what I have written in this es‐say—in  particular  for  my  undifferentiated  treatment  of  the  CCP  and GMD and for my depiction of the CCP as a constitutional alternative in China’s social transformation,  I welcome such criticism because  it may prove that I have done something right. 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Desperately Seeking Subsidiarity  
Danish Private Law in the Scandinavian,  
European, and Global Context* 
  
 Joseph M. Lookofsky**  Dean Levi, colleagues, students and friends: Thank you for this great honor to lecture at  this  fine  law school  today  in memory of my dear  friend and col‐league Herbert Bernstein. This  is my  fifth visit here,  and  I have wonderful memories. Last  January  Dean  Levi’s  predecessor,  Dean  Bartlett,  invited  me  to come here to Duke to lecture comparatively, in Herbert’s honor, on a topic in Danish  or  Scandinavian  law.  In  response  to  that kind  invitation,  I will speak  about  subsidiarity, mainly within  the  context  of  Danish,  Scandina‐vian and European private  law. Thank you, Paul [Haagen],  for helping me to introduce the subsidiarity concept.*** That will save me a bit of time dur‐ing the first part of my lecture. Now, to help  introduce the comparative context of my lecture,  I  ask you to imagine a map composed of concentric circles or rings, a map which depicts the “private law universe.” At the center of this universe, within the 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innermost circle of this map, lies the private law of Denmark. Just outside this, the map’s second ring depicts private  law applicable  in all of Scandi‐navia,  in particular,  certain private  law rule‐sets known as  the Scandina‐vian “Model Laws.” Both of these inner rings are surrounded by a third ring which repre‐sents the law of the European Union,1 and this ring is the one in which the concept of subsidiarity lies. Finally, we imagine the outermost “global pri‐vate  law”  ring, which  comprises  certain private  law rule‐sets  adhered  to not  only  by  European  States,  but  also  by many  non‐European  countries, including  (e.g.)  the United  States and China. Within  this  last  ring we  find such  commercially  significant  treaties  as  the  Convention  on  the  Interna‐tional Sale of Goods (CISG) and the New York Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. This map serves to depict my private law universe, and it’s not so un‐usual that I see things from my own location and perspective. After all, I’ve been in Denmark for some thirty‐five years, and so Denmark is the center of my universe, not only as regards private law, but also as regards life and society in general. I realize that might be hard for an American audience to understand,  since  I  was  born  and  lived  here  in  the  United  States  for twenty‐seven years, but I have lived in Denmark for an even longer period of time, and the center of my universe shifted (or at least drifted) towards Scandinavia some time ago. As I proceed with my lecture, I’ll ask you to keep my private law uni‐verse  in mind. I’ll use Denmark (the  innermost ring) as my starting point and then work outwards. Before I tell you about Danish private law, I’ll say a  few  things  about  Danish  society  in  general.  I  think  these  observations about the societal context might make it easier to explain some of the per‐haps unusual concepts of Danish law which I intend to mention later. I will also make a  few general points about Scandinavian law. There are,  to  be  sure, many  similarities  between Danish  and Scandinavian  law, but there are also many differences. There is, in fact, no real “Scandinavian Law,” as there are no (regional) Scandinavian rules which regulate conduct throughout Scandinavia,2 but we do have some similar private law legisla‐tion  in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, because these statutes were origi‐nally  drafted  on  the  basis  of  models  which  reflect  a  Scandinavian 
 
 1. The author notes that in a more perfect map of this “private-law universe” the third 
ring would account for the fact that one of the Scandinavian States (Norway) is not a member 
of the European Union. 
 2. A few Scandinavians once dreamed of “federalizing” Scandinavian private law. In 
1947, a prominent professor at the University of Copenhagen presented his Draft for a Nordic 
Civil Code. Although the idea never took hold anywhere in Scandinavia, his Draft was later 
published in English. See Fr. Vinding Kruse, A Nordic Draft Code (Else Giersing trans., 
Munksgaard 1963). 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consensus. So, just as parts of the New Jersey version of the UCC closely re‐semble  the  corresponding  parts  of  New  York  or  North  Carolina  law  be‐cause they were all drafted on the basis of a uniform model, we find parts of  Danish  private  law  which  resemble  parts  of  Norwegian  and  Swedish private law. But my main focus today will be a comparison between Danish and European law. That will be the main comparative context. I think many of the things I say will also invite other comparisons in your own (American) minds, but I must say that from a Danish point of view the main compara‐tive interest these days is the relationship between Danish law as such and European Community law (which is of course becoming part of Danish law as well),  as opposed  to  comparisons  between Danish and American  law. But, as I’m here in the United States today, I will also make some compara‐tive comments in that American law direction as well. There is a trend towards what I permit myself to call the “federaliza‐tion”  of  private  law  in  Europe.  The word  “federalization”  is  in  quotation marks  here  in  my  notes,  since  some  constitutional  scholars  in  Europe would debate or contest the validity of that term, at least technically speak‐ing, but there’s no question that some key areas of private  law that were previously the exclusive province of the Danish legislator and part of Dan‐ish sovereignty have been federalized and have become (or been replaced by) European  law  common  to all Member‐States of  the European Union, and  Denmark  is,  of  course,  one  of  these  States.  I  will  be  illustrating  this point as  I  go along and explaining with concrete examples—as many as I have  time  for—and  at  the  end  of my  lecture  I  even  hope  to  reach  some global  comparisons (the outermost ring on my map). These comparisons will be few and brief: one is about arbitration—the New York Convention on Arbitration, and the other one is about the International Sales Conven‐tion, the CISG, since I hope to say a few words regarding Denmark’s special position in relation to these two significant treaties. Well,  I don’t have to tell you what “subsidiarity” means, since Paul [Haagen]  did  that  for  me,  but  you  might  still  ask  why  I  (or  anybody) might be desperately seeking that? Well, a  lot of people are desperately seeking  something  these  days.  Indeed, when  I googled  the words  “des‐perately  seeking,”  I  got more  than  two million hits.3  A  large  number  of them,  it seems, were related to the  film entitled Desperately Seeking Su­
san (with Susan played by Madonna, herself)—that film was, by the way, one of the “top ten” films of 1985.4 And then there are the many others, 
 
 3. Google, http://www.google.com/ (search “desperately seeking”) (last visited Oct. 5, 
2008). 
 4. RogerEbert.com, Movie Answer Man, http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070816/ANSWERMAN/70817006/1023 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008). 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those  desperately  seeking  other  things—everything  from  snoozin’  (a good night’s sleep) to sanity. But why seek subsidiarity? Well, if you search for the term in Google (one of the great sources of law these days actually), you’ll see that sub‐sidiarity had its origins in Catholic Church doctrine from the late 1800s. So, even the Church once sought subsidiarity. And though this  informa‐tion (subsidiarity’s religious origin) is actually quite interesting,5 I won’t take the time right now to say more about that. Instead,  I’d  like  to discuss what subsidiarity means  in the European Union  context.  As  you  said,  Paul,  the  term  became  prominent  in  1992, around the same time that the European Community was moving towards (developing into) the European Union. I think it’s fair to say that subsidiar‐ity, as it was used then, was a kind of signal to the peoples of Europe who thought (and feared) that Europe was harmonizing too quickly, becoming one  single  “State.”  To  counter  (or  slow  down)  that  trend,  the  European Community, and  later the Union, could “put the brakes on,”  if you will, by using the subsidiarity concept. In  Danish  we  “translate”  (or  re‐write)  the  term  subsidiarity  to something  we  call—get  ready—“nærhedsprincippet.”6  This  is  (literally) the  “closeness‐principle,”  the  idea  that  decisions  should  be  taken  as closely as possible to the citizens. I think that (our own freely translated) version serves to explain the ideological aspect of subsidiarity. And  then  we  have  the  more  technical,  “constitutional”  aspect  of subsidiarity, and this is the idea that the European Union does not (or at least should not) take action unless such (centralized/federalized/ Euro‐pean) action is deemed to be more effective than action taken at the na‐tional  level.7  The Union  should,  in  other words,  not  go  beyond what  is “necessary.” But even that,  I would venture to say (and I’m not a constitutional scholar), is also at the moment a kind of an ideological concept. It’s just a signal; it hasn’t really “put the brakes on.” Denmark did, to be sure, send a shockwave through the Community by voting “No” to the Union in 1992, and for a brief period our “no” put the brakes on the entire unionization of Europe. So it was perhaps then appropriate that the European Council sent the signal of subsidiarity, saying: “Don’t worry Denmark; we’re not 
 
 5. Interested readers can easily obtain a wealth of information on this subject. See, 
e.g., Google, http://www.google.com/ (search “subsidiarity, Catholic Church”) (last visited Oct. 
5, 2008). 
 6. Pronounced in Danish (something) like this: nair–heds–prin–seep–it. 
 7. Except in the areas within its “exclusive competence,” see Europa Glossary, 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2008), and we 
can leave that exception alone, since it does not concern us here today. 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going to take over more than is absolutely necessary in terms of federal‐izing European law.” The more recent (draft) European Constitution—which was subse‐quently renamed the (draft) Reform Treaty (to make  it sound less “fed‐eral,”  I  suppose)—includes  provisions  purportedly  enhancing  the principle of subsidiarity.8 As expressed in the Treaty on the European Un‐ion,9  the  principle  “is  intended  to  ensure  that  decisions  are  taken  as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks are made as to whether action at Community level is justified in light of the possibilities available at the national, regional or local level.”10 Together with this new version of the subsidiarity principle, the Re‐form Treaty establishes an “Early Warning System,” which gives the indi‐vidual EU Member States the chance to say: “Wait, please don’t federalize 
that,  if you are going  in that direction.” Essentially,  the warning system permits national parliaments to “ask the Commission to review a legisla‐tive  proposal  if  they  consider  that  it  violates  the  principle.”11 Well,  as  I said, I am going to be looking at this from the point of view of a “private” lawyer,  and  since  the  term  “private  law”  (in  Danish:  privatret)  sounds more European than American, I’ll try to explain it this way: Private law is, quite simply, what I do. It’s not a strange thing. In some legal systems, I should say, the distinction between private and public law has technical and important significance. We have a scholar here today, Ralf Michaels, who has written about that,12 and all I want to say is that in Denmark the distinction  is of no particular significance.  It’s  just a convenient division of labor among faculty members. Some “do” private law and some public law.  People who  do  public  law  concern  themselves with  constitutional law, criminal law, administrative law, whereas the people who do private law  do  things  like  contracts,  torts  and  property.  I  “do”  obligations  and that includes contractual obligations, as well as delictual obligations (the 
 
 8. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Community, Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidi-
arity and Proportionality, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 150, available at 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML [hereinafter Lisbon 
Treaty]. 
 9. See also Treaty on European Union, tit. II, art. G(B)(5), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 
191) 1, amended by Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 5, para. 2, 
Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 57. 
10. See generally Europa Glossary, supra note 7. 
11. See Europa Glossary, Together 50 Years - Subsidiarity, http://www.together 
50years.eu/EN/gloss/index.htm. 
12. See generally Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, “Private Law Beyond the State? Euro-
peanization, Globalization, Privatization.” 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 843 (2006). 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things  you  call  torts),  and  I  also  do  private  international  law  and  com‐parative law as they relate to contract and tort. Now,  that  is  a  non‐American way  of  doing  things,  I  think.  In  the United States, and even in much of Europe, private international law, also known as conflicts of law, is something that is done by specialists, and I think that we have some of those specialists with us today. In Europe, in Denmark at  least,  it  is not uncommon for the person doing contracts to be  responsible  for  comparing  (e.g.) Danish  contract  law to  the  contract law  of  other  legal  systems—contracts  in  German  law,  American  law etc.—and also  to address  related  conflict‐of‐laws matters,  including  the applicable law (choice of law). So I do these things too. It’s a system (divi‐sion  of  labor)  which  has  both  advantages  and  disadvantages,  which  I won’t go  into now.  I  just wanted to explain what I mean by private law when I talk about it. And now I would like to take you on an imaginary trip, a tour from the Duke  University  Law  School,  located  on  Science  Drive  in  Durham,  North Carolina, to the place I work in Copenhagen, which is on Studiestræde (that means “Study Street,” which is quite similar to the German term). There are, of course, various ways to get to Denmark from Duke. If you were to go eastward, as the crows or  jets  fly,  towards what  is now the tiny Kingdom of Denmark, you would pass by parts of  the  formerly 
enormous  Kingdom  of  Denmark.  We  ruled  Greenland  (which  we  still “rule,”  though  they wouldn’t  like me  to  say  it  that way;  they now have “home rule”). Denmark also ruled most of Norway and even part of Swe‐den  at  one  time.  It  was  indeed  an  enormous  kingdom,  and  a  mighty one—you know, the Vikings and all of that. But, we could also approach Denmark from the south, which I think is more  interesting today, because  if we came up that way,  the way the Roman  Legions  did,  we would  pass  through  what  is  now  the  German Duchy  of  Schleswig,  and we would  pass  the  Eider  River.  But  if we  did what the Romans did, we would actually stop at the Eider, because there is (or at least was) a stone there saying (excuse my Latin): Eidora Romani 
Terminus  Imperii,  (i.e.)  “The Roman  Empire  Stops Here.”13  And  that  in‐scription  remains  significant  today, because  the  “Civil  law”  stops  there, too. And  it  is  incorrect,  although a  common error,  to  include Scandina‐vian law within the Civil law group of law families. There are, to be sure, numerous similarities between Scandinavian and  Civil  law;  many  of  them  came  afterwards,  when  we  stole  or  bor‐rowed or  imitated a  lot of German principles  in certain  fields,  including 
 
13. See, e.g., Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search "Eider River") (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2008). 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private  law.  But  the  Scandinavian  States  never  adopted  the  super‐structure of the Civil law system, and that fact might help you understand some of the things I am going to say about the Scandinavian position on the world comparative map, and more specifically, the Danish position. Before  moving  further  in  that  direction,  however,  I  thought  that  it might be appropriate to say something about the societal context, “where I’m coming from,” if you will, after living and working in Denmark for some 35  years.  Denmark  is  the  oldest  kingdom  in  the world.  It was  originally ruled by King Knud14  (his Danish name was  later translated as  “Canute”) and the Viking tribe that he led. And the term “tribe” is still used about the Danish people, because Denmark is such a tightly knit society, such a small and nearly homogeneous society  that  it  is often figuratively speaking de‐scribed as a tribe. And I’ll give you some examples of that. Today, we’re not only a kingdom; we’re also a modern Welfare State. That’s Welfare with a capital “W” (welfare is not a dirty word for us). And ours is also an extremely Democratic society (another key Dan‐ish word). Today, as fate would have it, there is a parliamentary election in Denmark.15 It is a very closely contested election, and it looks like we are  going  to  go  over  85%  in  terms  of  voter  turnout, which  is  going  to break the Danish record. And that is also the highest voter‐participation in the world, if we exclude the countries where you must vote (by law). So, we are going to break our own record today. And when we do that, 98% of the people who cast their votes will be represented by poli‐ticians with seats  in the Danish Parliament (Folketing).16  It  is not a win‐ner‐take‐all system, which is not so unusual for parliamentary democra‐cies, but it is unusual when the cutoff or borderline is as low as 2%, as it is in Denmark, and that means that nearly everyone in Denmark is repre‐sented  in  Parliament  by  someone who  shares his or her  political  view, and that  fact, some of us think, may contribute to the very peaceful na‐ture of the Danish society. If people want to “do battle” and argue about things, they do it in the Parliament and not on the streets. Well, what else should  I say about Danish society? Other key words on my list here  include Compromise, Realism,  and Pragmatism.  I’ll  be re‐turning to these  concepts, but  I should also mention Secularity: Denmark might well be the  least religious country  in the world. Don’t be  fooled by the large symbol on the Danish flag; ours is a very secular society. We don’t 
 
14. Pronounced: Keh-nood (as in “noodle”). 
15. The election in Denmark was held on the same date as this Bernstein Memorial Lec-
ture at Duke University School of Law: 13 November 2007. 
16. See Folketinget, http://www.folketinget.dk (follow “English” hyperlink) (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2008). 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have politicians talking about religion during our elections, at  least not in the sense of wearing their religion (if they have one) on their sleeves.17 We  also  have  great  Prosperity  in Denmark.  The Danish Kroner  is strong (we don’t have the Euro, but we have linked ourselves firmly to it). And we  have  a  concept  called  Flexicurity,18  which  even  the  French  are thinking  about  imitating:  security  and  flexibility  in  the  job market. We have “S & M” as well: do you know what that is? Socialized Medicine! And we are happy about  that. We don’t  really  call  it  that; we  just  call  it  the Healthcare  System.19  But  everyone  in  Denmark  is  covered  by  it,  and  it works fairly well. Sharing, Honesty and Happiness. We are also “number one” in these categories.20  Denmark  is  on  top  in  Sharing  in  the  sense  of  having  the smallest disparity between rich and poor  in the world (closely  followed by,  I  think,  Bangladesh, which  is  of  course  on  a  different  scale).21  Den‐mark also has  lots of Honesty,  in  the sense  that we have—according  to the people who do these surveys,  I don’t know how they do them—the least corruption in the world.22 And then there’s Happiness: how do they measure that? Well, however they measure it, they tell us that we are the happiest people in the world.23 Some have contested that and said: “Well, you Danes don’t have very high expectations; that’s why.” 
 
17. See generally Paul Zuckerman, Society Without God: What The Least Religious Na-
tions Can Tell Us About Contentment (2008). During a press conference televised on Danish 
public television on 28 February 2007, the Danish Prime Minister said: “In my opinion, we 
should have less religion in the public space (det offentlige rum).” Fogh Strongly Condemns 
Religious Særhensyn, Dr Nyheder, Feb. 28, 2007, http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Politik 
/2007/02/28/113931.htm. See John Hansen & Kim Hundevadt, The Cartoon Crisis—How It 
Unfolded, Udland.Jp.Dk, Mar. 11, 2008, http://jp.dk/udland/ article1292543.ece (regarding the 
Danish “Cartoon Crisis,” which engendered considerable political debate in Denmark and 
elsewhere, both about religion and freedom of speech). 
18. See, e.g., Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search “Flexicurity”) (last visited Oct. 
5, 2008). 
19. In Danish: Sundhedssystemmet. 
20. According to various surveys easily accessible in Google. See infra notes 21–23 
and accompanying text. 
21. . See, e.g., Financial Security–Income Distribution, http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/ 
indicator.jsp?lang=en&indicatorid=22 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (describing the Gini coeffi-
cient, which measures income disparity, ranged from 22.5 for Denmark to 48 for Mexico). 
22. Tied for first place with Finland and New Zealand. Infoplease, The 2006 Transpar-
ency International Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/ 
A0781359.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (providing the 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index 
scores). See also Christian Bjørnskov, Combating Corruption: On the Interplay Between Insti-
tutional Quality and Social Trust (unpublished and undated manuscript, on file with the 
author). 
23. This has been the case for several years running. See Denmark ‘Happiest’       
Country in the World, CNN, July 2, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/07/02 
/nations.happiness/; Denmark ‘Happiest Place on Earth,’ BBC News, July 28, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5224306.stm. 
2009   Desperately Seeking Subsidiarity 
 
119 
We are also “number one” in some other categories, including—this is  the  downside  I  guess—Taxation.  Of  course,  you  need  high  Taxation (and Sharing) to get  the very, very small disparity between the wealthy and the poor; we have, in fact, no “poor” in Denmark in the sense that you (in America) understand poor. That is the result of heavy taxation, heav‐ily progressive heavy taxation. But Danish people pay it willingly, and the voting  (in  the  Parliamentary  election)  today  is  not  about  whether  we should have  less  taxes, but  rather about whether we should  reorganize the taxes. Moonlighting is another negative: it seems we have the highest rate of moonlighting in the civilized world.24 Teenage Drinking—we have a lot of that too. And then we have problems associated with what I might la‐bel “Tribal Initiation.” I’m not sure whether we are first in that category, but we certainly have had a lot of publicity about it, especially as regards “initiating” foreign newcomers as Members of the Danish Tribe, which is, as  I  said,  a  societal  system  characterized  by  high participatory Democ‐racy and high Sharing (redistribution of wealth). These things have been hard for some newcomers to understand, and so it’s been hard for them to become Members of the Danish Tribe.25 Well, now that you know the societal background, or at least some‐thing about it, I return to the subject of Danish private law. My first Dan‐ish private law book was a book called “Den Borgerlige Ret.” This was in 1975, in my first course in elementary Danish contract law. This was my first “hornbook,” if you will. I have it with me here today, and I’d like to translate one sentence in it. It says this: “Article 1 (§ 1) of the Danish Con‐tracts Act  lays down  the  fundamental  rule  that promises and contracts are legally binding.” I read that a  few times in 1975: “Promises—and therefore also con‐tracts—are  legally  binding.” And  then  I began another kind of desperate search,  desperately  seeking  (but  not  finding)  some  key  concepts  I  had learned during my American legal education, things like “consideration,”26 writing requirements and other formalities. And if you searched today (in‐
 
24. Also sometimes referred to as the “black economy.” The Danish Tax Department 
considers “[m]oonlighting [to be] when you are offered and accept a job where neither you nor 
your employer informs SKAT [the Tax Authorities] about the employment and the pay        
you receive.” SKAT, Tax In Denmark, 18 (2005) available at http://www.skat.dk/ 
Vejledninger/Personserien/Pnr_37_eng2005.pdf. 
25. Author's note: Lest I be accused of jingoism, I'll readily admit that my lecture state-
ment on this point oversimplifies a complex set of related problems—some of them also at-
tributable to the way some Native (born-in-Denmark) Tribal Members treat newcomers to 
Danish territory. 
26. E.g. Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (search “consideration”) (last visited Oct. 5, 
2008) (defining consideration as the “value paid for a promise”). 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stead of  in 1975) you might, as an American‐educated jurist, also look for (but not find) the Law and Economics concept of “efficient breach.” Well, I searched for some of these things in 1975, but I found none of  them.  There  is  no  consideration  requirement  in Danish  law.  Indeed, there are, quite simply no formalities at all. No contract needs to be “sup‐ported” by consideration, nor does any contract need to in writing. Nor  do  many  Danish  jurists  concern  themselves  with  “efficient breach,”  not  even  today,  and  there  are  several  reasons  for  this.  There happens to be an article in the American Journal of Comparative Law this month which explains why many Civil law systems are not interested in efficient breach.27 I won’t go into that in detail, but I will say that the core explanation for us is that promises are not only “legally binding” in Den‐mark; they are also morally binding, and so how could Danish lawyers go out and encourage people to (efficiently) breach their promises? It would not work very well. So, in our “homemade” (pre‐EC and pre‐EU) version of Danish private law, promises are binding, period, Well, at least all rea­
sonable promises  are  binding,  because  there’s  another  rule  in  the  Con‐tracts Act which guards against unreasonable  contract  terms.28 That  too applies  to  all  contracts:  consumer  contracts,  contracts  between  mer‐chants, whatever. There are, to be sure, weak and strong merchants, and the  prohibition  against  unreasonable  terms,  including  promises  which would  be  unreasonable  to  enforce,  is  applied more  restrictively  as  be‐tween merchants, but it’s there and it’s the same rule. As for our “homemade”  law of Torts,  I’ll mention one principle now, and I’ll  follow up with a more concrete illustration later.  Imagine that we have a defective product, and that a consumer who buys that that product is injured. The seller of the product is liable under Danish law. Why is the seller  liable? Because  the Danish  judges who make  (judge‐made) private law decided that he should be liable. Is that a contractual principle? No, be‐cause the legislators who wrote the Danish Sales Act29 more than 100 years ago  were  of  the  opinion  that  contractual  rules  were  not  well‐suited  for product liability cases. So even the immediate seller’s liability is based on a tort  principle,  but  it’s  a  (near)  strict  liability  principle:  you  can  sue  the seller  with  whom  you  have  a  contractual  relationship—or  even  if  you don’t, a member of your family can sue him—and the seller will be held li‐
 
27. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Why No Efficient Breach in the Civil Law?: A Comparative 
Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 Am. J. Comp. L. 721, 721 
(2007). 
28. See Aftalelov, 1986-96, § 36 (Den.) translated in http://www.sprog.asb.dk/ 
sn/Danish%20Contracts%20Act.pdf [hereinafter Aftalelov].   29.  Købeloven, (1906), as subsequently amended, translated in http://www.sprog. asb.dk/sn/Danish%20Sale%20of%20Goods%20Act.pdf. 
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able unless he can prove that the producer is (without fault and therefore) not liable. This was at least the law made by our judges. I’ll return to a more concrete example, which  illustrates  how EU  law has  changed our  law  in this area, in a minute.30 I  realize  that  I’m  presenting  a  rather  abrupt  list  of  rules,  but  I  do want to mention another private  law rule now, one that applies to both contract and tort, and that rule says: no unreasonable compensation. Not only are unreasonable contract terms not binding in Denmark, but even when  a  binding  promise  is  broken,  the  party  injured  is not  necessarily entitled  to  full‐blown  “expectation  protection.”  There’s  a  regulatory mechanism,  codified  by  statute  actually, which  limits  compensation  (in both  contract  and  tort)  to what a Danish  judge would  consider to be a “reasonable” amount.31 So,  you  see,  the  reasonableness‐principle  pervades Danish  private law.  I  have  one  nice  illustration  of  the  fact  that  unreasonable  contract terms do not bind. Our daughter Sarah  is  living  in New York now. She’s going  to be married  in  the Kingdom of Denmark  this  summer,  and  she was  in the process of contracting with a Danish provider of services  for her  wedding.  When  she  found  the  standard  terms  of  one  prospective provider online, she sent me an e‐mail with a link to them, asking: “Dad, can  I  click  yes  to  this?”  I  answered  her  without  even  looking:  “Don’t worry  about  that,”  I  said,  “because  even  if  there  are  any  unreasonable terms in there, they’re not binding.” So she clicked yes, and that was that. I looked at those terms later, by the way, and they were quite reason‐able, from a Danish point of view. There was, for one thing, no arbitration clause  among  them.  Such  a  clause  might  not  be  unreasonable  per  se  in Denmark, but we simply don’t have any Danish merchants who include ar‐bitration  clauses  in  their  consumer  contracts, probably  because  the mer‐chants  would  not  expect  them  to  bind.  I  think  our  general  prohibition against unreasonable contract terms reflects a more paternalistic attitude than the corresponding, yet “milder” rule in the United States, i.e., the rule that  “unconscionable”  promises  are  not  binding.  I  think  that  “unreason‐able” is, as it sounds, a more flexible and more intrusive term than uncon‐scionable. I wouldn’t say that the difference is enormous, but it certainly is a difference in spirit. I think it’s time to move on now and say something about the sources of  Danish  private  law—where  do  all  these  rules  that  I’m  talking  about 
 
30. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
31. See Erstatningsansvarsloven [Liability for Damages Act], No. 885 (2005) (Den.) § 
24, translated in http://uk.patientforsikringen.dk/legislation/erstatningsansvarsloven.html 
[herein after Erstatningsansvarsloven]. 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come from? These flexible and open‐ended legal rules, the sources of what I’ve been calling “home‐made”(i.e.) Danish‐made private law. First, I’d like to highlight the word for “law” in the Scandinavian le‐gal systems. The Scandinavian languages are very close on this point: the word for law is “ret” in Danish, “rett” in Norwegian, and “rät” in Swedish (we have a Swede here in the audience today: am I doing this well?). In‐terestingly,  all  these  versions  of  the  word mean more  than  just  “law,” they also mean right. The Scandinavian word for  law is the same as the Scandinavian word  for  right. There’s  something nice about  that. Maybe I’m being a bit sentimental, but I think there’s something nice about that. What  about  statutes  and  legislative  codifications?  The  word  for “law” can also be used to mean (a) “formal law” in the sense of a legisla‐tive  enactment,  a  statute.  That  helps  explain  why  my  heading  on  this point  is: Make  love, not codes.  I  took a copyright on that phrase (by tag‐ging a © to it in my Power Point), because I thought it was quite cute. (I used to be a copyright lawyer at United Artists Corporation, you know.) Well, the fact is that the plural of the Danish word for law happens to be “love,” but this plural form is pronounced—not like you pronounce “love” in English, but  rather—as a  two syllable word:  low—vuh.  Say  the word for  law  in  the  singular,  and  it’s pronounced  “low.”  Say  the plural,  how‐ever, and you can hear the “v” (in vuh). But my main point here  is  that Danes make  laws; they don’t make 
Codes. Danish legislators have been enacting statutes on private law sub‐jects  for  centuries,  but  they  have  never  enacted  a  comprehensive  Civil Code. As I said earlier,  the Roman Empire (and Roman law) stopped at the Eider River,32 and that helps explain why we never got a general Civil Code, as in France and Germany and other Civil law systems. These days, when the European Union  is moving, step by step,  towards a European Civil Code,33 we Danish jurists are nervous about that. We have never had a Code; we don’t have the tradition for it; and we are worried about it. What we do have at the “home‐made” level are a few basic pieces of legislation within the private law area, the most notable being the Danish Sales Act.34  It’s quite similar  in  its coverage to Article 2 of the American UCC.35  Another  key  Danish  statute  is  the  Contracts  Act,  which  has  a 
 
32. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
33. See generally Towards A European Civil Code (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2004). The seemingly innocuous “Common Frame of Reference” is, in my view, just the first 
slice of the coming, fully codified pie. For recent developments, see, e.g., Study Group on a 
European Civil Code, http://www.sgecc.net/pages/en/home/index.welcome.htm (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2008). See also infra notes 50, 69 and accompanying text. 
34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
35. U.C.C. art. 2 (2004). 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broader  field  of  application:  it  applies  not  just  to  sales  transactions;  it also covers other contractual topics (which the UCC covers with respect to sales), such as contract  formation. The prohibition against unreason‐able  contract  terms, which  I mentioned previously,36  is  in the Contracts Act.37 And then there’s the Liability for Damages Act,38 which tells judges how to measure liability, particularly in tort cases. The Liability Act also contains the general  liability‐limitation I  told you about,39  so that plain‐tiffs don’t get unreasonable compensation (in contract or tort). These,  I think, are our main private law statutes. But we also have judge‐made  law in Denmark.  Indeed, since we have relatively  little (de‐tailed) statutory regulation, we have to rely on quite a lot of judge‐made law. That probably doesn’t surprise the American audience here. But our judge‐made  law might well  surprise  a  Civilian  jurist. We Danish  jurists don’t regard our judges as do the French, for example, as the “bouche de 
la  loi”—the mouthpiece  of  the  (French)  legislature.  Our  Danish  judges really make  law,  and everyone  recognizes  it. But  they make  it  in  a way that is different from the way it’s made here in the States. It’s made in a way that is less obvious. For one thing, our judges write very brief decisions. The longest part of a Danish judgment simply accounts for the  facts of the case and the ar‐guments of the opposing lawyers. The decision itself and the rationale un‐derlying  that  decision—the  ratio,  sometimes  also  referred  to  as  the premises  (præmisserne)—are  very  briefly  stated,  usually  fitting  within  a single paragraph. The premises need only send a brief “signal” as regards the main factors that have gone into the judge’s decision, because the judge is not trying to “set a precedent,” he’s trying to decide the concrete case. I know a fair amount about this aspect of Danish law, because I of‐ten work with judges. I work with them not only because Danish judges also sometimes serve as arbitrators (and so I sometimes get to sit on ar‐bitration tribunals with them), but also because Danish judges also serve as external examiners (censors), helping us grade Danish law school ex‐ams. When we talk about the solutions to a complicated problem on an essay exam in the law of contracts, for example, or in the law of tort, the judges often have the outcome  in mind. These judges are, of course, not ignoring the applicable rules, but it’s not necessarily the rules that push them towards the outcome. It’s rather as if they first sense the outcome—what they feel is just and right (which goes back to the fact that they too went  to  law  school)—and  then  they  test  that  result  by  looking  at  the 
 
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
37. See Aftalelov, supra note 28. 
38. See Erstatningsansvarsloven, supra note 31. 
39. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 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premises (the ratio—which in an exam situation is set forth in the “model answer”) to see if the premises do indeed “lead” to that just result. Is that putting  the horse  before  the  cart  or  the  cart  before  the horse?  I’m  not sure.  It’s  something  which  Patrick  Attiyah  from  England  (I  think  he’s been at this law school as well), has called reasoning backwards. It’s not a concept to which we claim copyright, but it’s something which we adhere to in practice.40 I think the result of all of this is that Danish private law is made up of  two main  components,  statutory  law  and  judge‐made  law,  each  in  a special  Danish  variation,  what  you  might  call  “legislation  light”  and “precedent light.” For these reasons, among others, the Danish system is an unusual system. I can see that I have to move along now if I want to get to some con‐crete examples, so that  I can  illustrate how Danish  law is characterized by pragmatism as well as realism. My  first  example,  inspired by a  real Danish  case,41  concerns a guy named Mr. Skov. He’s a farmer who runs an egg business, producing eggs. He sells  the eggs to “Bilka”, a  large Danish supermarket (a bit  like Wal‐Mart), and two consumers (named Jette and Michael) who buy those eggs from Bilka and make what Danes  call  an  “egg  cake.” As  it  turns out the eggs are tainted with salmonella, and the consumers become seriously ill. Who can they sue? Well,  if we apply traditional (pre EC/EU) Danish  judge‐made (pro‐consumer) rules to decide this one,42 the consumers don’t need to locate the egg‐producer (Mr. Skov, whose name isn’t on the box anyway). They just  go  right  to  the  supermarket  (Bilka)  and  let  that middleman‐seller worry about who ultimately might be  left holding the bag  (i.e., Bilka or Mr. Skov). This product  liability action against the supermarket  is not a contractual action under Danish law.43 It’s a tort action based on Danish judge‐made rules of law. I suspect the nature of the judge‐made law un‐derlying  this  action was  later misunderstood by  the European Court of Justice,44 but please excuse me if I’m wrong about that. 
 
40. See Joseph Lookofsky, The Limits of Commercial Contract Freedom: Under the 
UNIDROIT 'Restatement' and Danish Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 485, 490 & n.33 (1998). 
41. The facts here are inspired by Danish (City and High Court) decisions which led to 
the preliminary ruling issued on 10 Jan. 2006 by the European Court of Justice. Case C-
402/03, Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199. 
42. As did the lower (City) court judge. Id. para. 16. 
43. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
44. See Skov, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199. Although a detailed explanation of the basis for my 
disagreement with the ECJ ruling lies outside the scope of the present (lecture) discussion, 
my main point is that a better understanding of the nature of the Danish judge-made rules of 
(tort) liability by the ECJ might well have led to an interpretation of Article 13 of the Product 
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Another example, also based on a real Danish case:45  Two Danes pre‐pare to go on a hunting trip. They find each other by way of a hunting jour‐nal  in  Denmark.  They  rent  a  car  in  Scotland  and  buy  insurance  there  in accordance  with  Scottish  law.  They  have  an  accident,  and  the  passenger dies  due  to  the  driver’s  negligence  (no  question  about  that).  The widow then tries to sue the Danish driver  in Denmark, but the defendant argues that the action is time‐barred under Scottish law, because the lawyer hired by the widow waited more than three years before commencing legal ac‐tion against the driver. But the action is not time‐barred under Danish law, because  here we  have  a  five year  statute  of  limitations.  How  should  the judges in the Danish Court of Appeal decide? If we  translate  the  essence  of  the  decision—it  fills  no more  than  a small  paragraph—we  see  that  the  judges  quickly  list  the  main  factors which they found relevant, and then briefly add their conclusion (the out‐come) to that. It goes something like this: the accident occurred in Scotland in a car registered there, and the driver was covered by compulsory Scot‐tish insurance. For these reasons, the dispute should be governed by Scot‐tish law, and so the action is time‐barred.46 Now you might not  like the reasoning or the result, but you have to think about  it.  In the well‐considered view of one Danish professor (who later  became a Danish  Supreme Court  judge),  the outcome  (time‐bar)  in this case was hardly “dictated” by the  formalistic application of choice‐of‐law rules. Quite the contrary: the outcome was quite likely rather the result of pragmatic considerations and the principle of reasonableness.47 In other words,  it was  not  so much a  question of how  to make  the (formal) choice of law between Scottish and Danish law (and their respec‐tive time‐bars), but rather a question of how to reach the “best” result, i.e., 
 
Liability Directive which preserved the viability of the Danish (middleman-liability) rule. See 
infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
45. Based on the decision of the Danish High Court, reported in [B] Ugeskrift for 
Retsvæsen 886 (1982). 
46. For a more accurate translation, see Joseph Lookofsky & Ketilbjorn Hertz, Eupil. 
European Union Private International Law In Contract And Tort (forthcoming 2009), which 
reads as follows: The accident occurred in Scotland while [defendant] and [plaintiff] used a 
car registered in that country, which was covered by compulsory liability insurance according 
to Scots law. Therefore, the dispute should be governed by Scots law. The [plaintiffs] are de-
barred from starting legal proceedings in Scotland pursuant to section 17 of the Prescription 
and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, as the statutory 3-year period has elapsed. The High 
Court finds that this provision cannot be disregarded in proceedings commenced in a Danish 
court even though it is [or at least was, when this decision was rendered] a procedural rule 
under Scots law. Consequently, the High Court finds for [the defendant]. 
47. See Jørgen Nørregard in [B] Ugeskrift For Retsvæsen 47 (1985). “Should the fact 
that the lawyer chosen by the plaintiff (herself) did nothing (for more than 3 years) affect the 
outcome of the plaintiff’s case, especially considering that this same failure removed the de-
fendant from the shelter of Scottish insurance coverage?” 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the most reasonable result, or the “least unfair” result. Should the court let the widow suffer because of the negligence of the driver? Or should  it let the  driver  suffer  because  the widow  chose  a  lawyer who  took  no  action against that driver until the insurance protecting him had expired?48 Tough decision. The  judges  in  the Danish High Court of Appeal made what they thought was the “right call,” and they could do it that way because the ap‐plicable (Danish) judge‐made rule of private international law was flexible, so as not to “dictate” an unreasonable result  in a difficult situation.  I can’t give you all the details of this, I haven’t got the time. Too many of you will leave if I did it. This was, at any rate, the (pre‐EU) way Danish judges used to handle many cases like these. If we imagine a time‐line depicting the development of Danish private  law, we would see how Denmark moved from a period where we made all our own laws to the year when Denmark joined the EC. That was  in 1972. Twenty years  later,  the concept of subsidiarity was  in‐troduced in response to the Danish “no” to the European Union (in 1992). Later, Denmark  joined that Union (with 4 notable  “reservations” or  “opt‐outs”),49 and the Union subsequently moved Denmark and the other Mem‐ber States further in the direction of private law federalization. Ultimately, I fear we may get “total” private law harmonization: a European Civil Code. We  are  certainly moving  in  that  direction.50  I’m  in  the minority  on this, one of the relatively  few academics resisting the creeping federaliza‐tion of Danish private  law. And since we in the minority can hardly with‐stand  the  “full‐court  press”  being  exerted  by  our  European  opponents,  I know we can’t win the game. Where is this process of federalization taking us? We’re moving away from the Danish rule which simply says that contracts are unenforceable if the  enforcement would  be  unreasonable,  taking  into  account  all  the  cir‐cumstances. That’s our Contracts Act rule from 1976.51 Here’s where we’re going: to a list of 17 presumptively unfair terms from Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.52 
 
48. Id. 
49. The recent Irish “no” to the Lisbon Treaty, supra note 8, has had the effect of ce-
menting the Danish opt-outs, at least for the time-being. See Bruno Waterfield, Denmark 
Calls Off Vote on EU Opt-outs, Telegraph (U.K.), Aug. 8, 2008, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/denmark/2522903/Denmark-calls-off-
voteon-EU-opt-outs.html. 
50. See generally Joseph Lookofsky, The Harmonization of Private and Commercial 
Law: “Towards a European Civil Code,” 39 Scandinavian Stud. L. 111 (2000), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky14.html. 
51. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
52. See Council Directive 93/13, art. 3(3), 1993 O.J. (L 095) (EC). 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That’s the way the EU does things like that, by listing detailed exam‐ples. They tell you, “this is unfair, this is unfair, this unfair” and so on. To be sure, we in Denmark don’t necessarily disagree with these EU details. We’d agree, for example, that arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are pre‐sumptively  unfair.53  But  we  don’t  want  to  clutter  our  Contracts  Act  and “pollute”  its  legislative  simplicity with  all  these  details.  So Denmark  and Sweden decided to implement the Directive of Unfair Contract Terms with­
out including all these details, by simply continuing to ban (all) unreason‐able contract terms. We got sued by the EC for not including the “Grey List” of seventeen (17) unreasonable terms from the Directive in our legislative text,  and  luckily we won, since the European Court of  Justice agreed that our non‐inclusion of the grey list in the black letter of our statute did not provide proof that we planned to ignore the list.54 Now,  how  would  our  example  about  the  salmonella‐tainted  eggs turn out now that the EC court has  issued a preliminary ruling on that? Not  the  same  result  as  before.55  These  poor  consumers  cannot  sue  the supermarket  on  the  basis  of  our  traditional  judge‐made  rules,  because we now know, having been brought into the EC court twenty years after our implementation of the Product Liability Directive,56 that Article 13 of the Directive does not leave room for the Danish judge‐made rules which would allow the consumers to sue the supermarket. This is the way that the EC court interpreted the Directive, and I think that they may have in‐terpreted it in this way because they didn’t fully understand the nature of tort  liability under Danish  judge‐made  law. They  said we could make a supplementary fault‐based rule.57 We could also make a contractual rule, as England has, and I think we’re going to have to do it now because we need to reinstate an action against sellers, but I doubt whether we’ll get back to our previous pro‐consumer state.58 What about the decision reached by the Danish  court  in the case of the accident in Scotland?59 We would not be able to make that kind of deci‐
 
53. Id. at Annex (q). 
54. See Case C-478/99, Comm'n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-4147, para. 24. 
55. See Case C-402/03, Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus, 2006 E.C.R. I-00199, para. 
45. 
56. Council Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
May 1999 amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regula-
tions and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products, 1999 O.J. (L141/20) (EC). 
57. Denmark has now done so (in a recent revision of the Danish Product Liability Act) 
by basing the seller's liability on fault, although with a “reversed burden of proof” on the fault 
issuethus creating a (pro-consumer) rule which might not be able to withstand scrutiny in 
the ECJ. 
58. See supra note 57. 
59. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 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sion anymore, at least not under Rome II.60 The judges can’t make their call as to what they think is the right decision in this kind of case, because the EU wants to have more  “certainty” when it  comes to  choice of  law. They want  every  judge  in  the  European Union  to make  the  same  decision—it doesn’t matter whether it’s a good decision or a good result. They want all judges in a situation like this to base their decision on lex communis. Since the  two parties  concerned  come  from Denmark,  it  should be Danish  law which applies, so the action would not be time‐barred today.61 I’m overdramatizing to be sure. But, I don’t like the idea that we can‐not continue to decide a case like this on the basis of what is right: on the basis of the result, by putting the result before the more technical premises. In  fact, I have even complained to the Ministry of Justice, arguing that the Rome I Regulation (on the  law applicable  in contractual matters)62 would put us into a “straight jacket.” And the same certainly goes for Rome II (on the law applicable in tort).63 Unfortunately,  I  don’t  have  time  to  tell  you  more  about  that.  The global situation, at least, is better. The global situation is better because it’s more  flexible.  Denmark  ratified  the  New  York  Convention,64  as  did  the United States, and the Convention requires that each Contracting State rec‐ognize an arbitration agreement “in writing.”65 There’s a big debate about this  rule  these  days  (those  of  you who  do  arbitration  know  about  this): what’s “in writing,” and what’s not? We in Denmark don’t much care, since under Danish law, no agreement (of any kind) needs to be in writing. And luckily most people  interpret  the New York Convention to allow  for that. 
 
60. See Commission Regulation 864/2007, art. 4(2), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 44 [hereinaf-
ter Rome II]. The purpose of the Rome II Regulation, adopted in 2007, is to harmonize (and 
thus replace) the national conflict-of-laws rules previously applied by the courts of the individ-
ual EU Member States. The Rome II Regulation will enter into force in all EU Member States 
except Denmark on 11 January 2009, and the Regulation will remain inapplicable in Den-
mark, unless and until Denmark withdraws its reservation to the EU treaty as regards legal 
and home affairs. The Danish situation as regards the Rome II Regulation is thus the same 
as regards Denmark's position vis-à-vis the Rome I Regulation. Regarding Rome I and Rome 
II, see generally Lookofsky & Hertz, supra note 46. 
61. See Rome II, supra note 60, art. 4(2). There is a narrow safety valve in Article 4(3) 
of the Rome II Regulation, id. art. 4(3), which would hardly affect the outcome in a case like 
this. See Lookofsky & Hertz, supra note 46. 
62. See Europa, Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome 
Convention), http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33109.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008). 
63. See Europa, The law applicable to non-contractual obligationsThe Rome II Regu-
lation, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l16027.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008). 
64. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21, U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
65. Id. art. II. 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You must  at  least  respect  arbitration  agreements  in writing,  but you  can also respect arbitration agreements which are not in writing.66 At  the  global  level  of  commercial  harmonization  we  also  have  the CISG—the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. I’ll just mention Article 16 (in CISG Part II) which says until a contract is con‐cluded an offer may be revoked. And you know about this rule—it’s similar to the American (Common law) rule which permits  the offeror to revoke until  an acceptance has  been dispatched. Well,  since an offer  is  a kind of promise,  the CISG  rule means that (some) promises are not binding. And since that runs counter to the general Danish rule,67 Article 16 might have stood in the way of Denmark’s ratification. But the CISG allowed Denmark to ratify subject to a reservation under Article 92, a declaration saying we would not be bound by CISG Part II. I  myself  have  argued  that we  should  retract  that  CISG  reservation, since I think it causes more harm than it’s worth.68 But the reservation does show  that  it’s  possible  to  create  a  system  of  minimum  harmonization which allows Contracting States to breathe freely, to take account of local traditions, even as we join forces with the larger legal world. Where do we go from here? Should we continue to seek subsidiarity, perhaps even Desperately (with a capital D)? Well, I’ve written a bit about private law harmonization with one of my Danish colleagues,69 and we’ve tried to emphasize that there is, as yet, no real subsidiarity in Europe—nor has any cost‐benefit analysis been undertaken, so as to determine whether these harmonizations are “profitable” or otherwise necessary. But,  as  I’ve  said,  we  skeptics  are  in  the  minority.  Most  jurists  in Europe are seeking (or at  least  content with) more harmonization; some are even seeking a European Civil Code.70 The jurists who prefer to empha‐size the virtues of harmonization are numerous and well‐organized,71 and so I think the skeptical minority is quite likely to lose. Fortunately, I’ve got an alternative to my desperate (and probably fu‐tile)  search  for  subsidiarity.  It’s what you might  call my Danish  “Plan B,” 
 
66. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Law, Report of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law on the Work of Its Thirty-Ninth Session, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/61/17 
(June 19-July 7, 2006). 
67. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
68. See generally Joseph Lookofsky, Alive and Well in Scandinavia: CISG Part II, 18 
J.L. & Com. 289 (1999). 
69. See Mads Bryde Andersen & Joseph Lookofsky, “Nationale Aftaleregler og EUInte-
gration: Problemer & Løsningsmodeller”, Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen, Dept. B., p. 211 (2002). 
70. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. But see generally Pierre Legrand, 
“Against a European Civil Code,” 60 Mod. L. Rev. 44 (1997). 
71. See, e.g., Study Group on a European Civil Code, supra note 33. 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and it’s simply this: Don’t worry, be happy! As I said earlier in this lecture, we Danes are Number One in that.72 I’m going to stop here and just tell you this: I have wonderful memo‐ries of my five visits at Duke and of the great times that I spent with Her‐bert Bernstein and with his wife Waltraud and my wife Vibeke. We were a nice  foursome. And we were  together  in many  places:  in Hamburg,  New York, Athens, Bristol, and—last but not least—here at Duke Law. Thank you very much. 
 
72. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
